General Paul Eaton Comes Out For Repealing Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Posted by The Editors

This piece by Democracy Arsenal guest blogger Igor Volsky was originally posted on the Wonk Room.

Joining a long list of military leaders and commanders calling for the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, retired Major Gen. Paul Eaton — commander of operations to train Iraqi troops between 2003 and 2004 and currently a Senior Adviser to the National Security Network– told Mic Check radio last week that he too believed that it was time to end the policy. “Discrimination based on sexual orientation is inappropriate in our society,” Eaton said. “It is inappropriate to ask somebody to lie if he wants to keep his job as a solider, air man, seaman or marine.”

“The issue of sexuality is so complex, it’s not binary. And the older I get the more I learn about it and we’ve gone to a considerable level of openness in our society to discussing this,” he added, noting that attitudes towards sexuality have changed since the policy was first enacted. “There is a considerable amount of growth we’ve seen and when it comes down to the issue of gays serving in the military, the real issue is discipline”:

EATON: I expect people to serve in the military where sexuality is not a topic of discussion. It is not a topic of recognition. Simply, you don’t display affection….It’s not an issue. It’ just a discipline issue.

Listen to highlights of the interview:

Eaton acknowledged that now is the time to repeal the ban, but he didn’t call on the military to expedite its year-long review of the policy. “I believe that now is the time to repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell and as far as the timeline for implementing that decision, I defer to the United States Armed Forces to figure that out,” he said. “From the perspective of the Pentagon review, it gets really complicated when you get into the bureaucracy of implementation”:

EATON: There is the issue of preparing the force and preparing the services for the repeal so that we don’t run into unpleasant second-order effect events….Just like integration of women creates some challenges, and enduring challenges, discipline issues, so it will be that we’re going to have to be careful in our implementation of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.

Eaton also praised the leaders of the Pentagon review, General Carter Ham and Jeh Johnson and expressed confidence in that process.

Who Are You Calling "Unserious"? Posted by Michael Cohen

A couple of days ago I wrote about the ill-considered recommendation of military force against Iran that is increasingly being sounded by neo-conservatives. And when I say ill-considered I don't mean because it's a bad idea (which of course it is) but instead I was speaking of the the complete lack of "consideration" underpinning these bellicose cries. Case in point, yesterday's editorial in the Wall Street Journal, which had the temerity to call President Obama "unserious" in dealing with the Iranian nuclear program:

President George W. Bush will share responsibility for a nuclear Iran given his own failure to act more firmly against the Islamic Republic or to allow Israel to do so, thereby failing to make good on his pledge not to allow the world's most dangerous regimes to get the world's most dangerous weapons. But it is now Mr. Obama's watch, and for a year he has behaved like a President who would rather live with a nuclear Iran than do what it takes to stop it.

To be clear when the WSJ suggests doing "what it takes to stop it" it is of course talking about the use of force against Iran. But not surprisingly, at no point do the Journal's editorial writers take the time to consider the full implications of what using force against Iran might mean. 

As I wrote the other day, bombing Iran's nuclear facilities would be an unmitigated disaster for the region, for the global economy, for US interests and even global stability. And once again it would make the US a pariah state isolated from the global community. Now the Wall Street Journal might be unconcerned about that - or might even see it as a political plus - but for the folks in the Obama Administration these are precisely the issues that will have to wrestled over before the use of force can be considered. Bombing any country is hardly a consequence free activity.

But the Journal and others seem to view attacking Iran as an event that will occur in vacuum with few consequences for the region and the United States. At the very least, they've shown in this editorial no interest in wrestling with the implications of the use of force against Iran. As my good friend Andrew Exum notes, there are more than a few questions that have to be considered: 

If you're going to make a case for the use of violence to realize a political end, you're not going to find me in the back of the room wearing a Code Pink t-shirt and waving a banner. But you will find me with my hand politely raised asking how, exactly, the use of force is meant to achieve the political end. What are the interests at stake? What are the resources available? What are the desired end states? What are the risks and possible unintended effects? How are we mitigating those risks and unintended effects, and what contingency plans are we developing for when things go wrong? (And things will go wrong.) And what is your plan, by phase, for how force will be used? By all means, let's have a conversation about the use of force. But it has to be a mature discussion, and you better think through the questions I just asked. Because hope is not a method -- not for the Obama Administration, and neither for those who casually recommend the use of force in the political sphere.

