I Take It All Back! - UPDATED Posted by Michael Cohen

Well sort of, but this is huge news:

The Taliban’s top military commander was captured several days ago in Karachi, Pakistan, in a secret joint operation by Pakistani and American intelligence forces, according to American government officials.The commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, is an Afghan described by American officials as the most significant Taliban figure to be detained since the American-led war in Afghanistan started more than eight years ago. He ranks second in influence only to Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban’s founder, and was a close associate of Osama bin Laden before the Sept. 11 attacks.

Not only is this enormous as far as the US war in Afghanistan, but it suggests for perhaps the first time that the Pakistan government is willing to cooperate with the US in going after the Afghan Taliban.  One can only imagine the impact on Taliban feelings of security and reliance on Pakistani support: that safe haven ain't feeling so safe anymore. One has to think this will affect the drive toward political reconciliation in a dramatic way - because if you're the Taliban this news suggests that time is no longer necessarily on your side.

I don't think it's an exaggeration to say this may be the most important to thing to happen to the US war in Afghanistan - as Leah Farrell suggests this might be the more significant US capture since 9/11. This has the potential to change the entire complexion of the war in Afghanistan - and for the better. For the first time in a very long time, there is reason for optimism.

UPDATE: Greg Carlstrom has warned against over-optimism about reconciliation and he's right, it's probably a bit early to get too far ahead since we don't know all the reasons why the ISI moved on Baradar - and we don't know what's happening behind the scenes. But the combination of the US surge, increased military pressure on the Taliban, even the Shinwari deal and now this capture - for the first time in a while there is evidence that the Taliban may be losing the military initiative.  That may have the potential to move the reconciliation ball forward.  We may have to wait a while and see how this plays out, but there weren't many events that had the potential to really change the political equation on the ground - and this is one of them. 

BTW, if this was in the works before Obama's West Point speech - and was done in concert with the surge - could someone please direct me to my plate of crow.

Thoughts on Marjeh: The Jury is Still Out Posted by Michael Cohen

I've been wanting for a few days to say something smart and profound about the US offensive in Marjeh. While generally I struggle with smart and profound, the more difficult problem is what to say. 

As Josh Foust points out, reporting is, how shall we say . . . all over the map. It seems that US troops have encountered sporadic resistance; but even with the focus on not harming civilians, there seem to be several different incidents of civilians being killed. 

Yesterday, 12 were killed when an artillery shell went astray; another 5 killed today in an ISAF airstrike. As I noted the other day, none of this should be surprising - civilians die in war. If the US really didn't want to see civilians harmed (if that was our number one priority) we likely wouldn't be in Helmand in the first place. We've made the decision to place our interests above those of Afghan civilians. There's nothing inherently wrong with that; it's the very nature of war, but at least we should be honest in acknowledging it.

A couple of interesting points that did jump out in some of the coverage. There are some early indications that significant numbers of Taliban slipped across the border to Pakistan, which has always been one of the problems with trying to hold and build in Helmand, in general. Also, it's been very hard to figure out how many Afghan units are actually involved in fighting, but I thought this tweet from Atia Abawi, who is embedded in Marjeh, was interesting:

Afghan soldiers supposed to be a big part of Op Mushtarak. Some are motivated, but most that I've seen like to sleep as the Marines fight.

(And since I'm not obsessed with Twitter, you can follow me here: http://twitter.com/speechboy71) 

But in the end, what happens now won't be terribly revelatory. I think the Guardian did a nice job of summing up the issue:

The withdrawal of Isaf forces from Marjah will be more significant than their insertion. If this operation is designed to be as important to the Afghan surge as the capture of Falluja was for the Iraq campaign, then the objective is not to kill the insurgents so much as make it impossible for them to come back.

This is exactly right. It's way too early to draw any serious conclusions on the effectiveness of the Marjeh offensive. If the US is able to clear the area; if together with Afghan Army and police they are able to provide security and if the Afghan government is able to offer effective governance then maybe this whole thing works. Considering their lack of success in the past in doing effective "hold and build" in the past - not to mention the fact that US troops are on a pretty short leas before withdrawal - I'm a bit skeptical.

But time will tell; and until then the verdict on Marjeh is still pending.

Longing for No-Drama Obama? Check Out Iraq Drawdown. Posted by Heather Hurlburt

There's plenty of drama in Iraq these days, surrounding the upcoming elections and the banning and unbanning, de-Baathification and un-de-Baathification of candidates, the emergence of new political coalitions. 

