Undermining the Budget: The Supplemental Problem Posted by Gordon Adams

As military and diplomatic crises multiply overseas, the Congress has continued its merry way providing funding for the Administration’s national security policy. Given the policy chaos, it is not surprising that there would be budgetary chaos, as well, in the way Congress is supporting national security.

This week, the Senate will consider its version of the defense appropriations bill, which includes more than $453 b. for the Defense Department (defense funds are actually higher – nearly $550 b. - since this bill does not include military pay, quality of life and construction funds). Of that amount, $50 b. is included for what is called a “bridge fund.” for Afghanistan, and global military operations against terrorists.

This $50 b. has the status of “emergency funding,” meaning it does not count against the Congress’ self-imposed ceiling for discretionary spending. This $50 b. is the tip of the iceberg for funding, Afghanistan and the so-called Global War on Terror. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), through the current fiscal year ending in September, the nation will have spent another $437 b. on Iraq, Afghanistan, and the struggle with terrorism, nearly three quarters of it for operations in Iraq alone, and over 90% of it for the military.

All of this spending has been provided as “emergency” or “emergency supplemental” funding. And it is likely to continue. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the nation is likely to spend another $371 b. on these operations between now and 2016, even with the deployed forces shrinking.

Defense Industry and Congress: No Shame in Sight Posted by Lorelei Kelly

You would think that a $330 billion tab for two ongoing wars would create a bit of caution and conservation among those who profit from America's unparalleled military might.  Not so. This week the Senate defeated an amendment that would have required tough oversight standards for military contractors. I'm no conspiracy theorist, but you have to wonder. The defeat of increased oversight likely made Halliburton happy (a company that gives 95% of its campaign contributions to Republicans). 

Just who is benefiting from this outsourcing of our government? Certainly not taxpayers. The House Government Reform Committee's minority staff has reported an 86% increase in contracts with private businesses, from $203 billion in 2000 to $377.5 billion a year in 2005 - a growth rate nearly double that of federal spending as a whole.

But the abuse of national security dollars is a special category of shame. And the facts, no matter how they add up, don't seem to make a dent in the problem. Today the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report that basically says the Air Force's prized F-22 should be shelved  (this is a fighter plane designed for the Cold War that has caused egregious cost-overruns).   This news comes in the wake of the news that the Air Force is also planning to cut 40,000 people from its ranks in order to pay for weapons platforms (including the F-22).

When will our military leaders and our Congress fully understand that--in today's post 9/11 world--human beings ARE our best defense platform?  There's a reason that Special Forces are the poster child of the military. They can shoot, speak foreign languages and set up a criminal justice system. No spangley widget nor contractor can do this as well. Our defense needs to be in the hands of such dedicated, well-trained public servants.

The Use of Force Panel Posted by Suzanne Nossel

This should be where the rubber meets the road.  Richard Holbrooke, Joschka Fischer, Michele Flournoy and Larry Korb are on the podium, a panel chaired by John Ruggie.  So far we've had a case for "strategic redeployment" out of Iraq from Larry Korb, and a critique of the Bush Admin's definition of preemptive war by Michele Flournoy. 

Ruggie asks Holbrooke what the next President ought to do on Iraq, assuming he's handed the problem as Bush seems to intend:   

Holbrooke highlights Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan as a collective morass in which our position is deteriorating in every individual country.  Says we unaccountably outsourced our Iran policy for five years to other countries, rather than talking directly.  Last week's half-measure deserves very light applause.  Afghanistan is a deteriorating disaster - the Administration says he's too pessimistic but based on his trips there there's no basis for optimism.

He and our own Mort Halperin now agree that Iraq is worse than Vietnam both in its consequences and the policy challenge posed by the need to extricate.  Neither thought they would ever say that about any foreign policy quandary.  It's astonishing that with 1000 days left Bush is already saying he plans to hand this to his successor - its a guaranteed 2000+ more casualties.  Plus our international standing will only continue to wane.

Administration's dilemma is whether to draw down troops for political reasons or increase troops for strategic reasons.  Says Haditha reflects a climate of permissiveness throughout the power structure - the marines there don't know the name Alberto Gonzalez but got the message.  He deeply regrets giving the Admin qualified support on Iraq.  The most prescient statement on Iraq was Al Gore's speech in 2002 at the Commonwealth Club in San Fran.  Well worth a re-read.

If Bush buck-passes as is his stated intent, it now looks like the 2008 election may be a referendum on Iraq.  In office, a new president will have to end the war to have a hope of reelection in 2012.

So what to do??  Many good ideas have been put forward.  Korb's Strategic Redeployment.  Gelb and Biden's Partition Plan.  Talk of a regional forum or internationalizing the conflict are just rhetoric.  We need to talk about things we can do, not what we dream others could or should do.  (He didn't say this, but this is the import and I agree).

We need to get rid of Rumsfeld, as when McNamara was replaced by Clark Clifford to start to turn the tide.