I couldn't agree more with this sentiment (even the Code Pink reference) and it is worth noting that none of these questions were asked or answered in the run-up to the Iraq War . . . and I'm not so sure they were asked and answered properly in the period preceding the Afghan escalation. 

And look maybe those advocating for strikes against Iran are correct, but it's very easy to liberally recommend the use of military force; it's far more difficult to game out the consequences of such actions and the implications on US national interests. To do the former - loudly, abrasively and accompanied by calls of appeasement - without soberly considering the latter is not only unserious, it's the height of irresponsibility.

Why Do People Drink Iced Coffee? Posted by Shadi Hamid

Matt Yglesias writes:

The weather’s turned warm, which means it’s time for caffeine addicts to switch from hot coffee to iced.

This sentence, to my surprise, elicited a strong reaction. I've never quite understood what the weather has to do with whether you order hot or iced coffee. After all, the vast majority of people are drinking coffee inside a coffee shop where it's presumably not hot. Now, I suppose it's possible that people form their preference for ordering iced coffee before they get to Starbucks when they're outside (and hot), but I think this fundamentally misunderstands the process of preference formation that coffee drinkers go through. 

Matt's post also provides a convenient pretext to link to my previously long forgotten 'ode to Starbucks,' which also set forth a series of hypotheses about "Starbucks peace theory," provoking, in the process, a baffled response from Dan Drezner.

Underestimating Religious Parties Posted by Shadi Hamid

A quick follow-up on yesterday's post: the Western tendency to underestimate the strength of Islamist parties is not just limited to the recent Iraqi election results. There's a bigger issue here.

Analysts always seem to be finding signs of Islamist decline, and I think we've seen more of this trend the past couple years. I remember after the 2007 Moroccan elections when everyone seemed to think, or assume, that Islamists were the biggest losers. It was certainly true that the Islamist PJD performed below expectations but it was also true that the PJD won more votes than any other party and increased its parliamentary seats from 42 to 47. Not exactly a resounding defeat.

Yes, many Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Jordan's Islamic Action Front, are dealing with internal divisions and struggling to devise a coherent response to regime repression. But, if that's the case, then Islamist weakness reflects not their declining popularity but rather that Arab regimes are very good at repressing their strongest opponents. 

And even when Islamist parties suffer relative defeats in the electoral arena, it does not necessarily follow that they've suffered such defeats because they are Islamist. In other words, voters can decide not to vote for Islamist parties for a whole host of reasons that have nothing to do with their Islamist character. Similarly, just because people vote for Islamist parties does not necessarily mean that they have any particular affinity for Islamism as such. There is a reason, after all, that some Christians vote for Hezbollah, and many secularists for Hamas. 

In short, it would be a mistake to assume that when Islamist parties lose, that this reflects a broader shift away from religious politics or from religion, and towards "secularism" - the kind of thing we like to believe is happening in the Middle East but, for both better and worse, rarely does and most likely won't. 

We Aren't Fooling Anyone in Marjah Posted by Michael Cohen

Yesterday's New York Times article on the challenges facing the US military in convincing residents of Marjah to accept ISAF's presence - and "side" with the government is a depressing, yet not terribly surprising reminder of how misguided our counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan has become.

Military officials are shocked, shocked to discover that the promise of money for siding with the government isn't quite working out; that discouraging the growing of poppy is pissing a lot of people off and even more so, that the Taliban continue to intimidate locals into not working with the government. According to Maj. James Coffman, civil affairs leader for the Third Battalion, Sixth Marines the Taliban have “reseized control and the momentum in a lot of ways” and "we have to change tactics to get the locals back on our side.”

Sigh. Is there any reason to believe that a near-term change in tactics is going to meet the psychological goal of convincing local Afghans that the US and NATO will a) stay for the long haul (at the same moment that ISAF is already plotting its next offensive into Kandahar) or b) will provide the sort of long-term security in a town where as even Marine generals admit "most people identify themselves as Taliban."

