Is Bush's foreign policy schizophrenic? No. If it were, that would suggest moderates had real influence. Posted by Suzanne Nossel

There’s an interesting debate under way over at Opinio Juris (a terrific blog on international law, in case you don't know it) about whether the internal conflicts in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy represent a kind of schizophrenia or instead a coherent, carefully tailored response to a diverse array of issues. The argument dovetails with some discussion here about the contrast between what Derek maintains is a skilled and moderate set of second-term appointees, and the choice of extremist John Bolton as UN representative.

While Chris Borgen (full disclosure: a friend for 15 years) maintains that Bush’s willy-nilly swerving is the product of a split within Bush’s inner circle over the right means for executing foreign policy, Julian Ku counters that Bush is doing a slalom so methodical and sophisticated that its pattern is invisible to the naked-eye (Julian is too nuanced to use the word nuanced, but that’s what he means).

My view is that when the Administration feels that it can toss a cost-free bone to moderates, it does so. Thus the appointment of Colin Powell and the continuing support for Kofi Annan (which, as discussed here, may look magnanimous but is also a matter of self-interest). But the minute there is a cost – i.e. Powell beginning to question Iraq policy – the right-wing flank shuts it down.

During Bush’s first-term the appointment of Richard Haass to head the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning was widely touted as a sign of moderation and level-headedness within the ranks. Except that Haass had limited influence and his staff was, according to a friend of mine who was on it, left writing thoughtful memos that they knew would never be acted on. Will Bob Zoellick and Nick Burns meet the same fate? If they cross swords with the likes of Cheney and Rumsfeld, my guess is yes.

Does this mean that, apart from what have turned out to be pretty empty gestures, the Administration has a coherent foreign policy approach? Bush tries hard to come across as unswerving in his views and policies, but I don’t buy it. After all, his closest advisor, Condi Rice, foreswore nation-building right before Bush took office, and now styles herself as the champion of “staying the course” in Iraq and promoting freedom and democracy elsewhere.   WMD was the reason for invading Iraq, until that wore thin and the Administration seized on the idea of promoting democracy (something Wolfowitz had long talked about, but mostly to himself). 

It's impossible to imagine Cheney or Rumsfeld, the other key architects of the Bush foreign policy, making remarks anything like Rice's when she introduced Ruth Ginsberg at a recent American Society of International Law Conference.

My sense is that it works something like this: While there are some ideologues in the Bush Administration, their views are so unyielding that Bush and Rice don’t necessarily subscribe to their overarching ideology.

But at key moments where the President has needed to appear firm and decisive, the neo-con ideologues have proven very useful in proffering up concrete proposals and rationales (however trumped up) to back them up. Fearful of repeating his father’s mistakes by appearing weak or directionless, Bush has seized on the neo-con program at key moments including the period after 9/11. The moderates around him like Powell struggled to offer clear or resolute alternatives and, over time, neo-con influence grew.

While there was a major hiccup last year as Iraq sunk into chaos, neo-con credibility in the White House now seems to be back on the upswing. When moderates do fight back successfully, it tends to be on issues that either don’t matter to conservatives or are outside of public view (take the ICJ and Law of the Sea examples brought up at Opinio Juris). The ICC referral for Darfur was a case of the Administration being boxed into a corner by opponents at home and abroad (the same reason they went to the UN the very first time on Iraq in Fall of 2002 – the political heat became too powerful to resist).

So, signs of moderation are something less than schizophrenia.  When push comes to shove, the ideologues win out.  With less at stake for Bush politically in his second term, this may be less often, though I wouldn't count on it.

Upshot:  If confirmed, John Bolton is not going to China (not least because the Chinese wouldn’t have him).

Oh, To Be a Fly on the Wall Posted by Michael Signer

So, according to Scott McLellan in the gaggle this morning, there were three Presidents, not one, on the hours-long flight to Rome this morning for the Pope's funeral:  Bush I, Bill Clinton, and Bush II -- all sitting right together on Air Force One.

Is anyone else struck by how strange this must have been?

