Defending Strategy, Not “Defending Defense” Posted by Jacob Stokes

Washington’s entrenched defense budget hawks are either clueless or willfully ignorant. Following, the release of the fiscal year 2012 budget Monday, the “Defending Defense” trio of The Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute and the Foreign Policy Initiative released a statement. The first line was “strategy should always guide the defense budget, not vice versa.”

True enough. But looking at the group’s proposals, there’s no strategy involved. Strategy involves identifying threats, establishing what’s needed to combat those threats and then budgeting to ensure those capabilities. The Defending Defense group makes no such efforts. Instead, they use as their yardstick defense spending as a percentage of GDP. GDP tends to continually rise – which is, for them, exactly the point. If the defense budget is pegged to GDP, it keeps rising. 

They’re a wily bunch, though, so they have seized on the quip Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made about the presidential deficit commission’s proposals for cutting defense – Gates called the proposals “math, not strategy” -- to paint any cuts as dangerous to our national security. The reality is that no one is seriously calling for blindly implementing the deficit reduction commission’s proposals. And the other oft-cited proposal, Rep. Barney Frank’s Sustainable Defense Task Force, gave a menu of options that combined would equal $1 trillion in cuts over ten years. Some members support the full menu; others only support only some parts. 

The reality of who’s guilty of “math not strategy” is that Defending Defense has no strategy. In fact, there’s strong strategic rationale for cutting beyond what Secretary Gates has asked for. Even mainstream Washington voices such as the Center for a New American Security have called for proportional cuts to defense as part of a broader deficit reduction plan. CNAS goes even further than Secretary Gates, whose “cuts,” to be clear, are cuts to projected spending, not actual spending.

The Blindness of Moral Clarity Posted by David Shorr



Please join me in a thought experiment. I'm going to pinpoint what I consider the central falacy of the ultra-conservative foreign policy argument / critique. See if you agree that this theme -- blind spot, I'd say -- runs through a big proportion of what the hard-right says about the stance the United States should take internationally.

As David Kurtz of Talking Points Memo and Greg Scoblete over at RealClearWorld Compass blog have both noted, the Obama-botched-Egypt meme rests on an inflated notion of US leverage. An impulse that always assumes an American president can make world events come out the way he wants. Actually David's post flags a comment President Obama made in his news conference, pushing back against that idea of American omnipotence.

My hypothesis about administration critics adds one key element: moral clarity (aka 'resolve' or 'certitude'). Sound familiar? The critics love to talk about the president's supposed lack of principles, but let's talk about what self-absorbed self-righteousness gets you in the real world -- i.e. what can really be accomplished through moral clarity. In other words, I don't think the partisan foreign policy divide is about America's international objectives or our moral values; sensible Democrats and Republics largely agree about those. I think it's really a debate about persuasion and pressure versus bluff and bluster.

Here's a useful definition of strategic thinking from an excellent new book, The End of Arrogance by Bruce Jentleson and Steven Weber:

In a complex and rapidly changing environment it does not work well to repeatedly reinforce who we are and what we stand for. We know those things, and we know how they shape what we do, how we act, how we respond. Strategy is ultimately about how we influence what others do.

This is the burden of proof I'd put on the proponents of moral clarity. How will the defense of virtue get others to do what we want, and what's your basis for believing this cause-and-effect relationship? Can loud moral forthrightness ever backfire? Does it ever have unintended consequences?

Don't get me wrong; I don't deny the role of moral principles in international affairs. I'm a big believer in the importance of staking the moral high ground in diplomacy -- it's something on which I've based many of my own policy arguments. But I feel just as strongly that the claim of moral authority must be based on more than an assertion of principle or a belief in the nation's exceptionalism (which I actually share, to an extent). It matters crucially how others respond. As Weber and Jentleson remind us, the question of influence and legerage isn't a question of being true to ourselves but convincing to others. A leader without followers is just someone out for a stroll.

That's what I think the foreign policy debate is really about. Now coming back to that thought experiment, as you've observed national debates about foreign policy, how strong of an undercurrent is this?

America's Budgetary Delusions Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at AOL I have a new piece up on the dueling Republican and Democratic budget proposals . . . and it ain't pretty

With the Republicans' latest budget proposal -- and to a lesser extent Obama's -- both parties seem intent on furthering the charade that Americans need and want a smaller government, without making any real effort to get us there. It's the least of both worlds, combining pandering and ineffectiveness.

