More Truth on the Surge Posted by Michael Cohen

One of the problems with trying to keep abreast of all that is happening in the world is that fascinating news items always seem to fall through the cracks - take for example this excellent WSJ piece from last Saturday on the limitation of counter-insurgency tactics in Iraq:

Violence is on the rise in Iraq as American troops withdraw. A ground-level look at the handover provides one explanation: The Iraqi government is neglecting many of the successful counterinsurgency initiatives it is inheriting from the U.S. military.

The article goes on to note that the Shiite dominated Iraqi government has been dragging its feet on integrating Sunni Awakening forces into the government:

Now, the Shiite-dominated government apparently lacks the will to maintain thousands of armed Sunnis and the money to find them promised civilian jobs with the government.

Shocking. Who could imagine that the a Shiite-led government wouldn't want to maintain armed Sunni militias and find them jobs?

What this story reminds us (and you should read the whole thing here) is the serious limitations of counter-insurgency doctrine and the short-term nature of the tactical success that came from the surge in Iraq.

First, as every COIN advocate will tell you, successful counter-insurgencies operate on a long time horizon. It requires staying power, it requires a significant troop presence and above it requires political will and support both from the United States and the host country. Of course, none of these attributes have existed during the US war in Iraq and even if we go back in time and begin COIN operations in the Spring and Summer of 2003 it would have required a larger US footprint, possibly more initial US casualties and there is a good chance that US troops would still be there (of course the fact that we didn't take that route at the time is telling).

While there is no doubt that counter-insurgency techniques helped contribute to the reduction in violence in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 (you won't get me to say that it was the primary reason) and while the surge helped to place Iraq on a more positive trajectory it has not, by any means, dealt with the underlying political dynamics that divide the country.

The second fly in the ointment that the WSJ identifies is the extent to which the surge - by empowering Sunni militias in Anbar province - have created a second major power source in the country (a feat by the way that theoretically shoudl work against basic COIN strategy)

In 2007, Uday Karim says he grew disillusioned with Al Qaeda's violent tactics and led his 145 insurgents to join forces with the Americans. His so-called Awakening fighters began safeguarding the villages around Iskandriya, and the area grew calm. The U.S. military has passed off the responsibility for Awakening forces, which have numbered more than 100,000 fighters across Iraq, but Baghdad hasn't paid them in full. Since the government took over Mr. Karim's group in January, it has provided just one month's pay.

Iraq's government says it has addressed bureaucratic snags in the program's transition and that the fighters will be paid. Even so, the budget for Awakening salaries runs out at year's end.U.S. commanders worry that if Baghdad doesn't foot the bill, group members could become a threat again. The U.S. military believes that recent car bombings in Baghdad were hatched somewhere in this belt of rugged farming villages.

. . . On a recent visit to Iskandriya, his once-ubiquitous Awakening forces have largely vanished. A handful of fighters milled about in dun-colored camouflage. As for the rest, Mr. Karim shrugs.

"Who knows what they're doing with their time," he says. "If some individuals decide to fight the government again, no one is going to interfere."

This is not to say that we are about to see a reprise of 2005-2006 in Iraq. But one can't help but wonder that the short-term goal of encouraging and paying Sunni leaders to fight Al Qaeda brought a near-term success and a long-term headache to Iraq.

As I noted yesterday debates about the "success" of the surge and COIN in Iraq are not esoteric thought experiments - particularly when you have the advocates of counter-insurgency calling for these tactics to be used in Afghanistan and elsewhere.  This is not even to suggest that there is not a time and place for counter-insurgency (perhaps they might come in handy in Pakistan right now) but if we're going to have this discussion we have to be brutally honest about it.

As we are seeing in Iraq today, the limitations of COIN are clear; and they must be acknowledged before we double down on more military escalations that have a limited chance of achieving long-term success.

Comments

[Zathras]

I would have thought the obvious conclusion to draw from an increase in violence as American troops withdraw from some areas is that the problem with Iraq is the Iraqis.

Instead, we have people still fighting the political battle over the surge that began in late 2006 and early 2007. As long as this is what we're arguing about, we'll have an army in Iraq forever.

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the truth is that the surge holds out the very real promise of resolving what might otherwise come to be the most catastrophic foreign entanglement in American history.

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As I noted yesterday debates about the "success" of the surge and COIN in Iraq are not esoteric thought experiments - particularly when you have the advocates of counter-insurgency calling for these tactics to be used in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This is not even to suggest that there is not a time and place for counter-insurgency (perhaps they might come in handy in Pakistan right now) but if we're going to have this discussion we have to be brutally honest about it.
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