But on Sunday, Secretary Clinton announced that the US troop presence has fallen below 100,000,That is almost a 25% cut in seven months -- and a faster pace of withdrawal than the Administration announced last summer, when the commander of US forces in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, said the US intended to get to 120,000 by the end of the year. 

Did you even look up from the Nordic combined final to notice?  I didn't think so.  But don't feel bad.  Iraqis, as noted above, were too busy running their national affairs to be very concerned.  Even Dick Cheney  couldn't squeeze a word about Iraq into his politicized Sunday show litany.

(*An ironic note:  we are now heading, in 2010, toward the 30-50,000 troop level that Bush Administration pre-war planning predicted we would hit in 2003.)

It's fun to be snarky about this on a blog.  And of course the Administration is properly concerned not to draw too much attention to the troop moves in order not to embolden either its domestic or regional opponents.  In fact, making the announcement in a regional forum, as Secretary Clinton did in Doha, is just right -- because the regional Arab and Muslim audience is the one that most needs to see the US keeping our word and withdrawing troops from a Muslim country.

But it's worth asking what is wrong with the way we report on and debate national security here at home.  A leader can draw endless praise for starting a war, or escalating one.  Students of history and politics know that it's considerably more difficult to end a war than to begin one (this is where I regret the inadequacy of my education and my inability to provide a suitable reference from antiquity, but the French and Americans in Indochina alone ought to make the point).  We were told ad nauseam from 2005 onwards that pulling out would have unthinkable consequences for stability in and around Iraq, for human rights, and for the safety of our troops.  I don't at all wish to downplay the uncertainty surrounding the Iraqi elections, and the potential negative consequences.  But I have not seen a single arugment which suggests that more troops could have prevented or solved the problem -- or, more importantly, that Iraqis want it to be solved by American intervention. (Check out Marc Lynch on this.) I also realize that the most significant danger point for our troops lies ahead, when we really have gotten down to that mythical 30,000-50,000 level.

Wouldn't it be good to see endless columns of Washington Post tick-tock of the decisions to disengage, and how Iraqis have stood up at each one?  Or to see a fight break out between CAP and FPI over who deserves more credit for setting the foundations of this sage withdrawal policy, Obama (for demanding it for 4+ years) or George W. Bush (for negotiating the status of forces agreement that set it in motion)? 

In sum - we need a national security discussion which recognizes that wars have an end as well as a beginning, though not many will end with surrenders on battleships.  We need to accustom ourselves and our public debate to different ways the end may look, as well as the beginning.  And we need to praise and value leaders who have the wisdom and foresight and, yep, bravery, because it takes that too, to plan for the ending.  For it is likely that not all of this withdrawal, or the one from Afghanistan that will come in five or ten years, will be this "easy."  

Live-Tweeting the Brookings US-Islamic World Forum in Doha Posted by Shadi Hamid

We're currently holding our 7th annual Brookings US-Islamic World Forum in Doha, Qatar. I will be live-tweeting parts of the conference. You can follow me here.

This year's forum is shaping up to be a particularly interesting one. Earlier today, President Obama addressed the audience through an exclusive taped address. Senator John Kerry and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan then gave the keynote addresses. And tomorrow night, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will be giving a major speech, which some are billing as the "sequel" to the Cairo Address. Stay tuned.

I'm excited that, this year, there's significant representation from Islamist parties. I'm part of a working group that features one of the most interesting assortments of Islamists I've ever seen in one room, including from Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain, Iraq, and the Philippines. The working groups are under Chatham House rules, but I hope to write more about our areas of consensus and disagreement soon.

Rockets, and rodents, and uranium! Oh, my! Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

During the 31st anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, Ahmadinejad boasted of Iran’s enrichment program and nuclear capability. From the NY Times:

In the address in Azadi Square in Tehran, Mr. Ahmadinejad relied on familiar nationalist and anti-Western themes, accusing the United States and Europe of trying to hold Iran down and challenging them by saying that Iran had already succeeded in enriching uranium to 20 percent and could do even more.

“We have the capability to enrich uranium more than 20 percent or 80 percent, but we don’t enrich because we don’t need it,” Mr. Ahmadinejad said.

But he added a warning to the West. “Please pay attention and understand that the people of Iran are brave enough that if it wants to build a bomb it will clearly announce it and build it and not be afraid of you,” he said. “When we say we won’t build it that means we won’t.”