But those inclined to engage in typical Washington bashing should look inward. Americans have no one to blame but themselves for this situation. If they continue to remain blissfully unaware of how their own government operates and oblivious to the contradictions in their expectations for it, is it any wonder that politicians treat them like children?

You can read the whole thing here

Trends in Multilateral Cooperation - Part II Posted by David Shorr

I had an idea once that the noun United Nations (and its acronym) should always be used in the plural. We should say "the United Nations are," not "the United Nations is."  It's a difficult grammatical discipline, and perhaps impractical. But the point remains: the UN isn't really an entity unto itself, but instead an instrument of the 192 nation-states that comprise its membership. I think a lot of the discussion about the UN merely sets up the world body as a scapegoat and diverts attention from the political tug and pull between member states.

Sometimes I say that the United Nations works best when nations actually unite. In the struggle to address big international challenges like climate change or nuclear proliferation, the power of diplomatic alignment is a sight to behold, yet we see such consensus-building far too rarely. There's a very simple reason the UN has tended to produce lowest-common-denominator outcomes -- the way the UN diplomacy game is played, obstructionists have the upper hand. The UN's traditional diplomatic norm of trying to keep everyone happy has given a handful of countries tremendous blocking power. Often this has meant that New York is a place where urgent international matters disappear into a vortex of deadlock. And the problem is especially bad in UN global conferences, which have followed a consensus rule under which a single nation can prevent a communique or report from being adopted.

With all that as (extremely jaded) background, I think I glimpse very hopeful signs that the dynamic has begun to re-tilt away from obstruction and toward constructive action. Looking back at experts' post-game analysis of last year's key UN conferences on climate change and nonproliferation, they tell a story of dwindling tolerance of the obstructionists.

Let's start with Andrew Light's Cancun read-out over at Climate Progress. According to his narrative, an original hard-line coalition of Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Sudan dissolved over the course of the Cancun conference and left Bolivia standing alone. With Bolivia as the unstinting holdout, Light recounts the heroic leadership of conference chair Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa, ultimately rolling right over Bolivia's objections. I'd be interested to hear more from UN experts about the technical grounds for overruling a holdout; or is it simply a matter of common sense? (Also recommended: Michael Levi of CFR arguing in Slate why the Cancun and Copenhagen conferences shouldn't be given short shrift, as well as Levi's outline in WSJ of a diplomatic strategy to outflank China, which I suspect US negotiators used.)

Then there was the every-five-years Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference last spring, cogently explained by Rebecca Johnson of Acronym Institute in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. In that case, Johnson highlights the role of the Egyptian government -- with the help of Russia and others -- in pressing Iran to back down and go along with consensus. Obviously recent events give this story a new cast; I would just add that the Egyptian regime's traditional UN stance has been to join with obstructionists as a way to counter an image of being subservient to Washington.

Recently I was talking with a UN delegate about the question of obstructionism, and this diplomat referred to "the moderate countries." I think the emergence of such an identity among developing and middle income nations could change the dynamic within the UN. The key to breaking deadlocks in the past has been either consensus among the P5 in the Security Council, bridge-building Western middle powers like Canada or the Nordic nations, or entrepreneurial small countries trying to make a mark with one issue. If moderates started to act as a counterweight to the traditional obstructionists, we might see "nations actually unite" a lot more often.

The GOP's Budget Fiasco Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

The best part about the GOP’s budget day freak-out is that there is concrete proof that conservatives have no alternative vision or plan.  And given the civil war that’s currently playing out on the right, that’s not likely to change anytime soon.

The federal government is currently being funded through a Continuing Resolution, which is set to expire on March 4. So before Congress can get to the 2012 numbers, they have to first pass another CR to keep the government running for the next seven months.  Republicans are hell-bent on slashing the budget, but have yet to articulate an actual strategy for these cuts. 

Last week, Harold Rogers, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, heralded his committee’s plan to trim $74 billion from the 2011 budget, proudly proclaiming, “Never before has Congress undertaken a task of this magnitude.”

