Is the Fuel Swap Back? Again? Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

Could it be?  Is the Zombie fuel deal back?

With the P5 + 1 talks kicking off tomorrow in Istanbul, rumors of a revived fuel swap are surfacing.  Again. 

Iran has denied claims that it intends to propose new terms for a fuel swap and the U.S. is saying that it’s open to the idea but not sure it wants to be the one to bring it up. It’s hard to remember, but despite all of the hype, the original Tehran Research Reactor deal was never intended to solve the Iranian nuclear question.  It was however, supposed to serve as a confidence building measure.  A big baby step of sorts.  If the reports are true and parties are once again considering a fuel swap, it’s possible that this time around there could be some progress on the enrichment debate. Or at least the appearance of progress. 

In December, Hillary Clinton confirmed that Iran is "entitled to the peaceful use of civil nuclear energy," if and when Iran can demonstrate that that it is complying with its international obligations. A few Iran hawks on the Hill decided they didn't agree with this and announced instead that they preferred to "continue ratcheting up" the pressure on Iran, which for the record, is ridiculous. 

The U.S. and its partners have the right to demand that Iran temporarily halt its enrichment, but Iran’s hardliners can be counted on to torpedo any agreement that advertises such a requirement.  The original TRR deal went south after Western diplomats publicly congratulated themselves for pulling a fast one on Iran and Ahmadinejad ran into trouble at home. It's hard for some to remember, but even Ahmadinejad has a base.

"China as Behemoth" Has a Military Edge Posted by Jacob Stokes

Dan Drezner has a good roundup pushing back on Forbes magazine’s random and stupid article contending that Chinese President Hu Jintao is the most powerful man in the world. (Harry Reid also made a similar mistake, calling Hu a “dictator”.) Drezner tags the “Hu as powerful dictator” line as part of bigger “China as rising hegemon” meme. I’m not sure I agree with Drezner’s argument that the scope of Hu’s power is the argument that those who want to rebut the “China as hegemon” crowd need to target.

It seems to me the more pernicious line is that China’s military is out of control. That argument contends that no matter how peaceful China’s civilian leaders seem, the military’s continual modernization and technological progress shows China’s desire to challenge American power the world over (forget the fact that the American military is still vastly superior and no one should be surprised by a rising country modernizing its military). And even if China's civilian leaders wanted to stop them, they couldn't. FPI has trumpeted this line, as does Max Boot.

That line is convenient because it hedges (and everyone knows China fear-mongerers love hedging!) against any softening of the line coming from the civilian leadership. If the line softens – and I’m not saying it will necessarily, but it could -- it’s harder to trump up China as an enemy and make the case for increased defense spending to ensure the security of American allies in the Far East.

Finally, it has the imprimatur of being intellectually aware, as there’s been widespread debate and analysis about the free-for-all going on in Beijing when it comes to conduct of Chinese foreign policy. Of course, by insisting that China’s rise cannot possibly be peaceful and therefore American power should be used to subvert its rise in all forms, peaceful or not, American conservatives are empowering the hardliners in Beijing – self-fulfilling their prophecy.

Tactics vs. Strategy in Afghanistan Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at abumuqawama and registan.net, Josh Foust and Andrew Exum have posted a rather interesting exchange that examines the tactical efforts of the US military in Afghanistan. It's a fascinating debate between two smart people and one that I highly recommend.

But, and I mean this not to be insulting to either, it's a digression even diversion from the real issues regarding the current US mission in Afghanistan. To explain check out this quote from Andrew:

U.S. counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level were some of the best I had ever seen. Caveat lector, I do not know whether or not these improved tactics will yield a strategic effect. There are too many phenomena that we cannot even observe much less measure. And we still have a lot of known pains in our asses (like Afghan governance and sanctuaries in Pakistan) that could render tactical gains ephemeral.

It's good that Andrew makes this connection (because there seem to be a lot of folks who don't) but he's dramatically downplaying it's importance. In the end, it doesn't really matter how good the US military gets at counter-insurgency and it doesn't really matter if the Arghandab Valley is more secure than it was a year ago; particularly if the larger strategic impediments to success in Afghanistan remain in place. Indeed, our fetishization of tactical "successes" has become a distraction from our abundant strategic failures in Afghanistan.

Over the 18 months we've seen no evidence that the Afghan government is seriously interested in clamping down on corruption or is able to provide more effective governance for its citizens. We've seen no evidence that Pakistan has any interest in turning against the Afghan Taliban (in fact quite the opposite). We've seen little evidence that the ANSF will be able to take over from ISAF in providing security any time soon and the same goes for the police. And on the latter point, the lack of an effective judiciary system in the country tends to demonstrate how uselss a police force we are likely creating. All of this is happening while the clock is ticking on US engagement and NATO allies are becoming increasingly wary of their commitment to the fight in Afghanistan.