The president also repeated his declaration that Iran was a “nuclear state,” adding that it had the capacity to enrich uranium to weapons grade if it chose to.

While events that took place in the days before the rally—launching a rocket filled with little critters, increasing enrichment levels to the HEU threshold, and ticking off the IAEA— might alter the context of Ahmadinejad’s comments, this isn’t the first time Iran has declared itself a “nuclear state.”  Over at ArmsControlWonk, Jeffrey Lewis rattles off at least seven other instances where Iran proclaimed itself a “nuclear power.” If Iran was categorizing itself as a nuclear state in December of 2006, it seems fair to say this is more of a rhetorical ruse aimed at ruffling feathers and scoring domestic political points. As White House press secretary, Robert Gibbs, explained, “Iran has made a series of statements that are…based on politics, not on physics.”

Iran’s enrichment program has indeed experienced several setbacks and technological hiccups. David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and International Security, has conducted extensive research on Iran’s program and has detailed the areas where things have not gone according to plan:

Iranian officials have steadfastly maintained that Natanz operates successfully and do not admit to any serious problems at the plant.  However, the relatively low LEU output suggests otherwise. Iran tries to focus on the positive; its officials periodically trumpet the growth in the number of centrifuges installed at the plant…although it reportedly said in August 2009 that it shut down a few cascades for maintenance.  According to a senior official close to the IAEA, the IAEA does not know the reason for the decrease [in the number of centrifuges said to be enriching uranium—a number that has actually been decreasing since June 2009].  Iran did acknowledge some technical problems in its centrifuges to the IAEA, but it did not volunteer why it reduced the numbers said to be enriching. 

Despite these issues, Iran’s announcement that it plans to enrich uranium to 20 percent—the bright line between low-enriched uranium and highly enriched uranium—is serious.  As Albright further explains, Iran’s program is likely to improve:

The problems at the FEP, particularly during the last year, appear to involve complications in deploying thousands of reliable centrifuges.  But despite these problems, it is important to remember that a centrifuge program is not unchanging or static; centrifuge development is intrinsically about improving the separative capacity of the centrifuges.  Iran will continue to improve its enrichment performance at Natanz and elsewhere.

This does not mean that Iran is going to develop a nuclear weapon tomorrow, or in a week, or even in a month.  Iran’s rhetoric is ahead of its actual capabilities. Thus, there is still time for the international community to work toward a multi-pronged solution and strengthen the global nonproliferation regime. As it currently stands, it is politically advantageous for Ahmadinejad to continue to hype Iran’s nuclear program—even if it is stalled by poor performance and reliability. By domestically presenting the nuclear issue in an “us versus them” context as he did during Thursday’s rally, Ahmadinejad can harness any hasty or unilateral action by an outside actor and attempt to unite a divided population and stifle the domestic opposition.  This is precisely the reason why the John Boltons of the world need to shut up.  Military action would only make the situation worse.  That administration should continue working with international partners to coordinate a multinational response.  Smart, targeted sanctions—coupled with further negotiations will not solve the situation overnight, but at this point, it seems to be the best option.

Friday Round-up Posted by Michael Cohen

• On his Twitter feed Brian Katulis linked to this amazing poll result from the NYT. When asked about the most important issues facing the country, war got 3%, terrorism got 1% and Afghanistan didn't even rate. In fact, as near I can tell the poll doesn't even ask a single question about Afghanistan.

I understand the economy stinks and people are worried about their jobs (I know the feeling) but my gosh, we're going to have 100,000 troops on the ground there and Americans are blithely unconcerned. The extent to which Afghanistan has fallen off the map over the last two months is both stunning and depressing.

• Bernard Finel has an interesting article about COIN in the latest issue of Armed Forces Journal; as a critique of the military's COIN infatuation it's spot on. Although the Zen Pundit offers an interesting rejoinder.  

• Former NSN alum Moira Whelan who is now at AID flagged this piece in HuffPo from new AID administrator Rajiv Shah on ongoing relief efforts in Haiti.   

• As is his wont, Marc Lynch has a really smart take on Iran

• Finally, the indomitable Slim Charles perhaps best captures my thoughts about the imminent attack on Marjah: "Don't matter who did what to who at this point. Fact is, we went to war, and now there ain't no going back. I mean, shit, it's what war is, you know? Once you in it, you in it. If it's a lie, then we fight on that lie. But we gotta fight." 

