Start Another Fire and Watch It Slowly Die: The Aftermath of Regime Change Posted by Eric Martin

Adam Curtis, a documentary filmmaker, traces a loose history of the modern concept of humanitarian intervention in the West and its philosophical underpinnings - punctuated, unsurprisingly, with several compelling documentary film clips.

While historians may quibble with certain aspects of his rendition, there was one passage that stood out: 

The movement had begun back in Biafra because a group of young idealists wanted to escape from the old corrupt power politics. To do this they had simplified the world into a moral struggle between good and evil.

They believed that if they could destroy the evil - by liberating victims from oppression by despots - then what would result would be, automatically, good.

But the problem with this simple view was that it meant they had no critical framework by which to judge the "victims" they were helping. And the Baghdad bombing made it clear that some of the victims were very bad indeed - and that the humanitarians' actions might actually have helped unleash another kind of evil. [emphasis added]

These concerns speak directly to my apprehensions about US military involvement in Libya.  Even a muscular No-Fly-Zone was not likely going to prove sufficient to enable an out-trained and out-gunned rebel force to topple Qaddafi, yet escalating after that fact was made clear by sending in ground forces would be ill-advised to say the least (two wars is likely enough for the moment).  Even arming the rebels (like a No-Fly-Zone, this option has a certain arms-length, antiseptic appeal on the surface) is an extremely risky endeavor, with the potential to destabilize the nation and its environs for decades to come.

More importantly, as I tried to emphasize in my prior piece, we should be careful what we wish for: if the rebels do manage to usurp Qaddafi, what comes next could prove worse in many respects.  It is not fanciful to imagine that a country with no history of democratic rule and weak civil institutions would be fertile ground for violent purges, power struggles, protracted civil wars and/or insurgencies (with forces loyal to Qaddafi attempting to re-claim the power and privilege recently lost - see, ie, the Baathists in Iraq - and rebel forces keen to settle scores - see, ie, the Mahdi Army purges in and around Baghdad).  These armed conflicts would be exacerbated if the rebels receive large amounts of weapons, and the country is awash in arms.

Would the US feel compelled to intervene if such situations were to evolve as a direct result of our armed intervention? Would we commit to policing the population and nation building lest such conflicts run rampant?  Either scenario would be enormously costly and time consuming, both of which are understatements in the extreme. 

But as the Curtis quote illustrates, we can not and should not assume that merely removing an odious regime will inevitably lead to a positive outcome, or that the forces that oppose a given despot must be, ipso facto, righteous.

The essential lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan should not be limited to the notions that wars are almost always far more costly than advertised (in monetary terms), that they unleash myriad unforeseen destructive forces that can have regional implications and that disengaging from them is exceedingly difficult (already, we have been in Afghanistan longer than the Soviets, and our impending deadline to withdraw from Iraq is causing much consternation for US military leaders). 

That list must include the proposition that unseating even a noxious regime is no guarantee that the aftermath will be easily manageable, conflict free or anything short of tragic for the populations that we are ostensibly attempting to help - or that there are not also noxious elements amongst our putative allies in the underlying population.

So How's That Strategic Partnership With Pakistan Going? Posted by Michael Cohen

This is perhaps the least surprising development to come out of Pakistan - recipient of billions of dollars in US military and economic assistance and supporter of the Taliban insurgency killing American soldiers in Afghanistan:

Pakistan has demanded that the United States steeply reduce the number of Central Intelligence Agency operatives and Special Operations forces working in Pakistan, and that it put on hold C.I.A. drone strikes aimed at militants in northwest Pakistan, a sign of the near collapse of cooperation between the two testy allies.

Pakistani and American officials said in interviews that the demand that the United States scale back its presence was the immediate fallout from the arrest in Pakistan of Raymond A. Davis, a C.I.A. security officer who killed two men in January during what he said was an attempt to rob him.

In all, about 335 American personnel — C.I.A. officers and contractors and Special Operations forces — were being asked to leave the country, said a Pakistani official closely involved in the decision.

Honestly, who could have seen this coming? It's not as if the United States hasn't plied Pakistan with military assistance for the past ten years and it's not as if the Pakistanis have pretty much refused to take any critical steps to further US strategic interests (that don't also directly benefit Pakistan). You can't really blame the Pakistanis for being annoyed at the US, particularly after the Raymond Davis incident, but this whole decline in cooperation is indicative of how fragile the "partnership" between the US and Pakistan remains - and always has been.