In short, from a strategic perspective we've seen very little progress on our larger objectives that are (and this is rather crucial) supposed to support the tactical gains that folks in the US military love to brag about. (And if I sound like a broken record on this point . . . it's because I am).

This is elemental to the success or failure of our mission and speak to the sustainability of our current operations. Indeed, if there are no guarantees that the ANSF can take over security in the Arghandab valley any time soon or that the government can provide vital services or that the spigot of fighters from Pakistan can be turned off . . . then all we doing here is "mowing the lawn."

The worst part of this is that by believing enhanced security in the Arghandab valley or elsewhere in southern and eastern Afghanistan is a metric of success not only distracts us from our real challenges, but it allows military commanders and in turn political leaders to resist needed shifts in strategy.

So for example, the recent "success" in killing Taliban insurgents is used, in part, as a justification for not embracing a more robust political strategy of reconciliation. Why should we if the enemy is on the run? We're winning, or so the story goes, and thus it's not a good time to open up a political channel or embrace confidence-building measures that might bring the Taliban to the table.  From this perspective, believing that we are winning tactically in Afghanistan is our greatest curse; in fact, it's the root of all our problems. You see, if we recognized we weren't winning, we might shift course a la surge 2007 in Iraq, but instead we see progress where there isn't and ignore the many signs of failure.

This brings me to the final point: Andrew's evoking of the Wire (aka the best TV show in history):

I use The Wire a lot to explain everything from Lebanese politics to counterinsurgency, and I would liken the U.S. Army to the character Ellis Carver: when we meet him in Season One, all he wants to do is kick ass and take names. By Season Five, though, he’s become a much smarter police officer. He’s taken the time to get to know the people he’s trying to protect and can thus better separate the bad guys from all the people just trying to get on with their lives.

We could spend a whole week making a connection between international affairs and the Wire, but I think this misses the crucial takeaway from the Wire. Carver is not a smart police officer . . . he is a tragic figure. He doesn't realize that knowing the neighborhood better and separating the bad guys from ordinary folk does not change the fundamental nature of the Drug War, which overwhelms all efforts at effective policing. 

You bust one corner boy, another one sprouts up; you take down a package, another comes in; you arrest a drug lord, guess what another one takes his place. Unless you try to change the very strategy a la Bunny Colvin and Hamsterdam, you're just spitting against the wind.

So if there is a lesson from the Wire it is that the tactical efforts of the cops is a waste of time and resources. It doesn't matter how good they get at their jobs because ultimately the game is the game . . and the game is rigged.

Sounds like Afghanistan, doesn't it?

Wanna Tighten the Screws on China? Focus on Coalition Building Posted by Jacob Stokes

Chinese President Hu Jintao visits Washington this week amid much hang-wringing about continued obstinacy from China on a range of issues. So the question of the day is: What’s the best way to get China to play ball and become a more responsible power? One school of thought suggests the U.S. continue to ratchet up its responses to Chinese actions. But as Les Gelb points out, too much ratcheting on either side will empower the hawks in each country, leading to recriminations and a souring of relations between the two nations. That dynamic serves the interests of neither country.

In order to avoid that fate, and to more effectively pressure China, the U.S should avoid the G-2 framework which frames problems as bilateral. Instead, the U.S. should focus on doing the diplomatic spadework to build coalitions to lobby the Middle Kingdom to change its behavior. There are three reasons why this approach makes sense.

First, almost every issue cited in discussions of a U.S.-China rift affects countries beside the U.S. And those countries largely want to see the same policy solutions as the U.S. Talking currency? Engage other developing countries whose export sectors suffer from the artificially low value of the renminbi. Worried about the protection of intellectual property and indigenous innovation? Enlist our European and other Asian allies to push China to pay for licensing of software and remove regulations that force companies to release proprietary technology in order to enter the Chinese market. Feeling hot in here? Engage the Global South and other developing countries – those who will feel the effects of climate change most dramatically – to pressure China to continue to improve its environmental policies. Oceans feeling a little tense? Follow Secretary Clinton’s lead and pick up the pieces via ASEAN and other Asian regional fora when Chinese aggression spooks its neighbors; that would create a united international front, backed but not necessarily led by the U.S., against sprawling Chinese territorial claims. I could go on. But the point is: When possible, encourage others to lead the way.

On Village Razing . . . and Counter-Insurgency Posted by Michael Cohen

There's been a lot of back and forth between Paula Broadwell and Josh Foust about the issue of village razing in Afghanistan. Those who need to catch up can follow the debate here, here and here.