One More On Tribal Militias Posted by Michael Cohen

Just when you thought we had pretty much exhausted this topic at DA, there are two recent articles that add some complexity to the question of Afghan tribal engagement. First is this piece from Josh Foust in the National where he makes the argument that engaging Afghan "tribes" is not a effective means of stabilizing Afghanistan.

The current structure of the Taliban, as a de-tribalised Islamist resistance movement, means that normal methods of working within the tribal system are far less effective, if at all. It is why these initiatives to bribe tribes to fight for America fail so reliably – they just don’t apply to how and why people are choosing affiliations and making decisions. Since the Taliban is a movement that is inclusive of traditionally rivalrous tribes, even rivalrous ethnicities, that rivalry cannot be exploited to undo the movement.

You should read the whole piece here. Next we have Gilles Dorronsorro, who makes the argument that trying to pick and choose which tribes to support will have a destabilizing impact on the country:

Washington's gravest error, however, is its manifest lack of interest in shoring up the Afghan central government. Whatever the official word about fighting corruption, the international coalition is bypassing Kabul in favor of local strong-men, on whom it is growing more and more dependent for protection and logistics, especially in the south. Worse, the population rejects the militias, which are often brutal toward civilians, and do little to increase support for Karzai or the coalition. 

Even inside the Afghan legal system, the coalition is choosing its partners at a local level, skirting the political center. NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams act with total independence from Kabul, which is often not even informed of their actions. 

Dorronsorro argues that the biggest problem with US policy is that it's undercutting the Karzai regime and risks leaving "nothing behind in Afghanistan but warring factions - a mess not unlike the one that precipitated the Taliban's rise to power in the first place."

I think here Dorrronsorro gets to the nub of the issue. Michael Hanna has argued here that we need these sort of band-aids in Afghanistan so that we can get closer to a withdrawal point from Afghanistan:

We overestimate our ability to craft long-term, sustainable solutions to the many ills that plague Afghanistan. In short, I don’t believe that these types of short-term efforts are irreparably damaging the coherent nation-building strategy that would simply take its place. When coupled with the difficult security situation then I think that band-aids are not such a bad idea − we need all the help we can get.

But the problem here - as Dorronsorro argues - is that we are basically choosing a short-term solution at a serious cost to Afghanistan's long-term viability. In fact, I would actually make the argument that Afghanistan's long-term stability may well be a more important issue to US interests than even defeating al Qaeda (which we've already done in Afghanistan) or the Taliban (who were likely not going to defeat militarily). Band-aids are just that; a temporary fix - and while they might serve US interests in the near term they risk being disastrous to the region (and ourselves) over the long-term.

Ultimately if we leave Afghanistan a fractured mess, riven by empowered tribes, a militarily and politically viable Taliban and a weak, emasculated central government this is a recipe for a return to civil war and regional instability. 

Indeed, one could argue that our goal in Afghanistan should be not necessarily to defeat the Taliban, but weaken it enough and strengthen the government in Kabul so that we achieve some level of stasis - and prevent the possibility of a Taliban takeover of the country. But it does seems like an agenda focused on tribal engagement risks weakening the central government so significantly that when we do leave they will be unable to stand up to the Taliban.  

It's not that this sort of "tribal" outreach is necessarily bad it's that it needs to be coordinated with the government in Kabul so that these arrangements, while localized in nature, are providing indirect support to the central government. So brazenly going around Kabul undercuts the same government that we are nominally supporting.

Of course, this means that we are then reliant on a corrupt Karzai government and it likely precludes us from being able to leave Afghanistan any time soon. Ultimately, we are going to have to live and die with Hamid Karzai and make amends with his corrupt leadership. Granted, that's not much of a solution - and all of our Afghan options are a combination of bad and worse - but it seems a smarter way to go than supporting a number of independent and unconnected factions to the ultimate detriment of Afghanistan's long-term stability. 

Three-Dimensional Chess With Iran (In Which I Agree, Mostly, With Peter Feaver) Posted by David Shorr

In a very cogent post on Shadow Government, Peter Feaver lays out the basic policy and geopolitical challenges of dealing with Iran. At the heart of his analysis is a point I view as a basis for bipartisan consensus. Feaver critiques a certain attitude toward diplomacy that places a lot of hope in Iranian cooperativeness ("if only we gave them a chance"). He's right that unless it is confronted with incentives and disincentives from the outside, Iran will continue on a straight line toward (at least) virtual nuclear weapon capability. In other words, policy and diplomacy must take into account that Tehran's game is to run out the clock. As I say, this is a reasonable basis for bipartisanship.

