The Short Life and Timely Death of Pop-Centric COIN Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at the Nation, I have a new piece looking at the evolution of counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan - from McChrystal-esque hearts and minds to Petraeus-style, kinetic action:

What is happening in Afghanistan is an embrace of the aggressive approach to counterinsurgency once publicly dismissed by FM 3-24 advocates. This is not to suggest that US and NATO forces in Afghanistan have given up on trying to reach hearts and minds. But their embrace of techniques they once argued against is an implicit acknowledgment that the population-centric tactics of FM 3-24 have only marginal effectiveness in a nonpermissive environment like that of Afghanistan today. Like so many counterinsurgents before them, US generals are finding that the carrot is far less effective than the stick.

Their actual approach bears startling resemblance to the smaller-military-footprint counterterrorism strategy outlined by Vice President Biden during last year's strategic review debates. Put aside for now are dreams of state-building in the Hindu Kush or the belief that only by turning the people away from the insurgents can America secure its interests. Instead, military planners have shifted their focus to an end-game strategy of using lethal force to drive the Taliban to the negotiating table.

The shift in emphasis toward a more traditional conflict is compelling evidence of the disconnect between the theory of population-centric COIN and actual US capabilities—and an unstated recognition that FM 3-24 has so far not succeeded. This hasn't stopped COIN advocates from arguing that the shift in military emphasis is all part of the larger COIN effort; after all, they claim, direct military action is a crucial element of counterinsurgency. But these are self-serving and deceptive arguments, intended in part to mask the failure of the military to capture Afghan hearts and minds.

You can read the whole thing here . . . and please do!

 

Comments

[Don Bacon]

The timeless function of any military force, which includes the activities that they're trained to do, is to blow stuff up and kill people, and not to help little old ladies cross the street.

So COIN, as a think Gian Gentile says, was always BS. Thanks for calling it out.

[uggs outlet]

a sentry stood on guard at the corner.like a soldier standing guard day and night guarding one of our campus,he is on guard eight hours a day,

[مايك بن مايك]

Cohen:
You really should go back and and actually read FM 3-24 and review Petraues' and McChrystal's public statements about Counterinsurgency. Aggressive direct-action really has always been part of a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign. Ya know that whole "Clear-Hold-Build" phrase that COIN advocates through around that you don't seem to have an understanding of? The "Clear" part is aggressive direct-action operations (a la Helmand in '09, during the time those COIN advocates were supposedly talking about your misconstrued touchie-feelie concept of COIN). Even after this phase is completed in a certain area there will remain the need for raids on insurgents hideouts, logistical facilities, and staging areas. You've demonstrated a sophomoric ignorance of what actual counterinsurgency entails.

Bacon:
"The timeless function of any military force is...to blow stuff up" How exactly was this timeless function accomplished before gun powder? You should probably go back and educate yourself about what a military actually does instead of declaring it to be what your childish ignorant mind would like it to be (here's a clue: its function is to Win Wars. On War would be a good place to start learning).

[Michael Cohen]

For anyone to argue that the emphasis of the US mission in Afghanistan has NOT shifted to more aggressive military action (from where it was a year ago) is simply not paying attention to what is happening there - or the public statements of military officials. No one questions that there is a need for kinetic action in hearts and minds COIN, but again it's a question of emphasis. Even the manner in which we are fighting in and around Knadahar is demonstrably different from the Battle of Marjah.

[Don Bacon]

The doctrine

FM 3-24: Insurgents that never defeat counterinsurgents in combat still may achieve their strategic objectives.

FM 3-24: In a COIN environment, it is vital for commanders to adopt appropriate and measured levels of force and apply that force precisely so that it accomplishes the mission without causing unnecessary loss of life or suffering.

FM 3-24: Ultimate success in COIN is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force.

The McChrystal way (quotes)

We can succeed. We must redefine the fight. The objective is the will of the Afghan people. We must protect the Afghan people from all threats: from the enemy and from our own actions.

We also need to protect them from our own actions. When we fight, if we become focused on destroying the enemy but end up killing Afghan civilians, destroying Afghan property or acting in a way that is perceived as arrogant, we convince the Afghan people that we do not care about them.

If we say, ‘We are here for you – we respect and want to protect you’, while destroying their home, killing their relatives or destroying their crops, it is difficult for them to connect those two concepts. It would be difficult for us to do the same. The understanding, then, must be that we respect the people.

The Petraeus reset (news reports)

A military source close to Gen. David Petraeus told Fox News that one of the first things the general will do when he takes over in Afghanistan is to modify the rules of engagement to make it easier for U.S. troops to engage in combat with the enemy.

Troops on the ground and some military commanders have said the strict [McChrystal] rules -- aimed at preventing civilian casualties -- have effectively forced the troops to fight with one hand tied behind their backs.

Violence in Afghanistan hit an all-time high in recent months as Western troops battled an increasingly sophisticated insurgency expanding across the country, the U.S. military said on Tuesday.

An intense military campaign aimed at crippling the Taliban has so far failed to inflict more than fleeting setbacks on the insurgency or put meaningful pressure on its leaders to seek peace, according to U.S. military and intelligence officials citing the latest assessments of the war in Afghanistan.

The US is escalating its assault on the Taliban with a sharp rise in bombing and missile raids, more relaxed rules on the destruction of civilian property and the deployment of heavily armoured M1 Abrams tanks to Afghanistan for the first time.

But aid groups warned today that the dramatic increase in air strikes in recent months is contributing to "rapidly deteriorating" security for most Afghans and what is expected to be a rising number of civilian casualties.

[Don Bacon]

The Taliban had its own annual review.

news report:
The Taliban on Friday rejected the review of Obama's year-old war strategy in Afghanistan, saying that it has failed on both the military and the civil administration fronts.

In an e-mailed statement, Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid said the last nine years of war had proven that increased troop levels had no effect. "Corruption, insecurity and the civilian casualties are a result of failed American strategy," Mujahid said.

and US intelligence agrees

Reporting from Washington — Two new assessments by the U.S. intelligence community present a gloomy picture of the Afghanistan war, contradicting a more upbeat view expressed by military officials as the White House prepares to release a progress report on the 9-year-old conflict.

The classified intelligence reports contend that large swaths of Afghanistan are still at risk of falling to the Taliban, according to officials who were briefed on the National Intelligence Estimates on Afghanistan and Pakistan, which represent the collective view of more than a dozen intelligence agencies.

[Don Bacon]

Michael,
I sent you an email.

[geilifen]

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[wangjiacui]

We can succeed. We must redefine the fight. The objective is the will of the Afghan people. We must protect the Afghan people from all threats: from the enemy and from our own actions.

We also need to protect them from our own actions. When we fight, if we become focused on destroying the enemy but end up killing Afghan civilians, destroying Afghan property or acting in a way that is perceived as arrogant, we convince the Afghan people that we do not care about them.
ugg boots clearance

If we say, ‘We are here for you – we respect and want to protect you’, while destroying their home, killing their relatives or destroying their crops, it is difficult for them to connect those two concepts. It would be difficult for us to do the same. The understanding, then, must be that we respect the people.

[chengchang]

Patrick's two main Compression Tube Fitting challengers emulated Brown in certain ways. (A fourth candidate, Green Party nominee Jill Stein, is a perennial Compression Tube Fittings also-ran of the left.) Charlie Baker sought to remind the Bay State's tax-averse silent and slim majority that a two-party system was needed to counteract the Democratic machine on Beacon Hill. Shaded Pold Motor But Tim Cahill, the state treasurer, tried to take Brown's campaign to the next level: he left the Democratic Party and sought to appeal to Scott Brown led tube independents.