Iraqi Women Re-veiled/More on Hersh Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Latest word is that Iraq's draft constitution will roll back the rights and freedoms of women in the name of Shaaria (Koranic law).   The draft provides that family law matters like marriage, divorce and inheritance would be governed by religious law based on the sect to which the woman's family belongs. 

This would require Shiite women to get their families' permission to marry and give men, but not women, liberal rights to divorce.   This would replace a body of law that has for the past few decades been among the region's most progressive in its treatment of women, according them freedom to marry who they please and requiring judicial oversight of divorces.   

Iraqi women are understandably up in arms, taking to the streets to protest.  There's still a chance that public and international outcry may lead to revisions in the draft before its adopted.

Apropos of all the discussion about the Bush Administration's meddling in the Iraqi electoral process, its worth remembering that letting countries alone to set up their own democracies can open the door for infringement on principles we hold dear, even to the point of undermining what we see as precepts fundamental to democracy. 

That brings me to some interesting line-drawing questions that the Hersh article raises.   I doubt there would be much objection to the U.S. supporting, for example, the women's groups that are protesting these new provisions.   But if those groups backed someone for elected office, that equation might change.   

The perception of American interference in a fledgling democracy is obviously unacceptable.   But what does that mean for the reality of what we do and don't support?

Among the critics of the Administration that Hersh cites is the National Democratic Institute, a body that devotes a major portion of its program to helping develop political parties overseas.  NDI's criteria for who to support include things like "policy positions,"  "democratic commitment," and "level of internal democracy."   These may not be overtly political, but they sure are close.  I suspect that a strong case might have been made that according to NDI's written standards, Allawi might have merited the organization's support.   Other groups Hersh talks about like NED and IRI do similar kinds of work.

One could argue that that the difference is that NDI, NED and IRI are all private groups, so that there activities aren't the work of the U.S. government intervening in a foreign sovereign democracy.  But all 3 groups are primarily supported by the USG, and are known to be so by the groups they work with overseas.

If we are going to work on articulating a new vision for the role the U.S. ought to play in seeding democracy around the world, these lines are ones we will need to figure out where to draw.

Kidnapper President Posted by Michael Signer

On the revelation that Iran's new President may have been an organizer of the 1980 hostage-taking in Tehran, I have to disagree with my friend Kevin Drum, who writes:

I'm not sure that this really matters a lot, since Ahmadinejad has been routinely described as ultra conservative all along and it's pretty obvious that neither he nor the clerics who actually run Iran have any love lost for the United States. But it's an interesting tidbit anyway and I thought you might be interested.

Well, I completely disagree.  I side with Laura Rozen, who writes, "It's hard to imagine that US-Iran relations could get much worse but this would be the kind of historical irony that could do it." 

On reflection, I'm concerned less by what this signifies of any further intentions by (this may have been Kevin's point) Ahmadinejad, than by how the Administration will react to this predicament.  Especially with an Administration possessed with all the nimble diplomatic skills of, say, William Wallace, Ahmadinejad's past is going to present a terrible challenge. 

Ahmadinejad was already going to be a terrible pain in the ass.  The media has generally just described him as a "hard-liner," without going into specifics.  But look at a description in the Khaleej Times of a June 24th campaign rally for the "little street-sweeper":

British, US and Israeli flags had been painted on the ground at the entrance to the mosque so voters could sully them with the soles of their feet as they entered.

Ahmadinejad proceeded to praise the "martyrs of Islam" in his speech, as well as the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini." 

Well, so there's all of that, which could be interpreted (a) as raw affection for suicide bombing, (b) sheer pandering to the lower-class population that constituted his base, (c) a little bit of both. 

But, still, the picture may be more complex.  In his same speech, Ahmadinejad proceeded to extoll freedom.  Freedom, you say?  Really?  Just read what he said:

"Freedom is the spirit of the Islamic revolution and it is God's biggest gift to the Iranian nation.  We want to spread freedom in all aspects and we will have the biggest freedom in the spheres of economy, society, and politics.  Today the freedom in Iran is unique but compared to the desired freedom we are just the beginning of the way."

