China, Democracy and Making Government Work Posted by Jacob Stokes

I’m late to this, but over at Democracy in America, there’s a well-informed and balanced discussion about whether China’s growing wealth will push the country’s political system towards democracy and what this means for the relative competitiveness of democracy vs. Chinese-style authoritarianism. The piece is worth the time, and it contains a strong message towards the end about what’s needed for the democratic model, not only to continue to best China’s authoritarian model, but also to continue to be distinct from it (i.e. complex debates being decided by accountable, democratic institutions rather an unaccountable bodies of technocrats). This message that has special resonance in the context of today’s deficit debate. Key paragraphs below:

Democracy is supposed to build public legitimacy for governance. I think there's a legitimacy deficit because of the way communications work nowadays. Democracy is also supposed to communicate problems to government so that government can respond. I think the constant crisis-atmosphere contrarianism of the current media and internet environment overwhelms the signal-to-noise ratio there, and preoccupies government with addressing blaring non-issues. And I think this has all weakened the advantage that democracies have generally enjoyed over autocracies in addressing real problems and in generating public support for fixing them. I think the result of that could well be that an increasing number of important policymaking issues are gradually shifted to non-democratic institutions, while political democracy increasingly devolves into a form of reality-TV contest.

Or maybe I'm just contributing to the blaring non-issue alarmism here. Thailand has recently taken a strong turn back towards democracy; maybe the Red Shirt/Yellow Shirt years were just growing pains, no worse than what France went through on its way to democracy in the 19th century, and a lot less bloody. The Arab world has just seen a bunch of autocratic regimes fall, and if some of those countries move towards democracy while others don't, that'll be par for the historical course. Here in America, well, if we throw away a perfectly good 200-year-old credit rating, that'll be pretty dumb, but nobody's killing each other yet. And American politics were often mean and stupid in the old days too, long before the internet arrived. But what I would say is that we should not be comfortably sure of anything. We're not in an era when fascism is on the march, but we are in an era when democracy is not generally showing its best governing face. What that means, I think, is that people who believe in democracy on moral grounds should make the case, again, on moral grounds, rather than relying on a comfortable assumption that countries will naturally go democratic as they get richer. And I think the fact that autocracies sometimes enjoy real advantages in policymaking should remind us of the need to behave responsibly in democratic activity and to make sure that our representative institutions are actually capable of governing, and are not paralysed by political brinksmanship.

Ahmed Wali Karzai: Embodiment of a Flawed System Posted by Jacob Stokes

There’s a lot of good commentary out today on Ahmed Wali Karzai, most of which seeks to answer the question: Is this good or bad for the U.S. mission to stabilize the country?

Brian Katulis takes a crack:

Although it is too early to assess what impact his assassination will have on the rough-and-tumble politics of Kandahar, Ahmad Wali Karzai’s killing and the role he played in recent years serves as a reminder of how one wields power in Afghanistan and what it means when people talk about sharing power and using terms like reconciliation. In today’s Afghanistan, these words mean who will control the guns and money. And for all of the talk about “smart power” and civilian surges, the big money in Afghanistan today is still wrapped up in running criminal networks, drug trafficking, and controlling the shipping networks.

And Josh Foust has searing indictment of AWK:

Whatever his influence as a political stabilizer, though, Ahmed Wali was also an economic and political nightmare. He would, in essence, hold court at his many offices and mansions around Kandahar city, circumventing the "legitimate" government and doling out to his supplicants handfuls of cash everyone whispered were gained through smuggling opium. From a business perspective, AWK was a mafia don, controlling his own business interests with an iron fist and, the rumors go, violently attacking anyone who posed too much competition… When your entire modus operandi is based on friendly local strongmen, you rise and fall on their backs.

Ahmed Rashid explains how the U.S. relied on AWK:

However much Ahmed Wali Karzai was loved or loathed, his death leaves a huge political vacuum for the Americans and President Karzai at a critical moment for three efforts — the war against the Taliban, the start of the drawing down of American forces, and American efforts to talk to the Taliban and forge a peace agreement.

Ahmed Wali Karzai was involved in all three. He had forged tribal alliances to defend his half brother’s presidency and extend the central government’s rule outside Kabul. He openly helped American and British forces with strategic advice and knowledge of the tribes, and ran a clandestine Afghan special operations team for the C.I.A. And, as early as 2007, he was the first prominent Afghan leader to start talks with the Taliban in a bid to end the war.