Back in December 2009 one of the key elements of the Obama Administration's Afghanistan strategy was to strengthen ties with Islamabad. In fact, in some key respects it's almost more important than the war in Afghanistan. Since then relations between the two countries have gotten worse, particularly on a host of issues crucial to US security interests. And because of the US reliance on Pakistan as a transit point for resources into Afghanistan our ability to put pressure on Islamabad is even more constrained. 

For what it's worth, color me skeptical that drone strikes in the FATA will cease; the Pakistanis benefit too much from them to cut them out completely. But the critical issue in US-Pakistan relations is the Afghan Taliban safe havens - and on that front we've of course seen no progress and no shift in Pakistan's strategic calculus. One can imagine that this latest downturn in relations only makes it less likely that anything positive is about to happen.

Peggy Noonan on the Virtue of Restraint Posted by David Shorr

In her Wall Street Journal column Friday, Peggy Noonan criticized the international intervention in Libya as an example of excessive activism. Pointing to Dwight Eisenhower and her own mentor Ronald Reagan as model presidents, Noonan dusts off the classic argument against action for action's sake -- 'don't just do something, sit there!' But as much as I admire Eisenhower's leadership and embrace prudence as a virtue, I find Noonan's case unpersuasive. Despite what she says, President Obama's Libya decision was more grand strategy than grand gesture.

The more I think about these issues, the heart of the debate seems to be between realism about outcomes versus realism about alternatives. Interventionists are charged with impulsivity and failing to think through the contingencies. But was the option of staying at arm's length truly more realistic?

One thing that Noonan notes is the pressure for action from the international media:

The administration no doubt feared grim pictures from Benghazi and the damage those pictures could do to the president's reputation and standing.

Just to point out the obvious, the damage would have been much more severe for the people of Benghazi; so it isn't just a matter of perceptions. That's not to say perceptions don't factor into it -- they cannot be dismissed, nor should they. Indeed it's a strange sight to watch a living legend political communicator be so dismissive about media perceptions.

Noonan is at least consistent in her argument, stressing the importance of being "steely-eyed" and "responsive to immediate and long-term strategic needs." But again, damning the Libya intervention as an emotional response is too facile a critique. It overlooks the strategic interest in a rules-based order, an international community in which some abuses of power and violations of humanitarian principles are considered beyond the pale.

Are critics of the intervention being realistic about the alternative of failing to intervene? They ask about the ambiguous outcome and lack of consistency in response to the different (or similar) situations in Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, or Sudan, for that matter. Here's my question: can someone explain why the United States should stay on the sidelines when an international consensus wants to forcibly resist a despot's brutal crackdown? Does that make strategic sense?

The ambiguous outcome -- and its twin, the ambiguous objective -- indeed pose a problem. By keeping the military commitment within constraints (rather than whatever-it-takes open-endedness), President Obama is playing a game of chance rather than certainty. The calculation is that the Qaddafi regime is weak enough to be ousted by the combination of Libyan rebels on the front lines, coalition forces over the horizon, and defections from Qaddafi's own forces.

Where Peggy Noonan sees an emotional impulse, I see underwriting a calculated risk. We just don't know if it will be enough to remove Qaddafi. Looking at it through the realism of alternatives, giving limited help for an uncertain outcome is still better than the certainty of abandoning Libyans rising up against Qaddafi to their fate. Remember the key facts. The opposition asked for the help and understood it would be limited. A surprising international consensus called for the intervention.

I think these ambiguities are characteristic of the world in which we live. They make for difficult dilemmas and uncomfortable choices. With all due respect to former Secretaries of State James Baker and Henry Kissinger, the criteria for intervention they lay out in Friday's WaPo seem sensible on their face, but require a degree of clarity and certainty that will be very hard to find.

If you're looking for an example lofty rhetoric not backed up by forceful action, look at US actions right after the first Iraq War in 1991, probably the most under-discussed historical analogy of the current debate. Many will recall President George H.W. Bush's prudent (and wise) decision not to press on to Baghdad and remove Saddam from power. What's less remembered are the signals from Washington encouraging Saddam's foes to rise up against him -- as Barry Lando, the episode's leading expert, reminds us. An Iraqi insurrection indeed sprouted, with the expectation of American support. None came, and they were slaughtered by Saddam. The situation in Libya is the reverse; the rebellion was initiated internally, and the US and others stepped up with material backing. As I say, a response that was better than the alternatives.

Further Confirmation That Our Strategy in Afghanistan is Not Working Posted by Michael Cohen

One of the key elements about US policy in Afghanistan that nearly all sides seem to agree upon is that without success in standing up the Afghan government and without success in getting Pakistan to turn on the Afghan Taliban safe havens in their country - the mission will likely fail.