There are several ways to interpret these remarks:  (1) It's a whole-hearted lie, aimed at converting a popular sort of Western freedom-rhetoric in a media-sensitive age to soften Ahmadinejad's image, a little, (2) To Ahmadinejad, "freedom" is code for "rebellion against Western cultural decadence and political and military imperialism," and (3) There's actually a very subtle emerging doctrine of nativist nationalist Iranian/Islamic proto-democracy whose best aspects are worth cultivating by the United States. 

I think (3) is the answer, bolstered by a fascinating speech titled "Letter to Tomorrow" by Ahmadinejad's predecessor, Khatami, from this spring.  Khatami says (and apologies for the length quotation, but I think it's necessary to truly get the flavor of this new ideology):

Advancing toward a democratic system demands that a democratic culture be nourished. In our country, this culture can thrive and flourish by relying on Islamic justice and modesty, which have brought justice to the humanity, and have also been the factors contributing to the establishment and consolidation of democratic social relations, norms and practices and democratic political processes as well. It is left to our young generation to contemplate on the exiting historical situation and follow up its brave demand for establishment of a democracy compatible with its religion and culture; recognize both its resources and impediments and deal with them prudently. Democracy is a concept, a path and a process.

And then this passage on Iran’s resentment of outside influence.

A generation, which is agonized by dependence, which rightfully considers itself deserving freedom, without breaking away from its own national culture and religion and which is fearful and resentful of extremist and the narrow-minded moves that try to impose their violent and biased guardianship and volition on societies should be made to take charge of its own destiny lest deviated thoughts, narrow-mindedness and illusions hijack the great opportunity afforded to us, our Revolution and our noble people in this era. 

Ahmadinejad's victory speech makes a little more sense in light of his predecessor's remarks, which indicate some appreciation for the Western ideal of freedom, strained through the sieve of Iranian Islamist culture.  Ahmadinejad has already made some surprising overtures to the West,  politically, suggesting in his victory speech:

We are interested in protecting the rights of the Iranian people, and there is no one who can tell us not to use this technology. And if we look at this with mutual trust and understanding and if the European Union is committed to what they promised, we will continue our cooperation with them.

Based on all of this, there's a chance -- a small chance, granted -- that there's a narrow, brambly, but promising path for US-Iranian relations, focused on cultivating the intriguing hybrid of nativist self-respect; education; increasing secularization and a rolling-back of the clerics' institutional power; a growth in democratic institutions; growth in the lower-class, fanatic-breeding economy; and careful, deft diplomacy focused on carrots as well as sticks.

With some blend of these ingredients, there's a chance we could help this populist leader walk out of the wilderness and into the world.

But if we react to this hostage story -- as horrifying as it is -- with the President's customary sturm und drang, we're going to make things worse.

Color on Koran Riots Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Great piece today by Sarah Chayes, who lives in Kandahar, about the role that Pakistani and Iranian operatives may have played in ginning up the riots in Afghanistan over the alleged Koran flushing incident.

Her analysis underscores a point we've been making here about anti-Americanism.   She blames the Pakistanis and Iranians, but also says they found fertile ground for rabble-rousing among an Afghan population that's fed up with U.S. soldiers who do business with corrupt local politicians, who turnover so fast that they've gained little insight into local mores, and who abuse detainees.

Yes, there are those who are against us for policy reasons, such as our growing and lasting military presence near their borders and/or their view that Westernization is a threat to their religious beliefs.  And noone is suggesting that their views should dictate how we set policy in service of U.S. national interests.  But those opponents' (many of whom are truly dangerous) will find their work made much easier when ordinary people have reason to distrust and dislike us.   So the abuses at Bagram and the reports on Koran flushing play right into their hands.

Small Signs that Reason Can Prevail Over Extremism Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Sari Nusseibeh has long been one of the most level-headed and forward leaning Palestinian leaders around.  Now, as President of the West Bank's al Quds University he has joined with Menachem Magidor, the President of Hebrew University in Jerusalem, to call for the British Association of University Teachers to end a boycott of Israeli Universities enacted at the behest of 60 Palestinian organizations.