Unfortunately for the GOP leadership, the tea party immediately denounced this plan and sent the leadership back to the drawing board, insisting that they live up to their pledge to slash $100 billion from the 2011 budget. Without holding a single hearing or seeking any actual analysis, Rogers announced less than 24 hours later that they would “reach a total of $100 billion in cuts compared to the President’s quest immediately—fully meeting the goal outlined in the Republican ‘Pledge to America’ in one fell swoop.” The $100 billion, of course, is merely a symbolic number since it’s based off of the President’s FY11 request, which was never actually passed.  But hey, who has time for details?   

Bruce Bartlett has an excellent post on why the GOP hack-job is reckless and well, ineffective:

The point is not that there are no government programs worthy of cutting, but rather that this is a really stupid way to do it. The vast bulk of government spending, which goes to mandatory programs such as Social Security and Medicare, is completely exempted. And Republicans have effectively exempted the departments of Defense, Homeland Security and Veterans Affairs from cuts. This leaves only 16 percent of the budget from which they will extract their pound of flesh to satisfy voters who demand huge budget cuts but also oppose cutting just about any program except foreign aid.

So to the extent that there is a plan, it’s clearly not one that’s well thought-out. President Obama, meanwhile, has presented a budget, and an overarching strategy, for balancing the current economic climate and need for economic stimulus with the long-term priority of reducing the deficit. Even in areas where the administration could have gone further—the defense budget, for example— conservatives defied logic and decided to fund unwanted, unnecessary defense programs like the JSF alternate engine, which Secretary Gates called yesterday “an unnecessary and extravagant expense.” To top it all off, the F136 funding is “money that looks, feels, and smells very much like an earmark,” and for John Boehner, of all people. 

Politico’s David Rogers included a few side by side comparisons of President Obama’s FY12 budget request and the GOP’s sporadic proposal for the CR, noting:

“Even in areas where both parties have come together in the past, the differences are now measured in billions, not millions. Obama is proposing almost $7.8 billion for the National Science Foundation, for example; House Republican cuts would take the NSF back to about $6.5 billion. And the almost $10 billion gap in foreign aid and State Department funding represents a real retreat by the GOP from the activism of President George W. Bush, let alone Ronald Reagan.

The GOP’s proposed cuts the foreign aid budget have criticized by Republicans and Democrats alike:

“I think it’s short sighted,” said former Rep. Jim Kolbe (R-Ariz.), who oversaw the foreign aid budget for years. “I’m someone who believes it is absolutely vital to get control of our spending, but at a time when we are pulling back militarily, when China is active in Africa, this soft power is vital.”

“Cuts of this magnitude will be devastating to our national security,” Clinton wrote, yet the GOP has also included the National Nuclear Security Administration in its definition of “non-security” spending. Thus non-proliferation programs face reductions alongside those for water projects, and the GOP is backtracking on plans to update the U.S. nuclear stockpile—a major issue for Senate GOP Whip Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) in the recent START treaty debate.

As the budget debate rolls on, it’s clear that the GOP budget fiasco is indicative of the fact that conservatives are split and simply don’t know which direction to take the party, let alone the country.


The Pentagon Always Wins Posted by Michael Cohen

So there seems to be some argument going around that the Pentagon has engaged in some serious belt-tightening with its latest budget request. Honestly, I don't even have to read Gordon Adams take on this to know that is almost certainly not true, but the man's got the goods:

$78 billion in savings is a myth.  Six billion don’t happen until 2015 and 2015, the mythical budget years, when DOD says the Army and the Marines will start to roll back part of the 92,000 person increase that happened over the last decade.  Four billion comes from stretching out the schedule for the F-35 fighter, which could easily not happen. $12.5 billion comes from pocketing the White House decision to freeze civilian pay for the next three years, credit for a decision the Pentagon did not make.  $41.5 billion comes from “efficiencies” in what are called “defense-wide,” a mystery the Secretary has yet to unravel. And $14 billion is a truly “magic” number. It comes from revising downward DOD’s estimates of future inflation, a hardy, perennial argument between DOD and OMB.

Ezra Klein takes thinks a step further, by pointing out that $78 billion over 10 years really ain't that big of a deal when you consider that "domestic discretionary spending -- that's education, income security, food safety, environmental protection" gets a $400 billion haircut. In all the DoD base budget, not including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, actually increases by 6% in 2011. But then again it's not as if someone has gone out and actually found a trillion dollars in savings from the Pentagon budget over ten years . . . oh wait a minute.