Even though Clinton and George H.W. have been traveling together for weeks now raising money for the tsunami victims, it still strains the brain to imagine all three talking for several hours -- but maybe, just maybe, they talked about Scott Appleby's terrific article in Foreign Policy about how the new Pope needs to reach out, rather than reject, modern Islam -- and how cutting-edge ethicists in both faiths need to push their political wings toward progressive ends, especially on the intersection of poverty and instability, and the pursuit of just wars -- see, e.g.:

... the next pope must be the architect of a Christian-Muslim dialogue that fosters alternatives to policies and programs that violate the principles of Catholic social teaching. These principles include the preferential option for the poor, the sanctity of human life, and the need to formulate policies serving the common good rather than narrow interests. Muslim religious values lend themselves to this communitarian construction of society, but much work must be done by Catholic and Muslim ethicists to achieve shared visions on issues ranging from “just war” to birth control.

Alas, it was probably all long pauses, Clinton playing hearts, 41 munching pork rinds, and 43 making fratty jokes.  The above -- well, it's just a flight of fancy (okay, wince, I know -- sorry, long day at the office).

A Second Term Dream Team? Posted by Derek Chollet

For weeks DA and others in the blogosphere -- as well as the old fashioned media -- have been fuming about some of President Bush’s more troubling appointments, especially John Bolton at the UN.

But what’s been interesting to me is how Bolton’s appointment, as disturbing as it is, has been the exception rather than the rule. Let’s face it, many of the President’s recent second term national security appointments give reason for hope.  Ok, I know, railing against the Administration is more fun, but I believe in giving credit where it is due.

In many cases, Bush and his Cabinet Secretaries have stacked senior positions (especially at State, but even at the Pentagon) not with neo-con ideologues or raging right-wingers, but with sensible, smart, tough-minded professionals – who believe in diplomacy and institutions and agree with progressive internationalist ideals more than they (and we) might like to admit.

I’ve pointed out before that this is especially true at the State Department, where Secretary Rice has surrounded herself with folks like:

Robert Zoellick, her Deputy Secretary. He’s a politically loyal Republican, to be sure, but a direct descendant of the pragmatic Baker school (along with Dennis Ross, he ran the Department under Baker). He’s tough and has some faults (just ask the Japanese), but is one of the Administration’s best diplomats – in fact, as USTR during the first term, he was the Administration’s only effective diplomat. He also believes deeply in international institutions – it was Zoellick, working under Baker and then Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, who engineered the creation of APEC in 1989-1990.

Nick Burns, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, State’s number three official. A career foreign service officer, he was a top aide and spokesperson for Clinton’s first Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. He just served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO, where he was superb – he did a great job with a very bad brief. He worked on Zoellick’s staff, and later as Rice’s deputy, during the first Bush Administration.

Philip Zelikow, Rice’s Counselor. Recently served as executive director of the 9-11 commission (where there were grumblings about his partisanship), and has been assigned with troubleshooting and overseeing State’s counter-terrorist and intelligence bureaus. Chapter 12 of the 9-11 commission report is practically a playbook for progressive internationalism – and an inherent indictment of Bush’s first term – and let’s hope that Zelikow works to put into practice what he preached. He co-authored with Rice a chronicle of a major U.S. diplomatic triumph, the unification of Germany during 1989-1990, and along with Nick Burns, was a Zoellick staffer in the Baker State Department.

Chris Hill, the Assistant Secretary of State for Asia (he's not confirmed yet, but will be).  Another career official, he rose through the foreign service under the tutelage of Richard Holbrooke, played a decisive role at the Dayton negotiations to bring peace to Bosnia and during the Kosovo crisis, and was a senior NSC official during the Clinton Administration responsible for the Balkans.

Stephen Krasner, Rice’s Director of Policy Planning. Kranser is an old Rice confidante from Stanford, and she is said to trust him completely. So far he is traveling with her full-time. While relatively unknown in Washington, he is a major figure in political science circles (PoliSci grad school quiz: name the other “two K’s”). If his academic writing is any guide, he promises to come up with interesting ideas – he has written an entire book on sovereignty, arguing that it has never really existed as a single concept (now that would be news to John Bolton!).

Importantly, similar choices have been made elsewhere – including, crucially, at the Pentagon. Late last week, the President announced that Wolfowitz and Doug Feith, two of the Pentagon’s top three civilian officials, would be replaced by:

Gordon England, the former Navy Secretary. England is highly regarded in defense circles, and many have hoped that he would replace Wolfowitz. He has done a good job as Navy Secretary, and his reputation is as a straight shooter, easy to get along with, and non-ideological.