Nusseibeh said this:

"The reason I don't believe the boycott is the way to go is that I believe peace must be built on the bridge between two civil societies," Professor Nusseibeh said.

While some people believed that one way to deal with Israelis was "to bash them on their heads," he said, "the other way is to reach to their hearts, and it's the reaching out that's important."

Speaking separately, Professor Magidor said: "Academic cooperation is extremely important for creating the infrastructure for, eventually, a peaceful Middle East. What people don't realize sometimes is that while you report a lot about the violence and confrontation, there is below the screen a lot of academic research and collaboration going on."

This is exactly right.  Reconciling divided societies depends heavily on wresting individuals away from the extremes by giving them a stake in the center, and building on the relationships that quietly develop between ordinary people who have something to gain from cooperation and even more to gain from peace and normalcy.  It shouldn't take a don understand that.

Question 1: Mideast Transformation Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Many thanks to Heather and Derek for intrepidly helping answer the 10 toughies I posed a couple of nights ago. I will try to gradually work through thoughts on several of the others. I also urge everyone to read through the thoughtful comments appended to the original post.

The Middle East

: Isn’t it the case that had a progressive been in the White House, Saddam Hussein would still be in power, with the Middle East as stagnant as ever? Do you now admit that the only way to get the region moving was to dislodge a major dictator and launch at least one important country on the route to transformation? How else would you have gotten change afoot?

Before getting to answers, there are three things that – while highly relevant to an evaluation of the Bush Administration’s Mideast policy – are tangential to the question posed here: 1) the grave mistakes made en route to, and in the occupation of, Iraq; 2) the anti-American backlash triggered by those policies; and 3) the legitimate misgivings over whether the apparent progress in the region is sustainable and significant. 

These points are all important subjects of continuing debate, but they don’t answer the question of how progressives would have gotten the Arab world’s head out of the desert sand. They illustrate the wrong way to go about transformation of the region, but don’t illuminate the right way.

Newsweek, Cont'd Posted by Michael Signer

More on Newsweek... To paraphrase Chris Matthews from some years ago, talking about the Al-Gore-Is-Stiff meme that captivated most of the mainstream media, jokes work not because of their conclusion, but because of their premise.  It wasn't the specific formulation of Gore's bedevilments (he was Awkward, he was Condescending, he was Boring) that made all of those iterations so funny -- it was the premise behind them:  that the Prince of Tennessee didn't connect with folks.

If this applies to jokes, it also applies to outrages.  Which explains the outrage throughout the Middle East about the Koran-flushing episode. 

We cannot of course retroactively test history, but the reason that Muslims in Afghanistan and Pakistan rioted was not solely, simply, and exclusively because of the toilet episode.  For the Administration and their toadyish media friends to frame the riots this way attempts, ridiculously and disingenously, to unthread this episode from the tangle of preceding events -- from lies on WMD to abuses at Abu Ghraib -- that constitute the premise that drove the riots:  under the Bush Administration, GWOT policy has been one of bullying and condescension, disregard for local values, and a swaggering parade of ten-gallon hats obscuring a disproportionate focus on energy resources.

And it didn't have to be this way.

Just run the counterfactual.  The Middle East is an interconnected web.  Earthquakes in Aghanistan and Pakistan begin with tremors elsewhere.  Would the Koran episode have triggered riots if the Administration ran foreign policy more through professional diplomats at State than military planners at Defense; if the post-invasion regime in Afghanistan had been run more responsibly; if they had engaged in a subtler and less backfire-prone de-Baathification programme in Iraq; if they had worked directly with anti-war forces rather than brushed them aside, fanning the flames of opposition?

If, if, if.

Suzanne, as always, is on the money here, as is Kevin Drum:

As near as I can tell, the Pentagon has demonstrated more genuine outrage over this incident than they did over months and months of disclosures of similar (and worse) actions at Abu Ghraib. It's revolting.

Kevin gets it right.  What's most aggravating about the White House's approach to the Newsweek story so far is its hyper-political opportunism.  It's well-known in Washington that the Bush White House in general has been proud to the point of boasting about how obedient -- as a general matter -- the press corps has been. 

