Afghanistan: Why Do We Stay? Posted by The Editors

This post is by Stimson Center Distinguished Fellow Gordon Adams.

Once upon a time, we went into Afghanistan to remove the Taliban government and eliminate a training ground for our friends from Al Qaeda.  Mission accomplished. 

Then we decided to stay around to “fix” the Afghan regime so it would be more “democratic” and to help stimulate the economy, so that Al Qaeda (and the Taliban) would never come back. Mission incomplete, in part because we took our eye off the ball and went to war in Iraq, instead, pulling Special Forces and civil affairs units out of Afghanistan in the process.

Then Iraq became the “bad” war, for the new administration, and Afghanistan became the “good” war.  And, in the meantime, a lot of very enthusiastic military folks spiffed up our military doctrine, turning it into real counterinsurgency money (AKA COIN), and began to implement the doctrine, with equal enthusiasm, in Afghanistan.

Sad things had happened, meanwhile.  The Mayor of Kabul, Hamid Karzai, could not make himself into a national president.  The $27 billion we spent training Afghani soldiers and police did not produce a force that could bring security to the country.  Opium production soared, fueling the Taliban, and filling the coffers of local poo-bahs and warlords.

In other words, we began a new strategy in a country without a central government, rampant corruption, a breakdown of order, and an almost non-existent economy and hoped we could tie it all together, bring governance, order, discipline, and development.

Why were we doing this?  Not to remove the Taliban and Al Qaeda; we did that.  Not to create a democracy or a healthy economy; we couldn’t do that.  So why are we there?

The only compelling reason being offered is that there would be a power vacuum if we left, one that would be instantly filled by the Taliban (and, perhaps, a return of Al Qaeda).  But we are failing at preventing that power vacuum today.  In fact, one might argue, the vacuum exists around us, and we are doing little and can do little to prevent it from emerging.  And there is precious little sign of Al Qaeda being present in Afghanistan today.

The bottom line is that the solution to power relations in Afghanistan lies with the Afghanis.  And since it is not a democracy, that means with the Taliban, the warlords and their satrapies, and Karzai, to the degree anybody listens to Karzai.  And it means with the surrounding countries, notably Pakistan (who are the only government that can deal with the unruly forces and Al Qaeda in their northwestern regions).

We cannot “fix” Afghanistan.  We will spend significant blood and treasure trying, but we are neither competent, nor welcome, to fix it.  It is time to step back, look hard at the benefit of staying there, and rethink our presence.  And that will mean deal-cutting, with strange bed-fellows, to leave behind some kind of security, based on indigenous militia and security forces, leaving the Afghans to “work it out.”  It may, now, be the best outcome we can expect; we are not preventing it by staying.

Our Lack of Imagination About What To Do in Afghanistan Posted by Michael Cohen

Over the weekend, I was catching up on my New Yorker reading and came across George Packer's latest piece on Afghanistan. After about a half dozen paragraphs cogently laying out all the reasons why our current strategy in Afghanistan has not been working - and likely will not work - he makes this flabbergasting statement:

No one, however, has been able to come up with an alternative to the current strategy that doesn’t carry great risks. If there were a low-cost way to contain the interconnected groups of extremists in the Hindu Kush—with drones and Special Forces, as Vice-President Biden, among others, has urged—the President would have pursued it. If a return to power of the Taliban, which may well be the outcome of a U.S. withdrawal, did not pose a threat to international security, Obama would have already abandoned Karzai to his fate. But anyone who believes that a re-Talibanized Afghanistan would be a low priority should read the kidnapping narratives of two American journalists, Jere Van Dyk and David Rohde, who were held by the Taliban, along with the autobiography of the former Taliban official known as Mullah Zaeef. Together, these accounts show that the years since 2001 have radicalized the insurgents and imbued them with Al Qaeda’s global agenda. Tactically and ideologically, it’s more and more difficult to distinguish local insurgents from foreign jihadists.

This is an incredibly frustrating example of the real lack of imagination that seems to define a great deal of commentary about the war in Afghanistan. First of all, the notion that the Taliban would even be able to take over the country - or that would be the country's fate if we didn't maintain the current failing strategy - is just a bizarrely far-fetched notion. As Michael Semple noted in a conference I attended last week there isn't exactly a lot of love for the Taliban in Afghanistan (particularly outside the Pashtun-dominated south and east) and every reason to believe that there are severe limits on the ability of the group to take over wide swaths of the country.

Second, the very idea that the Taliban pose a threat to international security is, for lack of a better word, laughable. Instead of reading David Rodhe and Van Dyk, perhaps George Packer should listen to Leon Panetta say there are only about 50-100 al Qaeda in Afghanistan and then try to figure out why this meager AQ presence requires troops levels of 100,000 troops. As Fareed Zakaria noted recently we lost 100 soldiers alone last month in Afghanistan - more than the entire AQ presence in the country. Simple common sense would suggest that even if the Taliban were able to take over Afghanistan they would be insane to give al Qaeda a safe haven - and what's more the US would clearly have the wherewithal and the inclination to militarily eradicate any significant al Qaeda presence there. The notion that removing our presence from Afghanistan - in its current form - would return the country to pre-9/11 days just seems incredibly simplistic.

Does Packer really believe that our current $100 billion a year commitment is the only means of combating the al Qaeda threat? Does he believe that this is an appropriate and measured response to a terrorist organization that has not launched a major attack against the US in nearly 9 years? 

I continue to be amazed and befuddled that otherwise intelligent people don't see the current mission in Afghanistan as an utterly bizarre over-reaction to whatever limited threat al Qaeda actually poses - and seem congenitally incapable of imagining any other potential US strategy.

For example, Packer argues there are no alternatives to the current policy AND there is no low-cost way to the contain the terrorists who reside in the Hindu Kush.

Here's Sean Kay arguing for a containment strategy

Here's Gilles Dorronsorro making the case for political negotiations

Here's Austin Grant Long making the case for a CT approach

Here's me arguing for an approach that stresses regional prioritization

To be sure these plans each have their flaws and none of them are a silver bullet, but they are clearly alternatives to the current strategy at a far less significant cost.

The fact that folks like Packer - and others in the commentariat - are unable to imagine a world in which we can do something different than a) what we are currently doing or b) getting the hell out of Afghanistan ASAP is just impossible for me to understand. 

There are alternatives to our current, failing strategy in Afghanistan - why is everyone so afraid to talk about them?