Reading these, the obvious lesson for ISAF seems to be the hardest to learn: When you build political strategy around a single man or family – AWK, Hamid Karzai, whoever – you’re not only giving them great power which will likely result in abuse. (The money line in Rashid’s piece: “His tribal politics often led his rivals to join the Taliban.”) But you’re also ensuring that the system is tied to their heartbeat. Once it stops, so does the system.

So let’s not let the death of AWK go to waste. It’s time to focus on building a political system that can outlast our temporary partners. If we can't find a way to do that given the huge amounts of resources dedicated to the war, then we should remove those resources.

Photo Credit: The Guardian

Sudan Split Is Far From a Guarantee for Peace Posted by The Editors

The following post is from Amanda Hsiao who blogs on Sudan for the Enough Project. 

This Saturday, South Sudanese around the world will exuberantly celebrate the birth of the new country of South Sudan. Concerted international diplomacy, including the robust efforts of the Obama administration, helped pave the way for this moment, the culmination of a 2005 peace agreement brokered by the international community between the Sudanese government and what was then the southern rebel movement, the SPLM/A, to end two decades of war. But even as the arrival of South Sudan on the world stage is evidence of a diplomatic success, the insecurity that has proliferated in both the North and the South is a sharp reminder of the need for a comprehensive (US) approach to the multiple Sudanese conflicts.

In early June, violence broke out between Sudanese government forces and fighters in South Kordofan, a region that sits atop the North-South Sudan border. Reports trickling out from the ground describe government forces targeting civilians based on political sympathies and ethnic affiliations, searching house-to-house for opposition, and indiscriminately bombing large areas. “These acts could constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity,” said U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice in remarks at a Security Council briefing. Government authorities continue to deny access to international humanitarians, even coercing displaced populations to leave the refuge of U.N.-monitored areas. Untold numbers of civilians are dead, and at least 73,000 are displaced Violent management of dissent is not a new strategy for the regime in Khartoum, the same one that oversaw the devastation in Darfur, a region that today continues to be plagued by insecurity; just this year, the government has bombed Darfur 80 times. But unlike South Sudan, which experienced years of war with Khartoum to finally secede this weekend, the restive regions of South Kordofan and Darfur will still be part of Sudan come Saturday. The U.S. cannot overlook the chronic instability of Sudan which secession does not address. 

Hostilities between North and South Sudan may not be over either. In May, the Sudanese government sent its troops to forcibly take over Abyei, a border area claimed by constituencies on both sides, even though negotiations over its status were ongoing. Peacekeepers are arriving to secure the area, but how the South Sudanese government will respond once it has acquired sovereignty, is unclear. The two governments have not agreed on how they will split oil revenues after separation. Most of the oil lies in the South, but the infrastructure for exporting the oil lies in the North, an interdependence that should demand cooperation and peace between the two states. 

The host of unsettled issues means that the two parties may ramp up military aggressions, proxy violence, or manipulations of other sorts to strengthen their bargaining position at the negotiating table. In recent months, a blockade along the North-South border, stemming the usual traffic of goods, has exponentially raised the prices of key commodities in South Sudan; southern officials blame Khartoum. The African Union panel that is facilitating negotiations has shown almost no concrete progress for its year-long efforts to secure an agreement.   

South Sudan itself faces myriad challenges, whether it be the dearth of basic infrastructure or capacity in the country, or the proliferation of militias within its borders. The way the government has managed diversity, dissent, and expectations within its population so far do not bode well for the future of the state. The U.S. can play an influential role in nudging the government toward inclusive politics and in supporting the professionalization of the South Sudanese army, an institution that has at times targeted, rather than protected, its own civilians in the name of security. 

Going forward, the U.S. government must stay deeply engaged with efforts to stabilize both South Sudan and Sudan. In the South, the U.S. must wield the significant leverage it has to convince leaders to take the necessary steps toward peace. With Sudan, the relationship is much more hostile, and complicated by a deep distrust on the part of Khartoum. What is clear though, is that the graduated path of incentives leading to normalization offered by the U.S. last year was not enough to convince the regime away from military actions and the breaking of peace pacts. 

With the independence of the South, its time for the U.S. to rethink its approach to Sudan. New pressure points need to be identified in coordination with international partners, whether they be the expansion of sanctions, the halting of international debt relief talks, or more robust efforts to reach international actors who hold Sudan’s purse strings. U.S.  diplomatic efforts to resolve Sudan’s conflicts should shift from its current piecemeal approach—separate negotiations and peacekeeping missions for each individual crisis—to a holistic strategy that reflects the fact that behind the scenes, it’s the same regime pulling the same strings. 