Fischer's up.  America is indispensible.  He says it not because he wants it to be so, but having witnessed it.  If we give up our traditional role in the world, it will be a disaster.  We all but invented international law, international organizations.  He cannot imagine a peaceful world without these instruments - - this is the most rousing defense of American exceptionalism to be sounded this morning.  But its being made by a foreigner.

Asking permission to momentarily defend the neocons, he does think we need to work to modernize the Middle East and tackle the structures that stand in the way of that.  That said, the place to start was not Iraq (Palestine would be my guess).

So, What About Civilian Control? Posted by Heather Hurlburt

It’s gotten awfully trendy to toss around concerns over civilian control of the military.  But do we really have a problem, and if so, what is it?

This week, conservative Republicans think that naming an active-duty military officer to head the CIA puts dangerous pressure on civilian control of intelligence affairs.

Last month, when half-a-dozen retired generals called for Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s resignation, a line of worry ran from the White House talking points to the Washington Post editorial board and even some progressives:  the generals were, in the words of the Post, assaulting "the essential democratic principle of military subordination to civilian control…. If [the generals] are successful in forcing Mr. Rumsfeld's resignation, they will set an ugly precedent."

And, lest we forget, for much of the 1990s we heard from the right how the incompetent Clinton Administration was unable to master the military.

Now, I’m in a strange position here.  I do think we have a problem with the balance of power in our civil-military relationship.  But our friends on the right are wringing their hands about symptoms, not root causes.  Retired generals trashing Don Rumsfeld, or Les Aspin for that matter, is hardly the heart of the matter.  Neither is appointing active-duty military officers to senior positions in intelligence, the war on drugs, etc. etc.

Last month the problem was (retired) military officials questioning the judgement and qualifications of the civilian Secretary of Defense.  This, said Charles Krauthammer, might lead to factions within the active-duty military:

That happens in places such as Hussein's Iraq, Pinochet's Chile or your run-of-the-mill banana republic. And when it does, outsiders (including the United States) do their best to exploit it, seeking out the dissident factions to either stage a coup or force the government to change policy.

Lest you think I am picking an extreme target here, Slate’s Fred Kaplan agreed that the long-term threat is factionalism within the force.

And when you stop to look at the analyses, folks have quite different definitions of what the problem is.

This week the problem seems to be expanding military control of our intelligence apparatus:

Dennis Hastert said “I don’t think a military guy should be head of the CIA, frankly.”

Senator Susan Collins saw the problem as DoD moving to take control of the intelligence apparatus by “seeking to fill any vacuum or create one if necessary.” 

Until I Figure Out whether the Iranian President is Crazy... Posted by Shadi Hamid

I'm still trying to figure out whether Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is rational. In the meantime, here is my latest article on the "origins" of the nuclear confrontation with Iran, beginning with the 1953 coup (can you say "blowback" ?).

National Security Vision: Right, Left, or Dare to Be Different? Posted by Gordon Adams

Once again the Democrats have tried to outflank the Republicans on the right on national security. And, once more, the Republicans, and the Administration have out-maneuvered them. The Dubai Ports World management deal will go into overtime, with a 45-day CFIUS review, as it should have had in the first place.

The lesson should be clear. The issue with the administration’s national security policies is not one of who can be tougher. Al Gore tried that; so did John Kerry. No sale! The Republicans will always win the fight, positioned that way.

Many Democrats have been posing the wrong issue, and not with a lot of credibility. If they try to look tougher than the Republicans, it doesn’t pass the laugh test. If they move to the left, they are vulnerable to being soft on American national security.

Exploiting Terrorist Dysfunction Posted by Lorelei Kelly

West Point's Combatting Terrorism Center has produced report that dissects Al Qa'ida through a group dynamics model straight out of a business school organizational behavior class.  They put forward the idea that members have different goals and objectives, and preferred strategies for achieving these ends.  The authors then ask the question, how might we exploit the weak links in these human relationships?

While capture-kill options may be most effective for certain individuals—e.g., operational commanders—we identify a number of non-lethal prescriptions that take into account differences in al-Qa’ida members’ preferences and commitment to the cause.

The US invested time and money in social science research until about the end of the Vietnam War, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided they would never fight an irregular war again.  Simple linear theories like nuclear deterrence and containment prevailed for the next few decades. But, looking around today,  technology is not the key to victory in the war against terrorism...(nor Iraq, nor Afghanistan)  so social science research is again gaining ground.  The report is fairly academic (and I'm only half way through it) but it provides yet more human-level analysis for today's greatest challenge--that of preventing and disrupting catastrophic criminal networks.

The terrorists’ challenge is simple to describe. For security reasons, political and ideological leaders, the principals, have to delegate certain duties—planning attacks, soliciting funds, recruiting, and the like—to middlemen or low-level operatives, their agents. Such delegation poses no problem if all the agents are perfectly committed to the cause and agree with leaders on how best to serve the cause. Under those conditions, the preferences of the principals and their agents will be perfectly aligned, and the agents will act exactly as the principals would like.