It's hard to believe that during the Truman and Eisenhower years, these presidents calculated defense spending by using the "remainder method" - namely taking tax revenues, subtracting domestic spending and whatever was left over went to the Pentagon. Now we have the exact opposite situation with military expenditures taken up an astounding and indefensible 60% of the discretionary budget. (Imagine how much a greater a health care system, education system and infrastructure we'd have if we reversed these ratios).

The problem, however, isn't even the money and the competely non-serious reduction in defense spending.

The problem is the starting point from which these cuts are made - with an eye toward reducing the deficit rather than actually contemplating what our miltiary priorities should be (and to be clear the numbers being cut from the DoD budget are a mere rounding error in the context of more than $1 trillion deficit).

Instead of asking the questions: what is that we want the US military to do; what military capabalities should we prioritize; how should the US military support the country's larger foreign policy goals etc . . . our defense spending decision-making begins from the starting point that we need a really big military, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines should get support for most of their pet weapons programs and to cut defense spending when the country is at war would be to put American security at risk.

At no point does it appear that Pentagon officials sat down and said "what do we really need to keep the country safe." Instead, the discussion seems to have been "how do we shave a bit off the budget here and there to make it look like we're being fiscally responsible, but all the while prevent a more serious examination of our bloated defense budget." I don't blame the Pentagon at all for this; every other agency if they had the luxury would do the same - the problem is that no one from the White House or Congress demands that they do it.

To be clear, this doesn't mean that we must have reductions in Pentagon spending (although it's hard to see why not); it means we should think about whether the hundreds of billions we dole out to the Pentagon every year is keeping America secure and is in the nation's best interests. It's a conversation that we haven't even tried to have in more than 30 years. Instead we just pile more defense spending upon more defense spending . . . and demand that every other government agency think more judicously about how it spends the taxpayer's hard-earned dollars.

Threading the Elections Needle in Egypt Posted by Jacob Stokes

As the revolution moves out of Tahrir Square and into the halls of power, it makes sense to look at historical examples for how a military-backed authoritarian government can transition to democracy. Enter this solid piece in the Wall Street Journal today that looks at Indonesia as model for making that move. The piece illustrates an important point that should inform the discussion about the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian politics. It shows that broad participation of Islamists parties in the system resulted in a relatively small base of support:

Karen Brooks, who helped oversee Indonesia policy in both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, says post-Suharto governments were particularly successful because they co-opted Islamist parties that emerged following the dictator's fall. 

One of these parties, which has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, campaigned as being untainted by the corruption of the Suharto years. That party, the Prosperous Justice Party, controls 8% of seats in Indonesia's legislature. Islamist or Islam-inspired parties in total hold 28%.

The article goes on to say, “‘Thirteen years into Indonesia's democratic transformation, the Islamist parties appear to have maxed out their popular support,’ Ms. Brooks says. Their inclusion in Jakarta's political process seemed to have ‘demystified’ their allure, she says.”

The American mainstream is capable of this kind of thinking. Just a few weeks ago, CFR President Richard Haass said that, “You want to make sure that the political space opens, because if the political space opens, the Muslim Brotherhood will have to compete and, based on everything I know about Egypt, it will have an element in the vote, but it will not be a majority.” 

Credit Where Credit Is Due, Obama Played This Beautifully Posted by Michael Cohen

First things first; this is an extraordinary day and while it's a bit trite to salute the people of Egypt . . . I salute the people of Egypt. I think President Obama summed it up best in his remarks today:

The word "tahrir" means "liberation." It is a word that speaks to that something in our souls that cries out for freedom. And forevermore, it will remind us of the Egyptian people: of what they did, of the things that they stood for, and how they changed their country, and in doing so changed the world.

Yup. And now a word about the Obama Administration. At times I've been fairly critical of this president's handling of foreign policy, but credit must be given - this Administration handled this situation about as deftly as possible. This was truly an American diplomatic tour de force.

From the beginning the White House was caught betwixt and between - not wanting to be seen supporting the status quo, particularly when the winds of change seemed to be blowing in the direction of reform and yet at the same time not be seen as throwing a key ally under the bus. 