The Right’s Rigid Response to Warsame Posted by James Lamond

A lot has been made over the handling of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame. Warsame, was arrested in April held by in U.S. custody for two months.  He was interrogated by the High-Value Interrogation Group – in accordance with the Geneva Convention. This is reported to have yielded significant intelligence, including information establishing a stronger connection between the Somali-based al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) than previously thought. Over the weekend, he was transferred to the Southern District of New York, and was charged with nine counts related to accusations that he provided support to the Shabab in Somalia and AQAP. The Southern District of New York has the most terrorism convictions of any of the over 200 convictions in federal courts since 9/11 – considerably more than the six in a military commission.  

But taking a terrorist off the battlefield, collecting valuable intelligence and placing him in the venue most likely to put him behind bars was not enough to make conservatives happy.

Senate Majority Mitch McConnell responded saying: 

“This ideological rigidity being displayed by the Administration is harming the national security of the United States of America….The administration’s actions are inexplicable, create unnecessary risks here at home, and do nothing to increase the security of the United States.”  

Senator Lindsay Graham similarly stated: 

“They are so afraid to use Gitmo that they are basically making decisions around not having to use Gitmo, rather than what’s best for the country… What’s best for the nation is to treat these foreign fighters as enemy combatants.”

Senator Susan Collins, said:

"A foreign national who fought on behalf of al-Shabaab in Somalia – and who was captured by our military overseas – should be tried in a military commission, not a federal civilian court in New York or anywhere else in our country." 

And Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Buck McKeon said that: 

“The transfer of this terrorist detainee directly contradicts Congressional intent and the will of the American people. Congress has spoken clearly multiple times — including explicitly in pending legislation — of the perils of bringing terrorists onto U.S. soil."

To summarize: The right thinks the Obama administration is wrong because with its “ideological rigidity” the administration is not making the decisions that are best for the country, which creates risk at home and undermines the will of Congress.

But the ideological rigidity is clearly coming from the other direction. Conservatives in Congress have two responses to anything terror-related: Obama got it wrong and how can we use military commissions/Guantanamo more. 

Ken Gude at CAP rightly points out, this case “has provoked the now-typical reaction from conservatives who reflexively oppose every Obama administration action as a radical departure from U.S. norms that threatens the security of the nation.” Every time there is either a terrorism case, or a policy decision that is in line with what has been done over past adminstrations from both parties the right acts as if it is some radical departure from the norm. For example, it was never considered controversial to read terrorism suspects their Miranda rights.  After all it was done under the Bush administration in cases including Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber.” Yet when a nearly identical case occurred in December of 2009 and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab the “underwear bomber” was read his Miranda Rights, the right was up in arms.  Similar outcries came a few months later with the Times Square case. 

But besides the political ideology of “Obama has it wrong” there is also an ideology on the policy. There is consistently a move towards a more extreme policy of why we should use Guantanamo more – even though almost all national security experts agree and the Bush adminstration stated it should be closed – and that we need to use military commissions – despite the fact that they have been drastically less effective than their civilian counterparts. There is pending legislation, introduced in the House by Rep. Buck McKeon, that would require military detention or military commissions for terrorism suspects.  Even Ben Wittes, a proponent of the legitimacy of military commissions, responded conservatives’ comments on the use of military commissions that: “They are not the only tools. And in many cases, they will not be the best tools.” What remains most astonishing is that civilian courts have proven time and again to be more effective than military commissions, yet conservatives continue advocate on their behalf.  

Talk about ideological rigidity. 

Obama Nuclear Arms Reduction Blamed for Proliferation Threat Posted by David Shorr

The world faces mounting threats of nuclear proliferation in Iran, North Korea, and potentially Saudi Arabia. Do you want to know why? Well according to Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation, one major cause is the US administration's own nuclear arms control policy. (Hat tip to Nonproliferation Review editor Stephen Schwartz.) Peter connects the dots for us in his lead paragraph:

President Obama's "lead by example" nuclear-nonproliferation policy of strategic-weapons cuts and treaties (such as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia) isn't having the desired effect. In fact, the "fallout" is quite the opposite: All the news points toward a more nuclear world.

Brookes' New York Post column goes on to catalogue a number of worrisome developments and prospects. What's missing from the piece, though, is an explanation of how reductions in US and Russian arsenals of thousands of n-weapons worsens matters in the Mideast or Northeast Asia. All Brookes offers is this breezy observation:

So, while Team Obama spends its time focusing on downsizing our strategic forces and future, others are upsizing theirs. Coincidence? Probably not.