I won't bother to summarize the entire discussion, but it began with what I think can be charitably described as Paula's less than empathetic response to an Afghan village being destroyed. What I find most striking about this is not the rather bloodless manner in which Broadwell describes the incident (although that is notable) but rather the fascinating, and unintentional, insight into how dramatically the war in Afghanistan has shifted in opposition to the population-centric policies being espoused a year ago.

A lot of COIN advocates will tell you that kinetic action is integral to war-fighting and that even though airstrikes are up 300% and targeted killings are on the rise and more homes are being destroyed since General David Petraeus took over command . . . it's still just counter-insurgency.

But for those with long memories the operational approach of ISAF forces in Afghanistan under General McChrystal was to avoid civilian casualties and even property destruction at all costs, even at the risk of putting US troops in harm's way. (Some even argued that protecting civilians was actually more important than killing insurgents).

Indeed as Foust points out, when ISAF troops went into Marjah last February they appeared to be far more concerned about village destruction then what you are seeing in the Arghandab Valley today - and at the time went to far greater lengths to avoid bringing harm to both person and property there.

But look if you don't want to believe me; how about believing the guidance issued by General Stanley McChrystal to his troops:

Conventional military action against insurgents consumes considerable resources with little real return and is likely to alienate the people we are trying to secure. Large scale operations to kill or capture militants carry a significant risk of causing civilian casualties and collateral damage. If civilians die in a firefight, it does not matter who shot him - we still failed to protect them from harm. Destroying a home or property jeopardizes the livelihood of an entire family - and creates more insurgents. We sow the seeds of our demise.

I find myself in violent agreement with Stanley McChrystal even if I think trying to fight a war on these terms is nearly impossible. But what McChrystal says here is also in violent disagreement from what Broadwell is describing happened in the Arghandab Valley. Indeed, it's hard for me to imagine that had this occurred in Marjah or elsewhere in Afghanistan when he was commander McChrystal would have been supportive of such actions. They appear to run directly counter to his guidance to troops - and yet I haven't seen anyone from ISAF publicly criticize the methods that are being employed in the Arghandab Valley.

Indeed, look at what Broadwell says about the clearing operation that razed a village to the ground: "Clearing operations are a necessary evil to weed out the Taliban, and they often leave devastating destruction in the wake. But what Aziz [President Karzai's advisor, Mohammad Sadiq Aziz] failed to note is the tremendous effort some units, like 1-320th, have made to rebuild his country." Does anyone really believe that because the US threw some money at the villagers this just washed away the sense of anger and frustration these individuals felt toward Americans?

You don't get a mulligan because you rebuilt the town you leveled.

But it's a far cry from what COIN advocates were saying a year ago. Then US/ISAF destruction of property was a bad thing because it "creates more insurgents." Today, destroying property, not such a bad thing because we helped the people whose homes were destroyed to rebuild them i.e. building trust.

It's perhaps another example that COIN advocates tend to define COIN by whatever definition furthers their arguments at that exact moment.

Armed Social Work in Action Posted by Michael Cohen

This might be the greatest, most depressing and yet bizarrely symbolic picture depicting the US effort to stabilize and pacify Afghanistan. Here in an article from the New York Times that references a "humanitarian assistance patrol in Ghazni Province" which handed out "crank-powered radios, books, candy and drinks."

But check out the title of the book in the picture below:

That's right, US soliders are handing out English-language copies of "Chicken Soup for the Soul" for Afghan villagers.

Truly, you can't make this stuff up.

More Ideas For A Constructive Foreign Policy Debate Posted by David Shorr

I spent last weekend at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School for a conference the Stanley Foundation co-sponsored with three of our favorite colleagues. The main subject was the prospect and challenge of international cooperation amidst pervasive change, but there were a couple of nuggets for the domestic politics of foreign policy. The first came from Rich Williamson, a highly accomplished practitioner and pillar of the Republican FP establishment. Rich's comment offers a sort of truce for some of the most contentious strains of the debate, one well worth exploring:

America’s foreign policy properly is driven in the first instance by national security concerns and then by vital interests, many of which will be economic.  Yet human rights are integral to the American character.  And a world in which human rights are respected is a safer, more secure and better world.  At the very least we should speak out for voiceless victims and in behalf of human rights.  During my many diplomatic jobs I have spoken the truth to many bad actors who have done bad things, and they have never been surprised.  They know they are doing bad things.  Rather they are surprised when America does not speak up.  And when America is silent on such trespass of basic human rights it gives them more space to continue their abuse of human rights.