And while obviously critics can point to individual mistakes (Wisner's wandering off the reservation, Panetta's bizarre comment yesterday in congressional testimony that Mubarak was out the door) on the whole this Administration did a really excellent job - sending public signs that a crackdown would not be acceptable, working the military behind closed doors, trying to ensure a soft landing that wouldn't lead to violence, but still never backing down from the public position that an immediate transition to democracy (and not one in September) was the only acceptable course. (I'll be curious to see the impact of Obama's statement last night on Mubarak and the Egyptian military, but it was absolutely spot-on).

In a sense we helped throw Mubarak under the bus without directly delivering the push (a fact that I'm sure will leave many a non-democratic US ally a tad less secure this evening - which is good).

As Marc Lynch wisely points out the Administration basically followed the lead of the Egyptian people and didn't try to get too far ahead of what was actually happening on the ground.

To this point they didn't overplay their hand or overstate their own influence or demand too much from the government or the protesters. They played it about as well as can be expected, calibrating public and private pressure - and all this while being cognizant of the host of obvious constraints on US actions and words. They seemed to understand something that a lot of the armchair pundits couldn't quite grasp; this wasn't about us and we were, if anything, a bit player in this drama.

And then after all that, President Obama delivered a speech today that was absolutely pitch perfect - one of the best of his presidency (Ben Rhodes take a bow). Most deftly, even though we've supported the Egyptian regime for more than 30 years Obama was able to place the United States, rhetorically, on the same side as those in Tahrir Square - and it actually seems to ring true.

From a diplomatic standpoint this section of Obama's speech was particularly smart:

The military has served patriotically and responsibly as a caretaker to the state, and will now have to ensure a transition that is credible in the eyes of the Egyptian people. That means protecting the rights of Egypt's citizens, lifting the emergency law, revising the constitution and other laws to make this change irreversible, and laying out a clear path to elections that are fair and free. Above all, this transition must bring all of Egypt's voices to the table, for the spirit of peaceful protest and perseverance that the Egyptian people have shown can serve as a powerful wind at the back of this change.

This is exactly the right tone going forward; praising the military but at the same laying out the expectation that their stewardship of the country will be temporary and will lead to a democratic transition. 

Of course, none of us know what will happen in the weeks and months to come, but for at least one day this Administration and his advisors should take a victory lap. 

 

Don't Believe the Hype: The Surge as a Sequel Posted by Eric Martin

While myth-making and propagandizing can be useful tools in political contests, such embellishments can pervert policy if taken literally. As a general rule, it is best not to believe the hype - even your own.  One recent example of this type of credulity is the conventional wisdom that has coalesced around the "Surge" in Iraq and the supposed benefits that resulted therefrom.

According to the myth, the brilliant visionary, General David Petraeus, shifted US forces in Iraq to a counterinsurgency (COIN) footing based on the COIN manual he wrote and that switch, together with an influx of 20,000 additional troops, led to victory in Iraq.

In reality, hundreds of Iraqis are still dying each month in political violence, though that tragic figure is far lower than the thousands per month that preceded the Surge.  Serious obstacles still remain on the political front as well, with potential for violence to erupt in the future along several existing fault lines.  Further, Petraeus didn't write the COIN manual, in either the literal or figurative sense.  More importantly, though, it was not the influx of additional soldiers, or implementation of COIN doctrine, that played the most important part in leading to a reduction of the violence in Iraq. 

Rather, the causal factors were indigenously conceived: First and foremost, the bulk of the Sunni insurgency made the decision to adandon insurgent activities, pursue political avenues and cooperate with coalition forces in targeting al-Qaeda elements (with such a turnabout commencing prior to the Surge, or Petraeus' arrival on the scene).  In addition, Moqtada al-Sadr, putatitive leader of the largest Shiite insurgent faction, also changed course, ordering his loosely organized militia to stand down. 

In essence, the main combatants comprising the insurgency opted to pursue their interests primarly via the political apparatus, and abandoned attacks on coalition and Iraqi government targets (in addition to the fact that the population transfers reduced sectarian tensions, and general exhaustion from fighting pervaded).  To Petraeus' credit, he was quick to seize on the outreach from insurgent groups and the extra soldiers likely enhanced our capacity to take the fight to al-Qaeda with our new Sunni allies. In summation, he deftly took advantage of the opportunities presented by both the Sunni detente and Sadr's stand down. 