We of course we have no intention of staying for the long haul; we can't protect every Afghan from the wrath of the Taliban; money only goes far in canceling out ethnic loyalty and fear of possible retaliation; and it certainly doesn't help that we are working on behalf of a government and President that (for good reason) doesn't appear to command one iota of popular loyalty.

But perhaps even worse we are lying to ourselves about why we are even in Afghanistan. Consider the words of General Nicholson, commander of the Marine force in Helmand:

“There are lots of people with lots of money invested here, and they are not just going to give that up,“ General Nicholson said. “Now is the heavy lifting. We have to convince a very skeptical population that we are here to help them.”

I know that I'm becoming a broken record on this point, but we are NOT in Marjah to help the Afghan people. We are in Marjah; and in Helmand; and in Kandahar; and in Afghanistan to defeat al Qaeda and make sure that no terrorist who threatens America can find safe haven in that country again. That we are helping Afghans is a nice by-product of our presence in Afghanistan, but as most Afghans must know it's ultimately not why we are there. And when we accomplish our mission - or far more likely, when we get tired of a never-ending war in South Asia and bring our boys home - the Afghans in Marjah and elsewhere will have to fend for themselves. Is it any wonder they aren't buying what the US and NATO is selling?

Perhaps right on cue there is this horrifying story that not only did US Special Operations forces kill three  Afghan women, they covered up the crime - even going to far as to dig bullets out of the bodies of the victims. It is yet another reminder that for all the talk of protecting civilians - and all of General McChrystal's noble efforts to prevent civilian deaths -- they are still happening, and they are still undermining our population centric goals in Afghanistan (again when you put 100,000 US troops, who are trained to kill and protect themselves, in a foreign country none of this should be even slightly surprising).

And as much as I hate to write it, this is likely only going to continue - and we wonder why we can't convince local Afghans to side with us?

Did Religious Parties Really Lose the Iraqi Elections? Posted by Shadi Hamid

I'll be moderating a "conversation" with US Ambassador to Iraq Chris Hill at the Brookings Doha Center tomorrow. In thinking about questions to ask him, I've been trying to get a better handle on the slowly solidifying perceptions of the March 7th results. And one of the post-election memes that's starting to irritate me is that Islamist parties were soundly defeated. This presumably signals a "new Iraq," one that is moving in a post-sectarian direction, with Iyad Allawi's "secular" coalition its new face. Well, while this rather convenient theme isn't necessarily 100% incorrect, it's kind of misleading.

First of all, it's slightly odd to call Allawi's Iraqiyya coalition "secularist," considering one of the leading coalition figures, Tareq al Hashemi, is an Islamist and, until recently, led the Iraqi Islamic Party, effectively the political arm of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood.

That quibble aside, all you have to do is exert some effort and count up the seats to find that Islamists did pretty damn well (alth. The State of Law coalition, led by Maliki's Islamist Dawa Party, won 89 seats. The Iraqi National Alliance (INA), led by the very Islamist Sadrists and very Islamist Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), won around 70 seats. If we add these together that pretty much comes out to 159 seats, which seems awfully close to the 163 seat threshold needed to form a government, something which, we can surmise, has not escaped Iran's notice. 

Hamid Karzai is a Gangster . . . Revisited Posted by Michael Cohen

So a couple of months ago, I wrote a DA post where I compared Hamid Karzai to Hyman Roth. It was based mainly on the fact that Karzai basically stole the Afghan election and at the same time got the US and NATO to pat him on the back for a job well done. Quite simply, he played it beautifully.

But these days, I'm beginning to wonder if Hamid is looking a bit more like Michael Corleone. And I don't mean the Michael Corleone who slaughtered the heads of the Five Families, took care of Carlo, Tessio and Moe Green and then became Don . . . I mean the Michael Corleone at the end of Godfather II, who was increasingly isolated, was losing the loyalty of his inner circle and was striking out at perceived enemies all around him. 

What else there is to make of Karzai's speech yesterday to the Afghan Electoral Commission - a 50 minute diatribe that featured attacks on US and NATO allies, accusations that the West orchestrated fraud in last year's election (that's rich) and even intimations that the US and its Allies are invaders of Afghanistan - rhetoric that is eerily familiar to that used by the Taliban.