It sure would be nice to reach some consensus about dealing with repressive foreign leaders who present other problems for us besides their abuse of rights. The "coddling dictators" trope is classic political point-scoring. And those who argue that resolute-ness is all you need to whip bad guys into line are selling Americans unrealistic ideas about how we can achieve our aims in today's world. I know for a fact that many of my conservative friends don't believe this, and I appreciated Rich saying it.

Don't anyone worry, though, about the new civility stifling all debate and eliding all differences. For a start, I have a slight unease over how Rich's above paragraph is weighted -- it pivots pretty quickly from the acknowledgment of other policy objectives to several sentences on the upholding of human rights. Now back to my Princeton conference story. In a memo that Bruce Jentleson wrote for the conference, I was struck by the following excellent summary of the Bush and Obama administration approaches to US leadership and international legitimacy, as well as the response and results they elicited:

Debating the Tunisian Uprising on Bloggingheads.tv Posted by Shadi Hamid

Issandr El Amrani and I took to bloggingheads.tv yesterday to debate Tunisia's almost-would-be revolution. What does it mean for the region, and what, if anything, should the US do about it? Issandr's twitter feed and website, The Arabist, has been one of the best places to follow events in Tunisia. A special bonus for viewers: Issandr and I offer predictions on which regime might fall next. We know that people like predictions, even when they're wrong. So we obliged. It is worth noting, however, that no one Middle East analyst on the planet predicted the fall of Tunisia. This, I hope, will be one of the main lessons of Tunisia: No autocratic regime is immune. Everyone is at risk - even the most "stable" among them. In any case, here's our debate. Enjoy:  

It Isn't All About Us Posted by Eric Martin

I cannot recommend enough my colleague Michael Cohen's piece on the need to take account of, and accommodate, Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan as part of our own strategic approach going forward. Cohen's assessment is realistic, thorough and takes care to recognize what Pakistani leaders (rightly or wrongly) views as its vital interests in Afghanistan, without falling into the trap of projecting our own goals onto Pakistan's leadership, or simply assuming that Pakistan will abandon its interests in a country it shares a border with for the sake of a mission undertaken by a power half a world away. 

In the present context, Pakistan has long cultivated influence in Afghanistan via its Taliban allies as a means to counterbalance its larger, and more territorial vast, rival: India.  In fact, as Cohen points out, the Pakistani security apparatus views almost all issues through the prism of India. Says Cohen:

Yet, for a policy that is so apparently solicitous of Pakistani needs, it is quite disconnected from actual Pakistani interests, particularly with regard to Afghanistan. In fact, the campaign to coax the Pakistani military into turning against its Afghan Taliban allies as well as the U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan that seeks to defeat the Taliban and strengthen the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai undermines rather than furthers Pakistan's interests. In essence, U.S. policy consists of political and diplomatic efforts to convince Pakistan to act against its perceived interests. Instead, the United States needs to more seriously address Pakistani concerns about Afghanistan's future.

Pundit Accountability - What I Got Wrong Posted by Michael Cohen

One of my biggest pet peeves as a denizen of the think tank and blogging world is the propensity of my fellow foreign policy analysts to make mistakes and errors of judgment - and never be held accountable for them.  Why should we be above reputational scrutiny for making errors in what, after all, is our primary occupation - analysis? And after all a little humility is probably a very good thing, especially when you are regularly standing on a soap box telling other people what they don't know or what they got wrong.

So just to show that I am willing to put my money (or in this case reputation) where my mouth is, I, a bit belatedly, decided to review the lion's share of my blog postings at DA from 2010 and pick out the worst ones for public exposure. (I would encourage other bloggers and analysts to follow suit - it's actually quite cathartic.)

For the most part I feel pretty good about my track record and I think most of my writings hold up to scrutiny - of course is things start going well in Afghanistan I may have to revise this entire post! But there are a few stinkers out there - and while I'm sure I've missed some errors along the way these are the ones that really leaped out to me.

Let's start with this post from May of last year about the attempted Times Square bombing, which is just plain embarrassing and was indeed wrong about where responsibility lay for that foiled attack. I jumped to some overwrought conclusions and my rhetoric was really a bit over the top. I wish I could delete it.

In April, Jim Arkedis wrote what I thought was a rather harsh assessment of a piece I'd written about Afghanistan in Dissent. It seemed a bit unfair . . . but that doesn't really excuse the rather d***ish tone I took in my response. So if you're reading this Jim, my apologies.

