It’s the Optics, Stupid: Why and How Hizbullah is Spinning the Lebanese Government’s Collapse Posted by The Editors

This guest post by Anthony Elghossain, who blogs at Page Lebanon and is a J.D. candidate at The George Washington University Law School.

After months of parading a purportedly imminent “Saudi-Syrian initiative” aimed at averting a crisis, Hizbullah and its allies have withdrawn from, and thus toppled, Lebanon's government. Meanwhile, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, having just concluded private talks with U.S. President Barack Obama, is en route to Paris for a meeting with French President Nicolas Sarkozy to shore up international support for the pro-Western March 14 coalition.

The parties’ inability to resolve their dispute over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is not surprising. After all, any prospective deal would have involved core interests and first principles. It is unlikely, then, that Hizbullah’s toppling of the government was a reaction to a Hariri reversal.

To placate Hizbullah, March 14 would have had to denounce the anticipated STL indictment before its issuance, politically abort the STL. Over the past few months, however, various March 14 figures had made clear that a “resolution” could not come at the expense of justice.

For its part, Hizbullah would have had to accept the risk of an adverse indictment without total political cover from the Hariri camp. Not content with Hariri’s public withdrawal of past “political accusations” against Syria, nor with reassurances that March 14 would disentangle prospectively accused Hizbullah members from the party as a whole, Hizbullah had been pressing Hariri to denounce the indictment outright.

In another vein, these resignations do little to derail the STL (yet). The Tribunal operates under the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority, which means that international expertise, funds, and political cover will ensure progress over the long term. While cooperation from the Lebanese government would certainly ease things, particularly in guaranteeing security for U.N. investigators or assisting in evidence collection, the Tribunal can ultimately move forward with or without such cooperation.

Sources close to the situation have indicated that the “Saudi-Syrian initiative” centered on preparing the ground for “post-indictment stability in Lebanon” and emphasized that “at no point did March 14, or Hariri, consider trading stability for justice.” Having failed to compel Hariri to delegitimize the STL’s indictment, Hizbullah is trying to "up the ante in Lebanon’s long-running stand-off."

But why now? It's the optics.

Hizbullah has attributed the government’s collapse to last-minute American pressure on the French, Saudis, and March 14, rather than on irreconcilable differences that precluded a solution in the first place. With Hariri on his way to New York and Washington, Hizbullah issued a 24-hour ultimatum to Lebanese President Michel Sleiman, demanding an “extraordinary” cabinet session to deal with the issue of “false witnesses” that Hizbullah argues have tainted the Tribunal’s credibility.

Of course, the ultimatum was only a gambit. Hariri was not about to shun Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah and Obama only to return to Beirut for a capitulation dressed up as a negotiation. And Sleiman had already made clear his unwillingness to force the issue.

As such, the ultimatum only heralded Hizbullah’s decision to withdraw from government. Having played up a professed “resolution,” the content of which remained unknown to a host of Lebanese leaders across the political spectrum, Hizbullah seized on a recent flurry of American, French, and Saudi activity to blame the U.S. and March 14 for its withdrawal.

But was it American pressure that derailed this mythical resolution? Or was it that the whims of Hizbullah, Hariri, or other Lebanese leaders, cannot dictate the operations of an internationally backed, financed, and staffed judicial body?

In any case, Hizbullah’s gambit has worked thus far. Despite strong diplomatic support from the U.S., France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, March 14 has not effectively framed the early stages of this debate.

The next battle over the STL might unfold in the streets and squares of Beirut. To indicate that public opinion in Lebanon has shifted away from justice and towards stability, Hizbullah may mobilize hundreds of thousands of Lebanese against the STL. But March 14 may mobilize in response, particularly with the commemoration of Hariri’s assassination just weeks away, so the likely outcome of this street fight is unclear.

Alternatively, Lebanon’s leaders may confine their checkers game to the halls of power. Hizbullah and its allies might seek to form a government without Hariri. However, because Hariri is the dominant Sunni actor, much like Hizbullah is the dominant Shiite party, it will be difficult to form a government without him as king or kingmaker.

Either way, Lebanon’s controversies will play out as a battle for credibility. With that in mind, March 14 and its Western backers have fallen behind in the race to spin this latest collapse.

Comments

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Alternatively, Lebanon’s leaders may confine their checkers game to the halls of power. Hizbullah and its allies might seek to form a government without Hariri. However, because Hariri is the dominant Sunni actor, much like Hizbullah is the dominant Shiite party, it will be difficult to form a government without him as king or kingmaker.
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use Hariri is the dominant Sunni actor, much like Hizbullah is the dominant Shiite party, it will be difficult to form a government without him as king or kingmaker.

Either way, Lebanon’s controversies will play out as a battle for credibility. With that in mind, March 14 and its Western backers have fallen behind in the race to spin this latest collapse.

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