Debating Safe Havens Posted by Patrick Barry

Michael notes some excellent points from Paul Pillar's op-ed this morning, but to say that it "expos[es] one of the key flawed assumptions underpinning the US effort in Afghanistan," mis-characterizes an important and unresolved point of contention within the CT\Intel communities over the importance of al-Qaeda central and the role of safe-havens.  Consider Pillar's assertion that "[t]he preparations most important to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks took place not in training camps in Afghanistan but, rather, in apartments in Germany, hotel rooms in Spain and flight schools in the United States."  That's a legitimate reading, but it's also far from incontestable.  Paul Cruickshank had this to say when Steve Walt made a similar argument last month:

9/11 Commission Report and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's interrogation reports make it clear that the key planning for the attacks took place on Afghan soil. It was in an al Qaeda camp in the Kandahar area in late 1999 that Mohammed Atta and his gang were groomed to become suicide bombers and directed to launch the 9/11 attacks.

Any argument disputing the idea that safe-havens matter should have to deal with the legitimate evidence to the contrary.  It has to deal on some level not only with a pretty authoritative interpretation of the attacks on 9/11, but also a more recent body of evidence linking high-profile terrorist attacks or plots with the Afghanistan-Pakistan region (2005 London Bombings, 2006 plot to blow up transatlantic flights, assessment by Brown Government and British CT officials that 3/4 of foiled plots link back to the region). 

That's not to say that Cruickshank is right.  In fact, testimony from senior intelligence officials suggests that a fully-resourced COIN mission might not be integral to the success of CT operations in the region.  And even if it were, Pillar's argument that "[t]hwarting the creation of a physical haven also would have to offset any boost to anti-U.S. terrorism stemming from perceptions that the United States had become an occupier rather than a defender of Afghanistan," is powerful.  There are lots of assumptions worth examining and re-examining.  But it's not enough to point to a shrewd argument say voilà! Assumptions exploded! This debate is far, far from settled. 

Comments

[Dan Kervick]

9/11 Commission Report and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's interrogation reports make it clear that the key planning for the attacks took place on Afghan soil. It was in an al Qaeda camp in the Kandahar area in late 1999 that Mohammed Atta and his gang were groomed to become suicide bombers and directed to launch the 9/11 attacks.

I really can't see how significant this point is, even if true. Do committed militant jihadists in 2009 really have to be "groomed" in any particular physical location? And can't the grooming and planning for a terrorist operation take place almost anywhere, and in an extremely small physical space - even a single room? And even if, per impossibile, we established some sort of panoptical security lockdown over all of Afghanistan, at great cost to the United States, wouldn't militant jihadists just do their thing somewhere else?

The Great Brinks robbery was planned in Boston. That's where the men were recruited; that's where the training was conducted. Waging a sustained and costly war against Afghanistan to put the kibosh on jihadist terrorism makes about as much sense as waging war on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in order to suppress bank robbery.

[Zathras]

If you want to recruit people to rob a bank, you don't need to be sure they are willing to die. You don't need to be sure they aren't compromised or being watched by one of several nations' intelligence services. You don't need to be sure they are prepared for a commitment of years during which time they must maintain their cover and their ideological discipline.

Al-Qaeda in the years before 9/11 needed to be sure of all these things, and as has been documented extensively found Afghanistan under the Taliban very useful for that purpose. It is surely true that there are reasons to think it might not again, even if the Americans and their allies left Afghanistan tomorrow -- ranging from Western intelligence agencies far less complacent about Islamist terrorism than they were before 9/11 to the attrition of al Qaeda's leadership by the Americans to Muslims' decreased admiration of an organization that has claimed so many Muslims among its victims. What is not true, or at least is not an argument that will get opponents of the Obama administration's Afghan policy anywhere, is that we don't need to worry about a terrorist safe haven because we just don't.

Paul Pillar, a serious person where this subject is concerned, does not quite make this argument, but the one he does make doesn't lead us much farther. Once again, an administration critic is "asking questions," intoning that the administration "has not made its case," and proposing as an alternative....well, something else. Nothing specific, nothing that might require stating assumptions that would make one look very foolish if they turned out to be wrong, nothing that grapples with the uncertainties facing the administration. In the end, nothing very helpful.

Though President Obama has, unaccountably, not chosen to share his innermost thoughts about the Afghanistan problem with me, I think it at least possible that he is aware of its contribution to America's fiscal and military overextension and is willing to pursue a course that does not make this wild and backward country a long-term ward of the United States. That course cannot be just any course, something I well believe Obama knows but I doubt many of his critics have thought much about.

[Dan Kervick]

Hello Zathras. I have just a few points to make in response. But the bottom line is this: Certainly we can point to various elements of past terrorist operations that were planned, prepared and carried out in Afghanistan. But that only justifies an effort on the scale of the US operation in Afghanistan if (i) there is some serious prospect that those organizing elements will occur in Afghanistan again on a dangerous scale if the US operation is discontinued, and (ii) those elements cannot be readily transferred elsewhere if Afghanistan is shut down as a hospitable staging ground for terrorism. Otherwise, the costs incurred in Afghanistan don't produce commensurate benefits. I think we have strong reason to doubt both (i) and (ii).

