Iran, Israel and Rock Star Prescience Posted by David Shorr

True story. In September 2008 I was waiting for a flight at Minneapolis airport. And so were the members of Rage Against the Machine. Which was how I found myself in a foreign policy discussion with Zack de la Rocha. (Our flight also gave me a chance to introduce Tom Morello to Ben Stein, but that's another story.)

The upshot of my chat with the RATM frontman was his observation that if Israel attacked Iran, that could pose big problems for us foreign policy establishment types. Not that de la Rocha and I would share views on Israel, but he could see tricky dilemmas down the road. Sure enough, here we are three plus years later, watching the Israeli government reaching for the lid of that very pandora's box. So a tip of the hat goes to Zack for his keen instinct.

The last few weeks have brought such a flood of analysis and commentary that there's a lot to choose from, but let me highlight and react to some of the points I found most interesting. Starting with Colin Kahl's excellent Foreign Affairs essay. Kahl offered some very useful reminders from the Iraq case. For instance, we know that bombing facilities will merely delay a nuclear program, rather than permanently halt it, because that's what happened after Israel bombed Osirak in 1981. It hardly prevented us from having to deal with the issue in the 1990s. I should quickly add that when people argue for the value of such a delay, that is hardly a strategic perspective.

The discussion of Israel's role in the first Gulf War in 1991 is quite interesting too from our current vantage point the perspective of Republicans' foreign policy message. Just to recall, President George H.W. Bush prevailed upon Israel to refrain from letting itself be pulled into the war -- despite Saddam's deliberate provocation of missile attacks on Israel. In return, Bush 41 helped shield Israel from the attacks with the Patriot anti-missile system, but the restraint shown by Israel was impressive. The main point of this restraint was that Israel's direct involvement would blur the stakes and distract from a clear focus on Iraq. In the geopolitics of the region, Israel brings added layers of conflict and sensitivity. In other words, we can't look only through the prism of America's own view of Israel as a close ally, but also the attitude and response of other players. As a matter of simple strategic calculus, duh. 

But wait, let's pause to note the huge disconnect between this kind of clear eyed-ness and the 2012 Republican competition over who can place themselves farthest to the right on the Israeli domestic political spectrum. We cannot highlight this crucial point enough. When the Republican candidates talk about the nation of Israel (see, support of) their rhetoric more accurately applies to a certain segment of opinion in Israel. One more time: the Israeli national security establishment and political elite are sharply divided over the wisdom of attacking Iran.

The other major issue, of course, is the prospect for a diplomatic resolution with Iran over its nuclear program. On this question, no one maps the terrain better than Trita Parsi, even if you don't completely agree with him. Trita has an excellent new book, A Single Roll of the Dice. But if you're not going to read the book, his blog post over at Fareed Zakarkia's Global Public Square blog lays out the core problems. 

Trita gives President Obama and his administration a lot of credit for placing Iran under heavy pressure, and for the deft diplomacy it took to build international support. His main critique concerns the trade-offs between exerting pressure (mainly sanctions) and leaving space for diplomatic negotiations. As he sees it, Obama's own so-called "pressure track" has boxed him in and potentially put a diplomatic solution out of reach. 

This is mainly a debate between different views of how to bring the Iranians to the table. From one vantage, Iran has a genuine interest in reaching an agreement, and the key things for the West are patience, diligence and a comprehensive agenda. My reading of Trita is that he sees the need for pressure, but also views it as essential to calibrate the pressure to give diplomacy enough time and patience for it to work. What these two views share is a worry that mounting Iranian mistrust may have reached a threshold that luring them to the negotiating table will be difficult to impossible. 

So where does the administration's policy come down on this question? The way I interpret it, the policy assumes Tehran is disposed against an agreement -- preferring the freedom of action to master the uranium enrichment process. Not that they're implacable and and unwilling to meet outside powers' demands for transparency and monitoring. Rather, it's an assumption that Iranian cooperation rests squarely on the cost associated with continued resistance. For critics who see an over-reliance on pressure, the administration is underestimating Iran's ability to withstand hardship. To which I'd respond that they might be overestimating it's ability to withstand isolation. Putting it another way, Iranian leaders know they can't sustain the same degree of autarky as North Korea's Kim family regime. As Iran moves closer to full-pariah status, they will start to alter their calculation.

Now finally to the core substantive quandary of this problem: whether a diplomatic solution would let Iran continue its uranium enrichment. As Trita explains, this question is actually a source of tension mainly between the United States and Israel. (Bill Keller delved into the wonkish practicalities of the issue in a recent post over at NYTimes.com.) The Israelis take a very hard line against any ongoing future enrichment by Iran. 

This is where the issue tilts toward the need to accomodate Iran somewhat in order to reach a deal -- aka the complete fantasy under Obama's predecessor of a diplomatic outcome whereby Iran totally capitulates. As it happens, the authors of an op-ed on the subject in today's NYTimes (Ambassadors Tom Pickering and Bill Luers) told us nearly four years ago in a much-cited NY Review of Books essay that zero enrichment was, practically speaking, a non-starter. Now as we look into the abyss of a new war with Iran, let me put the question directly. If an agreement can be reached that permits some enrichment -- under close international supervision -- is that a prospect really worthy of going to war?

The rumors of war have significantly notched up the danger of a real catastrophe. Meanwhile, it's the same tangled mess it's always been. Even a rock star could see that.

Photo: thetripwirenyc