In November I wrote this rather blistering attack against Wikileaks. Now I still think that the basic approach of Wikileaks is dangerous and undermines US national security in ways that Julian Assange and his band of cohorts don't truly understand. But, I'm chastened a bit by the fact that Wikileaks has responsibly not leaked all the cables they have and has wisely redacted the names of those who might be affected. I'm hardly a Wikileaks supporter but I think there is reason to believe that my initial take on them was perhaps too dogmatic.

Ok, now to some more substantive critiques related to Afghanistan. I wrote this in January 2010:

"'The more there is talk of negotiation, the more the Taliban view it as a sign of weakness. How do you make sure the reconciliation process does not embolden the Taliban to go on the march?'" It's a good question and it seems like the answer would be to put greater military pressure on the Taliban, but that isn't the strategy being espoused by General McChrystal."

Careful readers of this blog would know I've switched my position on the necessary precursors to negotiation - and I'm now generally opposed to putting greater military pressure on the Taliban. Honestly, it's a case of my view about the conflict evolving, but there is an apparent contradiction here that should be acknowledged.

Then there is this from April:

The idea that we are able to provide security in places like Helmand and Kandahar is nothing less than sheer folly; that we believe it will turn the tide of the war is far worse.

I stand by the turning the tide argument; but the US has been able to provide somewhat improved security in some parts of Helmand and Kandahar so I should admit that I was perhaps too skeptical in some of my earlier assessments. Of course, I still think those security improvement are mere tactical gains that don't fundamentally shift the strategic deficit in Afghanistan.

This post from June, which postulated that the "worm had turned on Afghanistan" was, um, wrong - and dramatically so. Even worse was my response to the McChrystal firing last June and what it might mean on the ground in Afghanistan:

And while this is unlikely to lead to a wholesale - and much-needed - change in strategy one would imagine that it might lead to other important tactical changes around the margins. For example, it will be very interesting to see if the long-planned offensive in Kandahar, which would almost certainly lengthen US involvement in the Afghan fight, still happens. Or perhaps there will be new efforts to open political negotiations with the Taliban. And I'll even be even more curious to see if the current, restrictive rules of engagement for US troops are relaxed by a general who hardly practiced the same sort of population centric COIN so favored by McChrystal. Quite simply, there is going to be enormous pressure on Petraeus to show results, particularly by December when the first major review of the Afghanistan policy is supposed to occur.

In the end, what matters perhaps more than anything else is that Obama is now quite firmly in charge of Afghan policy - and the longer, even open-ended, commitment favored by the generals is on the outs . . . Petraeus will now be under enormous pressure to stick by his promise to Obama and begin troop withdrawals by 2011. Maybe at one point Obama might have bended the rules or even been flexible if McChrystal or Petraeus were able to show "progress" in Afghanistan; not anymore.

I got the change in the Afghan rules of engagement part correct (but that was kind of an easy one) and I was right to suggest that there would be pressure on Petraeus to show results by December . . . but the how part was off 180 degrees. And the argument that Obama was back in charge of Afghanistan policy; chalk that one up to wishful thinking on my part. I completely misjudged and misunderstood Petraeus and what his ascendancy would mean to the war effort.

I doubled down on this silliness in July with a post postulating that we had hit an inflection point in Afghanistan that leaned toward de-escalation and not escalation. Yeah, not so much.

These were perhaps my two worst pieces of prognostication . . . well except for this post that I wrote after the capture of Mullah Baradar by Pakistan:

Not only is this enormous as far as the US war in Afghanistan, but it suggests for perhaps the first time that the Pakistan government is willing to cooperate with the US in going after the Afghan Taliban.  One can only imagine the impact on Taliban feelings of security and reliance on Pakistani support: that safe haven ain't feeling so safe anymore. One has to think this will affect the drive toward political reconciliation in a dramatic way - because if you're the Taliban this news suggests that time is no longer necessarily on your side.

I don't think it's an exaggeration to say this may be the most important to thing to happen to the US war in Afghanistan.This has the potential to change the entire complexion of the war in Afghanistan - and for the better. For the first time in a very long time, there is reason for optimism.

Jesus, that is awful. This is a great example of trying to write something that is absolutely outside my lane of knowledge (which is already a fairly narrow country road). At the time, I had a rather poor understanding of Pakistan internal politics . . . and it showed. I just had no idea what I was talking about (perhaps it reflected some desperate desire to say something good about the war).

To that last point, I can't help but note that the three worst blog posts of the year; the ones that most wildly missed the mark; the ones that put the greatest egg on my face - what they each had in common, was that they were perhaps the only three times all year I wrote something that offered an optimistic view of the war in Afghanistan. And as I now know that optimism was sorely misplaced.

I think there might be a lesson there. 

Anyway, sorry for the navel-gazing; I'll get back to pessimistic Afghan blogging toot suite.