Eric Edelman, currently U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. Edelman is one the finest foreign service officers of his generation, and his selection to replace the less-than-beloved Feith as the Pentagon’s lead civilian policy official was widely anticipated inside the building and throughout Washington policy circles. A former top aide to Vice President Cheney, Edelman was also one of Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott’s closest aides during the Clinton Administration, and helped shape the U.S. approach toward Russia and NATO enlargement during the 1990’s.

So what’s all this inside baseball mean? Will such officials shape the second Bush term? Maybe that's why Bolton is being exiled to New York. Or at least let's hope so.

Emotional Intelligence of Nations Posted by Lorelei Kelly

Remember Emotional Intelligence? Ten years ago, Dan Goleman's bestseller shifted our thinking about effective leadership. His book declared that a high IQ is only part of the picture, and that understanding and relating well with others is often more important than run of the mill smarts because self-awareness and the ability to build lasting meaningful relationships are fundamental keys to success.

Apparently nobody in the Bush Administration read the book.  By nominating  John Bolton for Ambassador to the UN and Paul Wolfowitz to head the World Bank, the administration has signaled round two of "talk to the hand" policy making.

Both men are indeed smart and understand the need for international cooperation. Bolton was behind the innovative Proliferation Security Initiative and Wolfowitz was by all accounts a knowledgeable and effective Ambassador to Indonesia.  But these attributes do not make up for the diplomatic failure--on the whole--of this administration. This is made evident by their tendency to view the world as one of Darwinian self-help. As a British friend put it to me  "America seems to see itself AS the scheme of things rather than IN the scheme of things."   A sure sign of low emotional intelligence.

International attitudes bear this out.  A 2003 Global Scan poll of 19 countries found that when asked if the US had a positive influence on the world, only 37% of respondents agreed. Distressingly, 55% disagreed.  Pre-emptive war, championed by Wolfowitz in Iraq and the regular dissing of the UN by Bolton have taken their toll on our prestige. Sure, only a small number of individuals beyond our borders have both the hatred and the sophistication to harm us, but it really doesn't help matters when nearly the entire population of Germany is repelled by our leadership.

The actual impact or "blowback" of these negative attitudes on the United States is difficult to measure.  But security in the age of globalization demands that we begin to appreciate the importance of such intangibles to our own well-being.  The United States, in its short history, has set the gold standard for problem-solving, cooperation and  mutually beneficial relationships.  It has taken only four years for that legacy to become frayed and fragile. We're slowly losing one of our most powerful tools of national interest: being exemplary.

It is unlikely that the rest of the world will forgive and forget easily. Collective amnesia aside, Bolton and Wolfowitz threaten to make our situation worse.

The Right Summers-Bush Analogy Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Blogger David Bernstein suggests that the Harvard faculty's vote of no confidence against President Larry Summers was motivated by displaced frustration with Bush.  There is an analogy, but it works the other way around.  Summers' situation resembles that of ousted New York Times Editor-in-Chief Howell Raines.  Raines was roundly disliked at the paper because of his arrogance, high-handedness and disregard for the views of those weaker than him.  Likewise Summers.   

Both men were strong and sure-footed in leading high-profile institutions, so much so that despite how unpopular they were it was virtually inconceivable that either could be vulnerable to ouster.  In both instances, the men were responsible for a critical misstep (in Raines' case the failure of oversight that led to publication of numerous fabricated stories by disgraced former reporter Jayson Blair).  Once that happened, the groundswell of animosity surged to the point where their leadership came into question.   Few were willing to give the leaders the benefit of the doubt and, smelling blood, detractors pounced and did not let go until, in Raines' case, a few careers were destroyed.

There's reason to fear that the Bush Administration may be similarly vulnerable.  The rest of the world for the most part dislikes Bush; anti-Americanism is at an all time high.   Yet the U.S. is powerful enough and Bush has racked up sufficient accomplishments that he seems invulnerable.  The question is what happens if a bad mistake gets made - a more serious version of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade or the shoot-out involving the Italian journalist and her bodyguard.    Would the U.S.'s detractors all pounce, with the result of an outsized blow to America's image and influence?  If there's any analogy to Summers and Raines, the signs are ominous.