With that as a starting point, it makes reading the latest White House report on Afghanistan/Pakistan acutely depressing reading. To be sure there is very little here that can be considered good news - for every possible step forward, there are one or two steps back. And what's more there is very little indication that the fledgling progress we have made is sustainable - either in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

But on the issue of safe havens and the performance of the Karzai government it is particularly distressing - and speaks to the failures of the current strategy.

First on safe havens. Much of the media focus of the report is on the challenges facing Pakistan in going after Pakistan Taliban militants. But from the perspective of US policy in Afghanistan, this is a sideshow - the real issue is the sanctuaries and here the report has nothing good to say:

The denial of extremist safe havens in Pakistan cannot be achieved through military means alone, but must continue to be advanced by effective development strategies.

Actually let me revise that statement - the report has basically nothing to say on this issue (as the above sentence suggests). There is a great deal about how the US is laying the foundation for a strategic partnership with Pakistan "based on mutual respect and trust" but no sense of when or even whether the Pakistani government will shift their strategic calculus against the Afghan Taliban. And as press reporting suggests there has been little progress on this front. Until there is, military success in Afghanistan will be hard to achieve and even harder to sustain. That the report basically punts on that question is telling.

How about the Karzai government? Here the report is more explicit, regrettably so. From July to December 2010, the report says that progress on building the capacity of the Afghan government is "static" - which basically means very little improvement at all. Indeed, the report notes that on the sub-national level (which is more critical to the US war-fighting effort than the national level) progress is particularly non-existent. Recruiting for district or provincial offices remains poor, the Afghan government has shown little inclination to take on corruption - and while security improvements are cited, the report does note that the security situation in the north has actually worsened.  (Of course, if one wants to draw a verdict on Hamid Karzai they can also consider his appalling behavior that led indirectly to the horrific killings of UN workers in Mazar-i-Sharif last week.)

The best the report can point to is "modest" improvements in training of the ANSF, but the force is still deeply dependent on ISAF forces to conduct operations and attrition rates, while better are still high.

In short, there is very little positive to report - but in the areas most crucial to the current strategy, progress is basically non-existent or fledgling. Now I have a feeling that an email will be headed my way soon after I publish this post that talks about security improvements as a first step forward and strengtening Afghan capacity as the next step. But to be honest, I'm not seeing any reason to believe that this second is possible (it's always been the most intractable element of our strategy and one where US influence is the most limited).

This question this report should raise is how much longer do we try to do the impossible (get Pakistan to adjust its strategic calculus vis-a-vis the Taliban and the Karzai government to be something they aren't) before we shift our strategy to what actually is possible?

Why Leon Panetta Shouldn't Be Secretary of Defense Posted by Michael Cohen

So according to the Washinton Post, the leading candidate for Secretary of Defense is current CIA director Leon Panetta. Hearing this news reminds of this little tidbit from Bob Woodward's, "Obama's Wars" and the debate about escalation in Afghanistan from the Fall of 2009:

He [Panetta] told other principals, "No Democratic President can go against military advice, especially if he asked for it." His own recommendation would be, "So just do it. Do what they say." He repeated to other key White House officials his belief that the matter should have been decided in a week. 

As I wrote last Fall it's almost as if in Leon Panetta's world we don't need a president.

If there has been a defining feature of US national security policy in the Obama Administration it would be the gradual erosion in civ-mil relations and in particular, the strengthening of the military in national security decision-making. This is, in part, what helped lead to the decision to escalate in Afghanistan and the President to embrace a flawed counter-insurgency policy that, as we've seen over the past 15 months, is not working. Much of this erosion is due to the fact that we have a "Democratic President" who for political reasons seems unwilling to get in a public battle with the military or openly disagree with military advice (it is of course not coincidence that the quote above refers to a Democratic President - one can imagine that a Republican President would, in Panetta's world, have a bit more latitude).

Indeed, more than ever what is needed is a Defense Secretary, and civilian leadership at the Pentagon, that is willing to rein in the military's adventurous spirit - especially in Afghanistan.  Even more important we need a Democratic president (and civilian advisors) who is inclined to make decisions about the use of military force based on policy not politics.

I'm not sure how appointing someone who allegedly said the words above to the top job at DoD is going to help in that process.

From the Department of It Must Be Wrong If Obama Did It Posted by David Shorr

Did you know that the Libya intervention is really just part of a larger plot to subjugate the United States to "an ever-broadening regime of redistributive transnational governance?" I didn't think so. Well, it's a good thing we have Stanley Kurtz of the National Review to pierce the humanitarian pretense:

Superficially, Power's chief concern is to put a stop to genocide and "crimes against humanity." More deeply, her goal is to use our shared horror at the worst that human beings can do in order to institute an ever-broadening regime of redistributive transnational governance.