      However, preferences aren’t always aligned.  Read more here.

National Security: Rove's Achille's Heel Posted by Lorelei Kelly

Two weeks ago, Karl Rove addressed the conservative faithful here in Washington with a typical display of magic.  In front of  an audience with severe political indigestion, (caused by a diet rich in lobbyists minus principles) Rove previewed his 2006 electoral strategy.  The rabbit he pulled out of the hat was the Energizer Bunny-- wound up and clanking "liberals are weak on defense, soft on security, and won't keep you safe"  Specifically he said:

At the core, we are dealing with two parties that have fundamentally different views on national security. Republicans have a post-9/11 worldview - and many Democrats have a pre-9/11 worldview. That doesn't make them unpatriotic, not at all. But it does make them wrong - deeply and profoundly and consistently wrong.

Then this week Rove's employer rolled out a defense strategy and a federal budget that hearkens back to approximately  1985.  But definately pre-9/11.  Why?  Because the Bush Administration--with its profoundly wrong worldview-- refuses to lay out a strong and effective defense strategy for post-9/11 threats.  One primary lesson from both Iraq and Afghanistan is that the way to keep our military strong is to share the responsibilities for national security across the government--made obvious by the gaps in our post-war reconstruction efforts.  Defense is just one part of a national security strategy, but the vast majority of security dollars go to the defense budget (over half a trillion dollars for 2007).  Re-balancing spending across the government is the work of decades, but today we're draining the coffers of defense to purchase billions of dollars worth of weapons designed to thwart the Soviet Union. This must stop.  These "pre 9/11" priorities are being foisted on us when our National Guard troops need basic items like trucks, ammo and language training.

Ever since Katrina, our Commander in Chief has lost credibility on the issue that he ran on: national security.  Many Americans have a nagging, uncomfortable feeling that these guys really don't know what they are talking about. Its time for liberals to hit back hard.  This will require renewed interest, updated language and a national security lead on every issue that comes into public conversation.  We must not let Rove be right.   First step: let go of the "guns versus butter" debate pronto.  What we need now is a guns versus guns debate.

The New National Security Budget: Are We Getting the Tools Right? Posted by Gordon Adams

With the arrival today of the proposed Fiscal Year 2007 budget, we now know what the administration wants to spend on national security next year: at least $578.2 b. 

- The Defense Department would get 84.6% of the total - $439.3 b. (seven percent higher than the $410.7 b. it received from the Congress for FY 2006), plus a $50 b. down payment for Iraq, Afghanistan, and the “war on terror” next year (DOD is also seeking a supplemental budget of another $70 for this year’s costs of that war, on top of the additional $50 b. it already got from Congress.)

- Homeland Security funding (including the Department of Homeland Security) would be 9.3% of the total, growing to $53.8 b., $3.4 b. or six percent over the FY 2006 level. 

- International affairs (including the State Department and AID) would be 6.1% of the total rise to $35.1 b., an increase of $3.5 b. or over 11 percent from what Congress provided for FY 2006. 

These numbers suggest that, as in years past, America’s tools of statecraft are not in balance. Once again, the tool “on steroids” is the Department of Defense, while international affairs is more on “life support.” This is why, over the years, the military services have been asked to carry such a large share of dealing with the new national security challenges – it seems like the best organized and best funded department to do the job. Moreover, the new Quadrennial Defense Review makes it clear that, as far as the Defense Department is concerned, its commitment to what the Pentagon calls the “long war” will continue well into the future, and will be reflected in future defense budgets.

Bulk the Army or Review the Policy: The Defense Dilemma Posted by Gordon Adams

The Quadrennial Defense Review appears today, the fourth since the Bottom Up Review of 1993. Newspaper columns are going to be filled with discussions of “irregular” conflicts and “catastrophic” threats, and the “long war” Secretary Rumsfeld announced this week at the National Press Club. The underlying debate, though, is going to focus on the Army – is it overstretched and near the breaking point, or is it a “Goldilocks” force – just right for what it is being asked to do. The answer to this question, however, is not “how much should we add to the Army,” but what is the Army for.

From the narrow point of view, there is no doubt the Army is overstretched. Maintaining 160,000 troops in Iraq, plus another roughly 30,000 at sea or in neighboring Kuwait, preparing a next wave of forces to go there, and resetting the forces that came home not only costs a lot (see that $70 b. Iraq supplemental coming this month) but goes well beyond the algorithm the Army likes to use for deploying its forces. Minimally, the Army likes three units for every rotation: one in the field, one getting ready to go, and one coming back to rest, retrain and reequip. In Iraq, it is more like one coming back and one going out, period. Can’t do that without calling up the reserves, so we have done that, with more than 600,000 men and women now on active duty in the Army.