Looking Back at the Baradar Capture Posted by Patrick Barry

After a second look, my analysis from yesterday seems like it would have benefitted from a complimentary examination of the dynamics that might have precipitated Pakistan to take action against a militant hiding within its borders.  While Colin Cookman is right that “we should be cautious about extrapolating too much from the detention of a single commander,” evidence and analysis is beginning to suggest a range of possible interpretations for why Pakistan acted as it did.

One view is that Baradar’s capture is related a possible political settlement of the Afghanistan conflict, a perspective expressed in today’s New York Times story analyzing the capture. “Pakistan has effectively isolated a key link to the Taliban leadership, making itself the main channel instead,” said the Times. 

Within this view are a range of possibilities. One variant is that by capturing Baradar, whom some have called the Taliban leader most interested in a settlement, the Pakistanis can set him up as a conduit for negotiations, even while he is imprisoned (see Spencer and Thomas Ruttig).

But that opinion of Baradar is far from universal, and contrary evidence indicates he’s opposed to talks.  If that’s correct, then another way to look at Baradar’s capture is that Pakistan still wants to control the terms of a settlement, but views the Taliban leader as an impediment to its involvement, either because he’s opposed to the idea, or because it can’t control him, and would preferr to empower say, the Haqqanis, who might be more easily influenced by handlers in the military or ISI (See Coll).  Either way, Pakistan’s desire to carve out a role for itself in a political settlement of the Afghan conflict is not in itself a bad thing.  It’s really the kind of involvement that matters.  If the U.S. treads carefully, it may be able to use this convergence around negotiations to its advantage.

On the other hand, it’s also possible that the Pakistanis don’t want a settlement with the Afghan Taliban at all, perhaps seeing an Afghanistan under threat from the Taliban as a useful check against India’s activities in Afghanistan (See Wall Street Journal).  With a few Talibs on record as saying that Baradar’s capture basically mucks up any chance of peace talks, this too remains a plausible interpretation, and would bode ill for the U.S.

Yet another view is the U.S. forced cooperation from Pakistan through either the steady accumulation of evidence linking the ISI to the Taliban or the presentation of specific evidence of Baradar’s exact location inside Pakistan. Such evidence, were it to become public, would be embarrassing for Pakistan, particularly as it heads into negotiations with India.  Far better to be seen as a U.S. partner, even if it's an unwilling partnership.  As Spencer notes, breaking news about another joint U.S. – Pakistan operation to capture a Taliban leader hiding in Pakistan adds to the weight of this interpretation.  For people hoping that Baradar’s capture was a sign that the U.S. and Pakistan were suddenly seeing eye-to-eye this isn’t very satisfying. But it at least shows that the U.S. intelligence is improving, and that it can use that intel to persuade the Pakistanis to be more cooperative.

A final interpretation, which only a small minority appears to have taken, is that Baradar’s capture is a result of months of diplomatic, military and economic activity by the U.S. intended to persuade Pakistan that it is within its interests to go after the Afghan Taliban.  Skeptics rightfully argue that this position overstates the degree to which the U.S. has influence over Pakistani decision-making.  I’m sympathetic to that argument, but as I said yesterday, I think it’s foolish to say categorically that the flurry of U.S. activity played no role in opening up avenues for this kind of joint-effort. 

Looking at this range of possibilities, I still see some good mixed with the bad.  Pakistan is clearly exercising its agency here, but it may be doing so in a way that compliments some U.S. objectives.  Baradar’s capture also comes after a year in which trends in the U.S. – Pakistani relationship were roughly positive, at least by comparison to the previous 8 years.  If nothing else, the arrest will keep the trend lines positive, which is good when you consider how hugely unpopular the U.S. is in Pakistan right now. 

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