What the Surge taught us, then (or rather, reminded us of), is that insurgencies can be wound down when the vast majority of the combatants join the political process and abandon violence, and that we should seek to encourage and facilitate such developments when doing so is consistent with our overarching interests.

Unfortunately, the Obama administration seems to have bought in to the mythologized version of the Surge, and has attempted to recreate in Afghanistan the successes realized in Iraq by simply adding additional soldiers, and shifting to a COIN-infused approach.

Predictably, the fighting continues: insurgent attacks are occurring at an accelerated pace, with estimates of Taliban numbers remaining constant during the recent escalation.  Despite a coordinated effort by military leaders to put recent events in Afghanistan in a positive light, tangible gains using any observable metric remain elusive. 

Perhaps, then, it is time to pay closer attention to the reality of the Surge, and test available opportunities to wind down the conflict through the political inclusion of the main group comprising the insurgency: the Taliban.

As Michael Cohen noted, a recent report by Alex Strick Van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn explores the possibility that the Taliban and al-Qaeda could be separated as part of a negotiated political settlement with the current Afghan government, and US/NATO forces.  Although admittedly optimistic, the report even includes this tantalizing prospect for military cooperation akin to that enjoyed by US forces working in tandem with Sunni groups in Iraq:

One such vision – recently suggested in private by a senior Taliban political strategist – is that Taliban forces could conduct counterterrorism operations, including joint operations together with U.S. Special Forces, against al-Qaeda and possibly its affiliates along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

That level of cooperation may never materialize, but something short of that could still be invaluable.  Given that our primary strategic objective in Afghanistan should be to disrupt al-Qaeda and deny that group a base of operations, we should pursue negotiations with the Taliban to test the feasability of at least a separation of the two groups.  Such a settlement might involve including groups whose human rights record we might find noxious, but it is important to note that there are current factions within Karzai's government with equivalent records.  We must engage the players in Afghanistan, regardless of what our ideal outcome would look like.

Unfortunately, our current strategy might be forcing the Taliban to rely more and more on al-Qaeda, sowing mistrust and giving rise to a younger, more radical crop of Taliban leaders who are taking the place of senior commanders killed or captured.  Pursuit of negotiations would require a more consistent approach, without various tactics working at cross-purposes and proving counterproductive to what should be the strategic imperative.

While there is no guarantee that a negotiated settlement with the Taliban would be possible within parameters that satisfy our interests, or that enough Taliban elements would be willing to abandon al-Qaeda at an acceptable price, it is essential that we explore the possibilities further. What the Surge taught us is that the quickest way to wind down an insurgency is to turn the insurgents into allies and political participants, not rely on superstar generals or over-hyped tactical approaches.

Back to the Top of the Slide Posted by Eric Martin

While it is understandable that there is a reluctance on the part of the Department of Defense to use bodycounts to measure progress in Afghanistan, Joshua Foust took note of a pretty damning announcement regarding insurgent numbers from the Afghan Ministry of Defense:

The strength of Taliban insurgents and other anti-government elements estimated to be between 25,000 to 35,000 in the militancy-hit Afghanistan, Afghan Defense Ministry spokesman Zahir Azimi said on Wednesday.

The reason those numbers should cause concern is that the estimate of Taliban/insurgents strength bears a striking resemblence to estimates in 2009 and, in fact, 2001 at the onset of the conflict.

Though estimates of Taliban strength dipped considerably in the years immediately following the onset of the US military intervention, that the figure has returned to the status quo ante, and remained fairly constant throughout the past few years, despite rather significant fluctuations in US/allied troop levels and shifts in tactical approaches, points to a list of possible conclusions - all of which are unsettling in their own right. As Foust notes:

• We have no idea who’s out there, or in what numbers;
• An enormous, expensive build-up in troops has not noticeably diminished the numbers of Taliban (or, in a worst case scenario, created 10,000 more);
• There was initial success in diminishing the Taliban, but their numbers have grown; or
• The Taliban are recruiting new people far more quickly than we can reconcile or kill off.

Each of those options militate in favor of pursuing a different strategy.