I mean the next thing you know Wali Karzai is going to be "sleeping with the fishes" at the bottom of the Helmand River. 

Perhaps the worst part about this speech is that comes a mere five days after President Obama flew half way around the world to gently remind our friend Hamid that the United States might need some help if we're going to win this whole insurgency thing.

I've been something of an advocate of the "Let Hamid Be Hamid" school, but this is ridiculous. How can anyone in this Administration argue that he is a reputable partner for a counter-insurgency effort. 

Along these lines, I can't help but be reminded of a quote from an anonymous Administration official last November:

We’re going to know in the next three to six months whether he’s doing anything differently — whether he can seriously address the corruption, whether he can raise an army that ultimately can take over from us and that doesn’t lose troops as fast as we train them.

You know what? I think we have our answer. 

In the President's meeting last weekend with Karzai he laid out several areas where he wanted to see more progress from Karzai. They included, "formulating stricter rules against corruption, establishing long-expected guidelines about how to proceed with persuading insurgents to switch sides, and keeping foreign members on the Electoral Complaints Commission, the body that investigates voting fraud." Color me skeptical that we're likely to see much progress on these fronts. And if we don't see progress how can the US continue to pour troops into the fight - and wage a population-centric counter-insurgency - when it's abundantly clear that we have a extremely reluctant partner in Kabul?

It seems clearer than ever that relying on Hamid Karzai to be the effective ally we need him to be is a fool's errand.

That Wacky, Wacky Joshua Muravchik Posted by Michael Cohen

World Affairs has a new group blog and it really has to be considered the front-runner for oddest group blog ever. Besides my good friend, the always cheery David Rieff, the ever controversial Jamie Kirchik, there are the occasional missives of famed neo-con Joshua Muravchik. Take today for example where he bemoans the fact that the 2007 NIE on the Iranian nuclear program forestalled any possibility of a Bush Administration strike against said program.

Citing the recent testimony of Vann H. Van Diepen Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, or as one might prefer, history's greatest monster, Muravchik argues that intelligence analysts with a clear agenda - to prevent an attack on Iran - manufactured a less than alarmist intelligence estimate on Iran . . . with dire consequences. Cue over the top and alarmist rhetoric:

With the countless accusations that Vice President Dick Cheney and other top administration officials “politicized intelligence,” it is amazing that so little has been made of this outrageous case, a far more clear-cut example of pursuing a policy agenda by twisting intelligence than anything Cheney et al. did. Worse, Cheney was elected to his position . . . I imagine Van Diepen and his collaborators patted themselves on the back for their coup: They succeeded in shielding Iran’s nuclear weapons program from George Bush’s sword. Millions may yet die as a consequence.

To be sure Muravchik provides no actual evidence that Van Diepen and his "cabal" of friends lied about the Iranian nuclear program or even that a more pessimistic NIE would have ensured war. Nonetheless, how can one really quibble with Muravchik - obviously preventing the Bush Administration from attacking Iraq was far worse than the ACTUAL war that the "politicization of intelligence" in the run-up to the US invasion of Iraq produced. 

Muravchik worries, again without evidence, that "millions may yet die" because of Van Diepen's duplicity but appears to be decidedly non-plussed about the hundreds of thousands who DID die in the Iraq War.

I have to admit it's a constant source of amazement at the extent to which neo-conservative are generally more troubled by things that might happen - as opposed to things that actually have happened.

And even with the potential bombing of Iran; while I suppose it is a remote possibility that millions might die if Iran is able to cobble together a workable nuke (although plenty of unstable and tyrannical regimes have possessed nuclear bombs and none of them have actually used one). But here's the thing; we can be pretty sure what will happen if the US does attack Iran. 

First, many Iranians will die. Second, there is a pretty good chance some Americans will perish as well. Third, world oil prices will spike imperiling the economic fortunes of many poor countries and likely reversing the fragile global economic recovery - causing more deaths. Fourth, US relations with key allies both in the region and elsewhere will suffer. Fifth; the United States will likely itself again isolated in the world, which will harm the country's national interests. Sixth, the possibility of terrorist attacks against the United States and allies in the region will almost certainly increase . . . and I could go on.