Accordingly, Feaver calls out China for the pretense that a non-nuclear capable Iran can be attained free of any political or strategic cost to itself. You can find an even more pointed dissection of Chinese free-riding from Bill Powell in Time. I remain optimistic about Chinese support for new sanctions against Iran. Russia's backing of sanctions will shine a white-hot spotlight on China as the obstacle, and forced with the choice, I don't think they'll want to be Iran's sole defender -- or the United States' primary source of resistance on a top foreign policy priority.

A couple of Feaver's criticisms of Obama administration policy warrant response. I don't know whether the administration was "slow to capitalize on the domestic turmoil inside Iran" after last summer's fraudulent elections, but I do know that there were trade-offs associated with America offering itself as the target of demonization. I'm quite certain that the administration's "profound misstep" (as Feaver calls it) of delaying the pressure track until last fall was no such thing. In saying that sticks must come before carrots, Feaver has it backwards. The United States' ability to exert pressure and rally international support was strengthened by showing a degree of patience rather than haste. When Feaver claims that we're no further along than six months ago, he ignores the important October success of reaching an agreed plan to move Iranian uranium out of the country. That agreement was the result of the engagement approach and now, crucially, serves as the basis of the current pressure track.

Given that time is on Iran's side, the key thing now is to maintain some diplomatic momentum and a steady tempo of pressure. I assume that is the driving purpose of current administration efforts. Speaking of which, Josh Rogin's scorecard of Iran policy players in the administration is a good companion post to Feaver's.

The state of Israel Posted by Joel Rubin

During my recent week-long trip to Israel, I visited family and attended the Herzliya conference, which is Israel’s premier security conference. During the trip, one of my hip, 30-something Israeli cousins told me that they supported Israel’s toxic foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman.

This is a sad commentary on Israel’s current state of affairs.

It turns out that Lieberman didn’t attend the Herzliya conference, which did attract Israel’s most prominent political leaders, as well as military, diplomatic, business and political leaders from across the globe.

Lieberman’s absence didn’t weaken the tough talk at the conference. Iran, the Palestinians and jihadist terrorism were all central topics. Speakers shared their views about the dilemmas facing Israel, more often depressing, rather than inspiring the audience.

But that should not have come as a surprise, as these are very dark times in the Middle East.

There was a sense of impending doom hovering over the conference. Subtle digs were made about President Obama’s leadership, with even some, such as Mort Zuckerman, reveling in his difficulties and rooting for his demise. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke about how Israeli youth were disconnected from their country’s past. These were not inspiring speeches.

There were also acknowledgements by Israeli leaders, many of whom have political roots in the conservative Likud party, about the need to achieve a two-state solution with the Palestinians. But this argument was rooted in the fear that demography would overtake Israel, with the Palestinians holding the long-term advantage in this regard. The talk was not about peace, but instead about survival.

It was clear, after attending this conference, that the weight of a decade of American neoconservative failure in the Middle East had brought Israelis neither security nor peace of mind.

This situation is problematic for Israeli political elites, who are also concerned that President Obama, unlike his predecessor, will not indulge conservative Israeli politicians in their greatest self-destructive behaviors anymore, especially when it comes to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Compounding this dilemma is the irony that the population supports a hard-line government, despite being frustrated by the policies that it is advancing.

For example, the citizens of Tel Aviv loathe settlers, whose representatives hold sway over the Netanyahu government. While settlers hold on to their vision of maintaining control over the West Bank and the Palestinians that live there, Tel Avivis understand that they are being sucked in to their dangerous, apocalyptic views. 

My Tel Aviv cousins, for example, pay more than half their income to national taxes, with a significant portion dedicated to supporting these settlers. They are infuriated by the reality that they are subsidizing the lifestyle of a group of people that has no interest in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a two-state solution, relegating Israelis to unending conflict.

Worse, while the people of Tel Aviv know that the settlers are holding the country’s politics hostage, they have no idea how to change this.

As for the political elites, despite repeated calls at Herzliya by prominent Israeli politicians, such as Tzipi Livni, Ehud Barak, Shaul Mofaz and Dan Meridor, for a two-state solution, it is becoming clear that the Israeli political system is incapable of getting there.

Compounding this dysfunction, there is a fear in Israel that the United States is a waning power. Israelis have thrown in their lot with America, and they are now beginning to worry about whether the U.S. will still be able to carry them on its back.

I left feeling that I had never seen such a demoralized Israel. Both the elites and the population looked tired, frustrated and uncertain.