What's the nonproliferation strategy here? If the United States kept all of our nuclear weapons, then Iran, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia wouldn't pursue military nuclear programs? Does nuclear nonproliferation hinge on America's ability to incinerate adversaries 50 times over rather than, say, merely 10? Or is Brookes saying that the administration needs to spend less time on arms control and more on nonproliferation. Last time I checked, the Obama administration has been doggedly cajoling other governments to impose heightened unilateral sanctions against Iran -- after lining up votes for multilateral sanctions, that is (on the latter, ditto North Korea).

Brookes' seems to take the radical and naive view that the size of America's nuclear arsenal will in itself prevent new countries from obtaining nuclear weapons. It's a hyper-realist idea, I guess, that with enough military power we can cow others into submission. It doesn't help explain why North Korea made it's most dramatic nuclear arms progress during the previous administration, but I digress.

Where Brookes computes the raw balance of military forces, the policy and political mainstream view it as a matter of the international community's standards of acceptable behavior. Fortunately, nuclear nonproliferation isn't merely a question of doing what America says; the taboo against nuclear weapons was established in the 1970 Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) and is a pillar of the international order.

But the United States can't have it both ways. Along with the requirement for non-nuclear weapon nations to remain that way, the NPT called on the world's nuclear "haves" to disarm. In the decades since the NPT was adopted, the US, Russia, and other nuclear powers have made modest progress in reducing their arsenals. They could get away with it because the treaty's nonoproliferation provisions are more specific than those on disarmament, but ultimately there is a classic problem of hypocrisy faced by the do-as-I-say-not-as-I-do posture Peter seems to recommend. Bottom line: meaningful nuclear arms reductions are the price the United States must pay to maintain our international credibility, moral authority, and support. 

Looking back at last December's Senate debate on ratification of the US-Russian New START treaty, I'm glad to say that Peter's approach represents the far-Right rather than the sober conservative view within the GOP. Tennessee's Senator Bob Corker endorsed the treaty's importance for nonproliferation, and Senator George Voinovich of Ohio specifically highlighted the need for Russia's help in multilateral pressure on Iran.

Photo: John Uhles

Ninety Years On, Communism in China Posted by Jacob Stokes

Today the Chinese Communist Party celebrates 90 years of existence (the China Digital Times has a good roundup here). FP’s Christina Larson reports that every public TV in the country is tuned into the festivities, whether people are watching or not.

This begs the obvious question: Is it still Mao’s party? The consensus seems to be, no, the Party’s fundamental nature has shifted from an organization focused on protecting ideology to one focused on keeping power.

Minxin Pei of the Brookings Institution explains: 

Yet if asked, “What does the Communist Party stand for,” few Chinese leaders today could give a coherent or honest answer. 

This much we know: It no longer stands for a utopian ideology. If there is one ideology that the party represents, it is the ideology of power. The sole justification for the party’s rule is the imperative to stay in power. 

Nor does the party stand for China’s masses. Despite efforts to broaden its social base and make it more connected with China’s dynamic and diverse society, the party today has evolved into a self-serving, bureaucratized political patronage machine. It is undeniably an elitist party, with more than 70 percent of its members recruited from government officials, the military, college graduates, businessmen and professionals.

Attempts to shroud the power-keeping motive have taken several forms in recent years, most famously as an ongoing competition between Maoist ideology and a resurgence of Confucian values. Jeffery Wasserstrom of UC-Irvine argues that it all boils down to the same thing (he also presents a very balanced view of the CPC’s record in FP here): 

There is nothing new about China being led by authoritarian modernizers who think that invoking “traditional values” can help them convince the masses that they believe in something greater than simply maintaining their positions in power. What is novel is that, at present, it seems to make little difference whether the “tradition” invoked is Confucian yellow, Maoist red, or a curious mashup of the two.

The Chinese people aren’t fooled. There's been progress, but it's largely unequal and riddled with corruption. That has the Party scared, writes David Shambaugh of Brookings: 

Instead of being secure and confident, [the Party] is seemingly frozen in fear of the future, unsure about its grip over ethnic regions (Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia), afraid of rising social unrest and ad hoc demonstrations, worried about the macro-economy and foreign relations, and on the cusp of a major leadership transition in 2012… China’s Communist Party at 90 is a bit like many 90-year-olds: increasingly infirm, fearful, experimenting with ways to prolong life, but overwhelmed by the complexities of managing it. 

This is not to say the Party sits on the verge of collapse. But it should put into perspective the China-as-ten-feet-tall narrative we’re likely to hear in the coming election.

Photo: China Daily