One exception was the Abu Ghraib coverage. 

We can see in the Administration's approach to Newsweek a chops-licking, sloppy wet kiss of the image of the newspaper's mistake (whether the mistake was actually made -- and it would certainly be grievous if it was -- is immaterial to the Administration's strategic use of the mistake). 

They see this as the signal moment to finally put the press, and, by extension, Congress, the U.N., the Hague, and, for that matter, any legacy-makers, on the defensive about Abu Ghraib and other missteps in the GWOT.

And, as far as casting stones goes, as CAP notes, the Administration itself relied on a single, anonymous source for the mobile biological weapons story.  So where's the outrage there?

Playing Iran Posted by Michael Signer

It’s a mild day in Washington, after a cold, harsh winter, and the always-serious streets below my office window are a little less gray than they’ve been for weeks, months... so the crocus I saw on the way to the Metro this morning clearly becomes a metaphor for a blog post.

The Bush Administration's foreign policy is like a lion in winter--shoulders back and roaring, amid an icy, cold, bleak landscape.  It’s sometimes effective.  But winter always ends, unless you’re stuck somewhere permafrost and vulnerable, like ANWAR, or the movie set of "The Day After Tomorrow" (which, okay, I just saw--NetFlix can make even the proudest movie fan do strange things).

All of which leads me to the current situation with Iran.  We started off so icy, harsh, and unyielding, so trash-talking and blustery--we were all Canseco, so little DiMaggio.

But then things started to warm up.  We started working with the EU, and Secretary Rice began focusing on multilateral sanctions (she explained on Face the Nation that we were winning against Iran because they were “uncomfortable with the notion that they have failed to split the United States and Europe on this matter.”) Who could have imagined such an approach in Iraq?

As things seem certainly to be in flux, it's worth asking whether or not we’ll try to know our enemy this time around -- or just go in arrogantly, guns blazing, like in Iraq.  With neocons preening about Iraq, and Iran the next member of the Axis of Evil in our sights, it's incredibly important that we remember the virtues of good, old-fashioned, flexible diplomacy.  We might draw some encouragement from the recent apparent hidden-hand approach of Secretary Rice, focused on the EU, the UN's Security Council, and constantly switching carrots and sticks, rather than the bludgeon of a Rumsfeld, or the airy abstractions of a Perle. 

But the Secretary's approach won't necessarily take once the honeymoon is over.  To the neocon lion, getting to know your enemy is a dewy-eyed, chirping, springlike notion deserving only a dismissive sniff, a toss of the mane, and a calm padding away toward some red meat.  (Though even a sometime warrior like Ollie North admits Sun Tzu -- every hawk's hero -- embraced the notion).

But even if Iran is a member of the Axis of Evil, the idea that their heads are filled with pure evil, an opaque, incomprehensible substance, like some medieval humor -- well, surely this isn't tactically useful.  If we're to do this right, we need to know what Iran thinks like, what motivates them, and where they're coming from.  Most importantly, we need to know what can we expect from our pressure.

I begin with a principle that would make any pomo undergrad aghast -- the meaning of most societies can be unlocked with simple concepts.  A long time ago, I remember reading that some scholar had figured out that America’s entire national identity lies in the word “hi”--our cheery informality, our sociability, our openness to strangers (well, before the Bush Administration).

Along these lines, in September 2003, Philip Gourevitch published an article called "Alone in the Dark" about North Korea.  Gourevitch focused on the Korean concept of han -- a word which“is an anger and resentment that build up, and at the same time a feeling of frustration or a feeling of desires that are unfulfilled. So resentment, frustration, bitter longing are lumped together.”

The point isn't that you can understand the entire psycho-pathology of the North Koreans with a single word.   History and personalities and current events and our own leadership are all ingredients in this causal stew.

But there’s something to be said for an economical approach to understanding your enemy.