Knowing what Samantha Power wants reveals a great deal about Barack Obama's own ideological commitments. It's not just a question of whether he shares Power's long-term internationalist goals, although it's highly likely that he does. Power's thinking also represents a bridge of sorts between Obama's domestic- and foreign-policy aspirations. Beyond that, Power embodies a style of pragmatic radicalism that Obama shares. Both Obama and Power are skilled at placing their ultimate ideological goals just out of sight, behind a screen of practical problem-solving.

I bet you were suckered by all that "crimes against humanity" stuff. Well, you'll feel pretty silly after you read the Kurtz piece. If you had brazenly extrapolated views expressed by Ms. Power and her association with left-wing bogeymen painstakingly researched Power's writings and statements, you would've pieced together the master plan of one-world government. That 644-page book from ten years ago, about the tragic history of the world's failure to react to the Holocaust and other genocides? An elaborate ruse.

Of course the really dangerous thing is that Power's long-term internationalist goals are shared by [President] Obama -- or at least it's highly likely he shares them, but it's not just a question of sharing the goals.

Can't you see what's going on here? One day, a US administration factors widespread international sentiment into a decision to use force; the next day, the American military is an arm of the UN. First, America offers support for the winds of democratic reform sweeping across the Mideast, and next thing you know, Al Qaeda goes from underwear bombers to running entire countries of millions of people. And of course it's a very short hop for America to go from enlisting other nations' help to bolster the rules-based international order, to becoming an enfeebled ex-superpower.

[NOTE: Just to avoid misunderstanding, all of the above was intended as ironic. I didn't mean those things seriously -- though in another sense, I mean it very seriously.]

Turning That Frown Into A Smile - Why I Was Wrong About Afghanistan Posted by Michael Cohen

For nearly two years I have been a harsh critic of the war in Afghanistan. For months and months I have railed at the false signs of progress, the failed US military approach to the war, the lack of a coherent political strategy, the shameless cheerleading of war supporters etc - but today that has all changed.

What shifted my view? Well, it was actually an op-ed I read in the Washington Post by Craig Charney and James Dobbins. I highly recommend reading this transformative article because I think it will have the same lightning bolt-like effect on you that it had on me. To sum up here are the key arguments:

1) Things used to really stink in Afghanistan; but they stink a bit less today.

Evidence: "Afghanistan’s gross domestic product has tripled. This puts Afghanistan on a par with China in its double-digit economic growth rate, though from a much lower base."

Just for the record, Afghanistan's GDP is $11 billion; China, about $5 trillion. But hey GDP growth is GDP growth. So as the kids say, Cha-Ching!

2) Things stink in Afghanistan; but in other places people think their countries stink more.

Evidence: "Polling confirms that Afghans are very troubled by official corruption, but they don’t compare their government to Switzerland’s. If they look abroad, they look at their neighbors — Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, China, Pakistan and Iran — and see systems generally far less accountable than their own. Afghans are also very concerned about still-rising violence, but they put that in context. Recent levels of violence do not compare to the levels that Afghans experienced in the 1980s and ’90s."

This seems incontrovertible - and I'm only amazed that I didn't see it sooner. Surely Afghans watch updates on their nightly news or read articles on their iPads and shake their heads at how bad things are going for the Turkmens. And when an Afghan child dies the reaction of family members and their community is "Eh, things were worse when the Russians were here. God Bless America, U.S.A, U.S.A!!"

3) Americans think things are going badly in America; and as a result they think things are going badly in Afghanistan.

Evidence: "The difference is that most Afghans are better off now than in the recent past, while most Americans are not. Consequently, they are optimistic — and we are the opposite. This also helps explain the drop in American support for the war, which says a lot more about how Americans view their prospects than how the Afghans view theirs."

So to clarify; Americans are pessimistic about their future, which stands in stark contrast to the bubbly optimism of your ordinary Afghan citizen. Because we are such a country of Debbie Downers we can't see all the many signs of progress in Afghanistan that is captured by unarguably exact public opinion polling. Thus . . . things are going well in Afghanistan and the country is perched on cusp of a political and economic renaissance.

Honestly, how could one argue with this logic.

Now of course my "change of heart" is a rather lame effort at an April Fool's Joke - this op-ed unfortunately is not a joke (well not purposely at least).

And for the families of these six young Americans . . . there won't be any laughter today.