From an American perspective, this is not surprising. A decade of ruinous neoconservative policies toward the Middle East, which are slowly being rolled back, contributed directly to this malaise. Neoconservative policies, such as promoting regime change in Iraq, creating settlements in the West Bank, terminating diplomacy with Syria and advocating for military action against Iran have clearly not worked either for Israel or the United States.

Is it any wonder then that Israelis support a man like Avigdor Lieberman and the current hard-line government? Israelis want peace. They want security. They also want a government that will protect them in these turbulent times. And so they have sought the warm embrace of the most hawkish government in recent memory.

It is both sad and ironic then that Israelis are nostalgic for the comfort of Bush-era neoconservative tough talk, despite the fact that they are most fond of an American president whose policies were diametrically opposed to those of Bush: Bill Clinton.

Perhaps this fact, that Israelis loved Clinton and his policies, can give us some hope, as Obama’s policies very closely reflect those of Clinton. And right now, the State of Israel needs a little bit of hope, because right now, the state of Israel is not good.

This column was originally published in the Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle here.

The Protecting Civilians Myth Posted by Michael Cohen

First things first. I have broken down and finally gone on Twitter surrendering to the forces of digital overload. My handle is speechboy71 (surprisingly most variations of Michael Cohen were taken). Please follow me because right now I have 21 followers and that is kind of pathetic - that and I'm intensely curious to know who all the DA readers are out there. Ok, on to the news.

Fascinating read in today's Wall Street Journal about how US troops feel about the counter-insurgency mission they are being asked to perform in Southern Afghanistan. 

Among front-line troops, many of them used to more liberal rules of engagement in Iraq, frustration is boiling over. "It's like fighting with two hands behind your back," says Sgt. First Class Samuel Frantz, a platoon sergeant in Capt. Reim's unit, the Charlie Company of the 1st Battalion of the 12th Infantry Regiment. "We're so worried about not hurting the population's feelings that we're not doing our jobs."

"It doesn't matter if we get killed—we're here to die," says Lt. Mark Morrison, 24 years old, the leader of the second platoon. "Our lives are not valuable enough to protect."

As Lt. Morrison's platoon gathered for a patrol, his soldiers traded gallows humor about losing limbs in coming hours. "Look at it this way—if you get prosthetic legs, you get to be taller," one told a shorter comrade-in-arms.

To be sure, this is not the first or last time that soldiers on the frontlines have complained about a mission or engaged in gallows humor, but it does speak to the frustration one has to imagine exists among soldiers who've been taught to be fighters - and are now asked to be armed social workers.

But here's the part of the story that is really concerning:

Capt. Duke Reim, commander of the American unit responsible for Pashmul, estimates that about 95% of the locals are Taliban or aid the militants. District Gov. Niyaz Mohammad Serhadi agrees. "People here are on the side of the insurgency and have no trust in the government," he says. "Insurgents are in their villages 24 hours." 

Now Pashmul isn't in Helmand, it's in Kandahar province, but this gets to an issue I raised yesterday - if our overarching goal in Afghanistan is to protect civilians then why are we waging offensives in places where a strong segment of the population doesn't want us to be there? 

Allow me to answer my own question; because our goal is NOT to protect civilians it's to defeat the Taliban . . . and further US interests. This is hardly a surprise; after all isn't this why most countries go to war - to further their interests. But this fiction that we are in Afghanistan to help the Afghan people is just that: fiction. If tomorrow, the residents of Helmand and Kandahar said "we'd rather live under Taliban rule, US troops get out" do you think we'd actually leave? I don't and the reason is simple; we think it's in our interests to stay.  Long ago we decided that defeating the Taliban - and protecting the lives of US citizens - was more important than protecting the lives of Afghan citizens. Otherwise we wouldn't be sending more troops to Afghanistan because no matter how well we play it, as long as 100,000 US troops are on the ground, Afghan civilians are gong to die.

If our goal was to "win the people's trust," the perhaps easiest course would be to leave places like Pasmul or Marjah, but instead we're going to spend blood and treasure to convince them to trust a government and occupying force that they appear to be quite wary of. And that wariness is only likely to grow if Marjah ends up like Fallujah. 

I'm sorry but this is no way to fight a war. Either we're in places like Helmand and Kandahar to defeat the insurgency or we're there to protect the civilians. I'm not sure that it's possible to do both. In fact, right now it doesn't seem like we're doing a very good job at either.