Now just a few isolated points:

1. The Great Brinks Robbery was indeed carefully planned and prepared for over two years, with a well-directed series of detailed steps, including extensive surveillance and elaborate practice runs. The leaders of the gang very carefully recruited and selected the other men, and since the people recruited were skilled, and must have had criminal backgrounds, I imagine that they did indeed need to screen their candidates carefully to make sure that they were not police informants and were not otherwise compromised. So the analogy is closer than you allow. Now, even if Boston had been completely shut down afterward as a hospitable location from which to plan bank robberies and prepare bank robbers, this would hardly make a dent in the national or global rate of bank robberies. By analogy, I don't see how shutting down Afghanistan would, in itself, be expected to make much of dent in terrorism, especially given that the most dangerous recent attacks and attempts don’t seem to have originated there.

2. The 1998 US embassy bombings took place in Africa. Some of the perpetrators appear to have received training in Afghanistan. But others were home-grown and locally trained.

3. Not every terrorist operation is a suicide bombing, and so not every such operation requires training/brainwashing people to accept death. But in any case, we know that people who were not trained in Afghanistan have committed suicide bombings, so it is hard to see why Afghanistan is so special. Even if it played a special role in the past, why can't that role be shifted elsewhere? And if we have had success in shutting down Al Qaeda and affiliated jihadist groups, that is surely because of a coordinated effort against an entire global network.

4. Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, who was arrested and sentenced for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings, was picked up by Pakistani intelligence after flying to Karachi because he had listed his final destination as "Afghanistan". I imagine that in 2009, if you want to recruit people who are not under intelligence surveillance, you would avoid having them go to Afghanistan. So is it really likely that Afghanistan will play a renewed role as a staging ground for terrorism?

I acknowledge that we have the assistance of state intelligence agencies and law enforcement in many other countries where we act against terrorism. So it would be ideal if Afghanistan were not an outlaw country, and even more ideal if their government were friendly to us. Can the war actually be expected to deliver that? And again, is the cost of achieving that outcome, and other desirable outcomes, commensurate with the benefits? This seems like an awfully long and costly war prosecuted for rapidly diminishing benefits.

[Gerard Cefalu USAF RETIRED]

9 Sept 2009

I would like to make a comment on our debate on Afghanistan and overall War On terror strategy.

As a 26 year Air force Vietnam veteran, I think the way we are fighting this war is wrong at many levels. In Vietnam, we underestimated the staying power, skill, ingenuity and willingness to die of the enemy. Quite simply, they outlasted us in a long protracted war of attrition in which they were willing to sacrifice considerably more casualties than the United States. North Vietnam taught us how the wars of the future were going to be fought. In order to win we had to hit them with overwhelming force then move on to the next base camp. Occupying Arab countries for long periods of time is suicidal in this new equation since our culture and religions are so diametrically incompatible to each other. The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan require the ability to gather intelligence, kill the enemy, better the lives of the people and set up self rule, and get out as soon as possible. Remember, we had allot of success in "Vietnamization". The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan require the ability to kill the enemy, better the lives of the people, set up self rule then get out as soon as possible. Iraq took six years too long while it bankrupted our treasury and will to win long term.

In order to do the above and strategically win the war on terror, it's important to have a draft (without college deferments). Presently, less than one percent, (military), of the population of this nation bears the burden and sacrifices which is morally wrong. This has weakened our military and created a false sense of security, while the rest of the country hardly knows a war is going on. Our country has never fought a war without a draft which rightly places the burden on all Americans. Moreover, we have never used Reserve and National Guard forces in place of a draft, further weakening our home emergency needs.
In the words of Gen William Westmoreland, on the Vietnam War, “When the President and his administration failed to level with the American people about the extent and nature of the sacrifice that had to be made, they contributed to a credibility gap that grew into an unbridgeable chasm. A low key approach (no draft or one with college deferments), means that some make sacrifices while most do not, and even those who make no sacrifice dislike it because their consciences trouble them. IF A WAR IS DEEMED WORTHY OF THE DEDICATION AND SACRIFICE OF THE MILITARY SERVICES, IT IS ALSO WORTHY OF THE COMMITMENT OF THE ENTIRE POPULATION." (A Soldier Reports, p500,). He also warned about the failure of graduated response, the failure of waiting too long to pursue the enemy into Laos and Cambodia (make it known we will destroy the attackers of 9/11 wherever they are, including Pakistan). These are just some of the lessons learned from the last insurgent war that we fought.
We should have dealt with these important issues six years ago but surrendered to the political expedience of the President and military leaders who should have remembered the lessons of Vietnam, the Soviets in Afghanistan and any standing army since Alexander the Great.
Moreover, I ask you why the Powell doctrine was ignored in regards to Iraq and Afghanistan and to this day is not applied wisely to the present request to increase troops to Afghanistan. I remind you that in 2001 we took down Afghanistan with small CIA and Special Forces units together with the Northern Alliance and the warlords we could win over against the Taliban. This is the only strategy that will work and a huge standing army will only result in coffins body bags and an endless unsuccessful entanglement.
My son is on his third tour of duty to the desert. How many more sons and daughters will have to serve innumerable combat tours before the rest of the sleeping public wakes up to the seriousness of the situation. Our enemy has millions of fresh recruits to draw from while we have exhausted the military heroes who are just trying to do their job. How much longer are we going to fill the VA hospitals with new young injured veterans that have to compete with limited VA funds to treat veterans of previous wars? As they slowly bleed us. I hope we wake up before it’s too late. For the third time I will not be sleeping much until my son comes home. How can YOU sleep?

Gerard Cefalu USAF RETIRED

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