So, turn to Iran’s own words.  If you go to the Government of Iran’s web site, you find a fascinating speech titled "Letter to Tomorrow" by President Khatami.  Khatami’s point in the speech -- rhetorical or not -- seems to be to inspire young Iranians to pursue a narrow, Islamic-Iranian quasi-democracy, while rebutting American charges that Iran hates freedom.  He seems to want to claim ground for Iran to go about its own democratic experiment its own way.

In the spirit of Gourevitch’s analysis, let's at least start with what Khatami says.  Look at this passage:

Advancing toward a democratic system demands that a democratic culture be nourished. In our country, this culture can thrive and flourish by relying on Islamic justice and modesty, which have brought justice to the humanity, and have also been the factors contributing to the establishment and consolidation of democratic social relations, norms and practices and democratic political processes as well. It is left to our young generation to contemplate on the exiting historical situation and follow up its brave demand for establishment of a democracy compatible with its religion and culture; recognize both its resources and impediments and deal with them prudently. Democracy is a concept, a path and a process.

And this one on Iran’s resentment of outside influence.

A generation, which is agonized by dependence, which rightfully considers itself deserving freedom, without breaking away from its own national culture and religion and which is fearful and resentful of extremist and the narrow-minded moves that try to impose their violent and biased guardianship and volition on societies should be made to take charge of its own destiny lest deviated thoughts, narrow-mindedness and illusions hijack the great opportunity afforded to us, our Revolution and our noble people in this era.

These are challenging, messy democratic propositions, smacking less of soaring Jeffersonian vision than cantilevered Madisonian compromise.  In other words, there may be no simple answer to what Iran wants.  Also, unlike our President, I cannot pretend to know the souls of others -- it's certainly possible that Khatami is trying a diplomatic bait-and-switch, a feint toward puppet elections and democratic posturing. 

Setting aside the problems, however, the han equivalent for Iran might well be this:  the political classes are interested in freedom -- but in a distinctly Iranian Islamic form that would avoid what they see as Western decadence, and that would emerge at a slower, more organic, pace. 

The problem is how to combine what they are with what we want.  How do we coax Iran away from nuclear ambitions and toward the democratization agenda?  Will the Iranian national personality run in the direction of lying down before the lion (like the new Libya) or will aggression beget more aggression (as with the Iraqi insurgents)?

The answer will lie in aggressive yet flexible deal-making premised on Iran's own history, culture, and the internal divisions between their democratic visionaries and Islamic hardliners.  We need to understand and embrace the complex internal conflicts of Iran in a modulated, organic diplomacy of pressure and persuasion.  Consider who they are.  Iran still thinks of itself as a revolutionary country; the main bragging right of Khatami’s cabinet ministers seems to be whether they were revolutionaries or not -- indeed, being a guerrilla fighter is a badge of honor.  The country has a lot of young people, and much of Khatami's energy goes toward reconciling their desire for freedom with the conservatives' desire for theocracy.  It’s educated yet paranoid, and riven by tensions between powerful religious conservatives and younger classes yearning to breathe free.  And it desperately wants to retain its own culture; rebuking the perceived decadence of the West was one of the most powerful impulses of the White Revolution, after all. 

It is this country we must play, rather than be played by. 

If we go the other way, we risk backlash rather than democracy.  Three years ago, when the Bush Administration began appealing to the Iranian people to overthrow the Khatami government, Iran's conservatives used the  invasive approach as an excuse to build up their own power. 

This April -- which can be a cruel month -- unintended consequences are the last thing we need in a country already painfully balanced on the knife-edge of tyranny and freedom.  Dealing with this complex society will require a nuanced, flexible approach, rather than a heavy-handed one -- not because we’re wimps, but because we want an easy victory, not a hard one.

Bandar and Anwr Posted by Suzanne Nossel

In his Summer 2004 blockbuster, Plan of Attack, Bob Woodward reported on a deal between the Saudis and Bush to keep oil prices low around the November 2004 elections in order to boost Bush's prospects for staying in office.  This week we see an unexplained all-time spike in oil prices just as the Senate votes 51-49 to approve President Bush's proposal to start drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.  Oh but I almost forgot - - we're no longer collaborating with authoritarian Arab regimes.  In that case, must be pure coincidence.