Anyone who has tuned in to the discussion about politics and foreign policy here in Washington knows that things tend to circle back to a couple basic questions: when will progressives get their act together, and how will the Democrats overcome their perceived weaknesses in national security? Obviously we welcome this debate -- one of the reasons for establishing this blog was to create a place for such discussions to play out. Yet while there is certainly plenty of reason for more soul-searching on the progressive side (don’t worry, DA ain’t going anywhere), folks are starting to notice something equally interesting and consequential: the fissures in the conservative movement.
We're seeing this in the debate about the NSA domestic surveillance program, the torture and detainee issue, what to do about Iraq and Iran, and how (and even whether) the U.S. should work to promote democracy abroad.
It’s not just progressives who are grappling with how to respond to a Bush Doctrine that stresses democracy promotion, pre-emption, and unchecked executive power; the conservatives are divided too – and this internal struggle will only grow more intense and bitter as the 2008 election approaches.
As the New Republic’s Josh Kurlantzick explained recently in must-read cover story, “for four years after the Bush Doctrine's inception, the GOP had maintained impressive intraparty unity on foreign policy, uniting Christian social conservatives, neoconservatives, traditional realists, and libertarian-minded business Republicans. This was the result of many factors, including Bush's immense personal popularity, a rally-round-the-flag effect from the war on terrorism, the predominance of Iraq over all other foreign policy issues, and the fact that moderates in the Bush administration, such as Colin Powell, were marginalized within the bureaucracy.”
“But, now, other schools of foreign policy thought are emerging within the GOP… Pragmatic Republicans have realized that the Bush Doctrine cannot be easily applied to other foreign policy crises, such as Iran, and potential 2008 presidential candidates have begun thinking through their foreign policy positions.”
Kurlantzick argues that conservatives are dividing into three camps: transformationalists, like Condoleezza Rice, who embrace the Bush Doctrine’s ambitions but value alliances; nationalists, like George Allen, who have less patience for multilateralism and stress more traditional state-centered threats, like a rising China; and traditional realists, who articulate the kind of pragmatic, less-ambitious, “humble” policy along the lines of what Bush entered office espousing.