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A common refrain amongst conservatives, and one which will undoubtedly emerge as a criticism of the President's strategy, is that setting any kind of timetable, no matter how flexible, is a sign of weakness. Their argument is that in order to demonstrate America's resolve, its commitment must not contain any hints of an end date. The more responsible of them suggest a conditions-based approach, but others just seem to prefer never-ending occupations.
This vehement opposition to timelines has never totally made sense to me. Of course it's important to demonstrate committment, but its equally important to gain leverage, something that timelines can give you. One surefire way to make countries like China, Iran and Pakistan start taking affairs in their backyward more seriously is to make them aware that there is an end-date to their riding on America's coat tails. Right now, Pakistan has less incentive to behave productively in Afghanistan, mostly because it's mostly consequence free. We're the ones holding the bag! But if they're forced to reckon with a future where it's not as easy to hide in America's shadow, it would be reasonable to assume more responsible behavior.
The President sets out by justifying America's presence in terms of the persistent threat posed by terrorist activity in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region.
America's goal?
"These facts compel us to act along with our friends and allies. Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future."
Still, it would have been nice to explain why an effort to reverse momentum against the Taliban is integral to that goal.
Hi everyone: I'm going to be posting at least a couple of times tonight as we watch the President's speech. After a few minutes, I'm alreayd struck by the staging and by the President's reliance on story-telling: setting the stage for a history that has become confused (witness the mixing up of the Taliban and al Qaeda) and complex (the trade-offs between Iraq and Afghanistan). To begin with clarity: what a concept!
Over the past few days, Jim Arkedis over at Progressive Fix and I have been having a bit of back and forth about Obama's Afghanistan decision. Often these sorts of intra-blog battles can get tedious, but this one is actually sort of interesting and speaks to the issues facing the progressive community.
What's interesting about Jim's latest post titled "The Need for Progressives to Make Tough Choices on Security" is that he doesn't really engage with my overarching argument that progressives should not simply stand and salute and follow the President's course of action in Afghanistan. This is basically what he and his boss Will Marshall are saying. And I quote:
And while I don't doubt that Jim thinks that Obama is making the right choice, the argument being made here to progressives is a pretty political one. For example, if "whatever course" the President chooses included sending 80,000 troops to Afghanistan should progressives be supportive? We pretty much know what the reaction of our non-adult party will be so it really is incumbent upon progressives to hold the President's feet to the fire and not blindly follow his course because as Jim writes, "President Obama has far superior information on the subject than either of us." A lot of people had good information on the threat that Iraq posed in 2003 and guess what, they don't get an A for decision-making. I mean jeez, Lyndon Johnson was a pretty progressive guy.
But the funny about this kerfuffle is Jim's notion that touch choices on national security involve sending more troops into harm's way. I would make the argument that military escalation is in some ways the easier choice - explaining why Afghanistan is not in the national interest or that the threat from al Qaeda really isn't the significant or that the generals are wrong about the need for more troops or that there are limitations on US military power or that this really isn't a war of necessity - now that would actually represent a much more difficult political choice and a far more difficult argument. Doing the bidding of the generals is, in some respects, the more politically expedient choice, particularly when you don't have a groundswell of progressives pushing back on the feverish dreams of the COINdanistas.
I don't say this to suggest that Obama's decision to send more troops to Afghanistan is one that he is taking lightly. I don't believe that at all. But even tough, well-reasoned decisions to use military force can be wrong. The simple fact is that over the past few decades - more often than not - they have been. And what's worse the potential consequences of those decisions have been ignored or under-appreciated. (See Iraq War: 2003 - Present)
Michael has already gotten things started with an excellent post, but before we go further, I think it's fair to look back on how Afghanistan came to be such a big mess. For that, let's look to Dick Cheney's interview with Politico. OH WAIT, apparently he wouldn't elaborate on how his administration presided over a mission in Afghanistan that slid deeper and deeper into a morass (those Politico guys really know how to twist Cheney's arm).
Fortunately, Spencer doesn't share the former vice-president's tongue-losing affliction, or the Politico reporting team's inability to recollect fairly-recent history:
Politico reporters transcribe, you decide:
Cheney was asked if he thinks the Bush administration bears any responsibility for the disintegration of Afghanistan because of the attention and resources that were diverted to Iraq. “I basically don’t,” he replied without elaborating.
Right, and why follow that one up? It’s not like a high-profile Senate report demonstrated over the weekend that the Bush administration allowed Osama bin Laden to escape the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001, a crucial mistake that allowed al-Qaeda to regroup in Pakistan. It’s not like the Bush administration in 2002 refused to allow U.S. troops to perform peacekeeping operations that would have preserved the initial post-Taliban order, even as President George W. Bush issued an ultimately hollow promise for a new Marshall Plan in Afghanistan. It’s not as if later that year the Bush administration had its regional military commander focus intensely on an entirely elective second war fought for ultimately incorrect premises. It’s not as if security and governance deteriorated in Afghanistan for years while the Bush administration declined to increase troop levels or even focus on the Pakistani safe havens for al-Qaeda that the 2001 Tora Bora failure yielded, even as ground commanders publicly stated the war could not be won without dealing with them. And it’s certainly not like the Bush administration passed an unfinished war off to its successor in year eight amid record levels of insurgent violence.