In short, attacking Iraq militarily is the furthest possible thing from a consequence-free activity. It's not as if you can drop a few bombs and then America's problems vis-a-vis Iran are solved. Indeed, it would be helpful if strident voices like Muravchik - instead of attacking those who are forced to weigh the costs of the military attacks they so casually advocate for -- occasionally wrestled with these difficult issues.

One Progressive's Two Red Lines Posted by David Shorr

Two policy decisions where I see particularly high stakes are on the White House docket to be decided any day, so I thought I'd offer one more plea. (Consider it a closing argument.) President Obama should really stand firm on prosecuting terrorists in regular civilian courts and declaring that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter and retaliate against nuclear attack by others. A reversal on either issue would not be a tactical retreat, but a strategic defeat in the detainee or nuclear policy debate. In other words, the lasting impact would be to severely shrink the political space for future policies. There would be a high cost that is sure to haunt debates over other decisions down the line.

On civilian versus military trials, what Adam Serwer said:

This would be a useless concession--the money for closing Guantanamo Bay is in the Afghan War funding bill; it will limit the administration's future options in fighting terrorism because it will encourage Republicans to insist that all Muslims accused of terrorism be tried in military commissions, and it will delegitimize the proceedings in the eyes of communities whom the U.S. most needs to persuade that it stands for the rule of law...

This would be a bad decision on the merits, but it would also be a bad political decision. Does the administration believe that Republicans will cease their incessant criticisms of the Obama administration despite its continuity of Bush-era national-security policies once they've made this concession? Because they won't -- for that to be the case, this would actually have to be an argument about policy rather than political gamesmanship. No matter what decisions the administration makes on national security policy, the Republicans will move to the right and accuse Obama of not being serious about fighting terrorism.

As I've said before, progressives have a strong argument to stand up for faith in the American system of law and refusing to let that system be terrorized. All you have to do is dig barely below the surface of this debate to realize that the chief function of the military in this debate is a shallow symbolism of toughness. What comes next? Commandos on commercial airliners instead of air marshals? Remanding detainees to the custody of Delta Force? The only thing to add is to highlight the excellent advocacy on this issue by Human Rights First, including the voices of retired senior military officers as proponents of civilian trials.

On the declared purpose of nuclear weapons, what Mort Halperin, Jeffrey Lewis, Daryl Kimball, Kevin Knobloch, John Isaacs, David Culp and Chris Paine (and several others) said in their recent letter to the president on the impending nuclear posture review (NPR):

It is inconceivable today that you or any other president would conclude the first use of nuclear weapons is in our national interest, especially in light of our conventional military power. Indeed, the logical corollary to your call to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons is that all non-nuclear threats can be met with a conventional response. The new NPR should clearly narrow the purpose of nuclear weapons to deterring nuclear attacks on the United States and our allies, and it should assure states without nuclear weapons that are parties in good standing to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that they will not face nuclear threats from the United States.

Ambiguity about the purpose of U.S. nuclear forces provides little deterrent value at a high cost; it undermines the credibility of our conventional deterrent, complicates our nonproliferation diplomacy, and can be used by other countries to justify their pursuit or improvement of nuclear weapons.

For this issue, the other side of the debate is not the opposing political party, but inside the administration, for instance the assistant secretaries of state for Europe and East Asia, as explained by Marc Ambinder over at The Atlantic. Now that the United States has a more far-sighted policy of reducing the role, levels, and dangers of nuclear weapons, the posture review represents an opportunity to set aside -- once and for all -- all the thinking-the-unthinkable scenarios and rationalizations for having and potentially using nuclear weapons. As you deal with the various steps and elements of your policy, Mr. President, believe me, you'll be glad you did.

On both matters, the indications have not been positive, so all I can do is hope, keep putting in my two cents, and call attention to the stakes.

Democracy Arsenal and NSN are now on Twitter Posted by The Editors

To our wonderful readers: Democracy Arsenal can now be found on Twitter under the handle @demarsenal. In addition, our sponsor, the National Security Network, also has a new Twitter feed. NSN can be found @natsecnet.

The @demarsenal feed will send a tweet every time there’s a new post on this blog. The @natsecnet will cover the progressive national security community and weigh in on the debate – all in 140 characters or fewer.

Let the tweeting begin!