None of that happened. That’s why Politico knows Dick Cheney would never lie to the American people or demonstrate poor judgment.
Several months ago when I started writing the AMCW I did so out of the fear that the Obama Administration - against its better wishes - was at risk of deeply enmeshing itself in a military and political quagmire that was not in US vital national interests. At the time US policy seemed adrift and there was a yawning chasm between what the President was saying about Afghanistan and what was happening on the ground.
Tonight this debate is about to come full circle as only 8 months after the President laid out his Af/Pak policy he is preparing to announce a new and more robust engagement in Afghanistan that will, in many respects, represent Mission Creep in Afghanistan as national policy.
Now, for who has bothered to read DA and my various rantings over the past 8 months they can make a pretty good guess of how I feel about this. Fundamentally, I think having 100,000 troops in Afghanistan - and spending $100 billion a year - will distract the US from more important foreign policy goals and will continue to allow the threat of terrorism to distort and subvert our national security debates. What's more I don't believe that the threat from al Qaeda or even a reconstituted Taliban in Afghanistan merits the costs that we now appear prepared to pay. Fundamentally, I think the focus on population centric counter-insurgency is a tactical mistake and is based on an ahistorical view of how counter-insurgencies work and the capabilities of the US military in fighting them. And politically, I fear that it will undermine the efforts of a truly progressive president.
But that is neither here nor there at this point. The decision has been made. Continuing to complain that it is a mistake won't serve much purpose. And of course, I must also recognize that the person tasked with making this decision about strategy in Afghanistan might be making the right one.
Reading the New York Times today has offered me some glimmers of hope. The deployment of US troops will be sped up over the next six months in an effort to take back the military initiative from the Taliban. This seems like a smart approach and a recognition that until the Taliban are pushed back on their heels it will be difficult to lay the groundwork for any sort of serious political reconciliation.
Of course, the success of such an effort will depend on the ability of the US and NATO to train an Afghan Army. Again, I like what I'm hearing about pairing Afghan units with US military units and empowering local militias. Not sure the latter will be the best approach to increasing long-term stability in the country, but in the near term it may do an important job of securing US interests. However, I continue to be dismayed by the focus on securing the population in Kandahar and Helmand province next door - and worry that our military leadership is prioritizing the wrong population areas.
But in the end, we'll need to wait to hear what the President says tonight.
Going forward, it's critical that progressives (and others!) hold the Administration's feet to the fire on the strategy being announced tonight. I think a few things will be key: how closely is the Administration adhering to its own benchmarks denoting success, is there progress on getting the Pakistanis to crack down on Afghan Taliban safe havens, are there signs that Karzai is not only tackling corruption but devoting resources to a counter-insurgency fight and the performance of the Afghan military. Without significant progress on these fronts it's hard to see the President's strategy bearing fruit in Afghanistan.
In the end, I think the President is making a mistake in deepening our engagement in Afghanistan - and may be dealing a fatal blow to the hopes many of us had that he would "change the mindset" of American foreign policy. But the decision has been made; the best that those of us who oppose this policy can do, is not only minimize its damage, but try to make it work.
UPDATE: The Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch goes West. I'll be debating Max Boot on the President's strategy in Afghanistan on KPCC's Air Talk with Larry Mantle so give a listen here.
The media has largely accepted the conservative frame that Obama has dithered on Afghanistan and delayed his decision to the point where our efforts there have been degraded. While this is wrong on so many levels, there's an important process comparison between Afghanistan and the Iraq surge decision that is rarely made. Buried in today's NY Times is this nugget:
Until recently, discussions focused on a deployment that would take a year, but Mr. Obama concluded that the situation required “more, sooner,” as one official said, explaining the some of the central conclusions Mr. Obama reached at the end of a nearly three-month review of American war strategy.
Accepting that this has been a little less than a three month process, from the moment Gen. McChrystal offered his troop recommendation to Obama's speech tonight, it's clear that Obama's decision on Afghanistan took either the same or less time to make than President Bush's decision on the Iraq surge. A quick timeline of the surge makes this eminently clear:
So not only did it take Bush slightly longer to decide on the surge in Iraq, but the decision was made against the recommendations of the sitting military leadership and driven largely by conservative political entities from outside think tanks. And it was done straddling an election, with both the first government meeting and strategy announcement done after American voters went to the polls.
Compared to President Obama's swifter, more inclusive strategy review that was done in a comprehensive manner with input from all factions--the military as well as diplomatic, civilian, and economic corps--President Bush seems to be the one who was the Ditherer-in-Chief basing decisions on political imperatives, not military ones. While the Iraq surge worked to give the government there more political space, the military component was really secondary to the other factors that contributed to its success.
And while conservatives and the media remain obsessed with troop numbers and the decision's time-frame, they quickly forget a recent history that demonstrates that President Obama embarked on a war strategy review process in a more methodical and rapid manner than his predecessor.