A Final Thought on the Shinwari
Posted by Patrick Barry
Spencer’s being a little unfair when he accuses Michael (the other Michael) of making an Awakening comparison. It’s not so much an Awakening comparison as it a reminder that when faced with an insurgency which threatens the state’s ability to exist, it can sometimes be necessary to cut deals with people you might ordinarily want to avoid. Both Spencer and Michael appear to be in agreement on that point, and honestly I don’t think anyone who’s so far expressed an opinion on the subject would disagree. I certainly don’t think anyone is actually taking the position of saying, as Spencer puts it, “I want the anti-Taliban opening without sullying my hands working with the tribes.” However, just because something is the least bad option, doesn’t mean it doesn’t deserve a strong show of skepticism, which in the end is what you’re left with, albeit in varying degrees.
So when is it OK to cooperate with a tribe that’s willing to fight the Taliban? In the case of the Shinwari, their willingness to fight the insurgents, “support the American-backed government,” and “send at least one military-age male in each family to the Afghan Army or the police in the event of a Taliban attack,” bode positively. But ties to Afghanistan’s criminal element, a history of bandwagoning, and thuggish statements about burning peoples’ houses down? Not such a good sign. Ultimately I don’t think I’m knowledgeable enough about either the Shinwari specifically or tribal dynamics in Afghanistan more broadly to give a fully informed perspective. What Spencer recommends - embrace a strategy of simultaneous partnership with the tribe to ensure it doesn’t actually burn people’s houses down while pressing the local government institutions to clear out their corrupt officials, thereby pushing both tribe and government closer together – sounds sensible enough. If NATO-ISAF could successfully accomplish something along those lines, that would be great. But, there’s also a lot of slip between the cup and the lip, and I think my question about how efforts at sub-national engagement should interact with simultaneous efforts to strengthen the central government still stands.
Looking beyond the debate over whether the U.S. should take up the Shinwari’s offer to fight the Taliban, I think this illustrates precisely why even COIN proponents are wary of third party counterinsurgency. It’s challenging enough to have to rely on a government that's illegitimate or ineffective. But far more difficult is when that government’s effectiveness in the security arena is so compromised that you’re forced to depend on sub-national actors with an independent streak and a history of engagement in activities that are corrosive to a well-functioning state.
So when is it OK to cooperate with a tribe that’s willing to fight the Taliban? In the case of the Shinwari, their willingness to fight the insurgents, “support the American-backed government,” and “send at least one military-age male in each family to the Afghan Army or the police in the event of a Taliban attack,” bode positively. But ties to Afghanistan’s criminal element, a history of bandwagoning, and thuggish statements about burning peoples’ houses down? Not such a good sign. Ultimately I don’t think I’m knowledgeable enough about either the Shinwari specifically or tribal dynamics in Afghanistan more broadly to give a fully informed perspective. What Spencer recommends - embrace a strategy of simultaneous partnership with the tribe to ensure it doesn’t actually burn people’s houses down while pressing the local government institutions to clear out their corrupt officials, thereby pushing both tribe and government closer together – sounds sensible enough. If NATO-ISAF could successfully accomplish something along those lines, that would be great. But, there’s also a lot of slip between the cup and the lip, and I think my question about how efforts at sub-national engagement should interact with simultaneous efforts to strengthen the central government still stands.
Looking beyond the debate over whether the U.S. should take up the Shinwari’s offer to fight the Taliban, I think this illustrates precisely why even COIN proponents are wary of third party counterinsurgency. It’s challenging enough to have to rely on a government that's illegitimate or ineffective. But far more difficult is when that government’s effectiveness in the security arena is so compromised that you’re forced to depend on sub-national actors with an independent streak and a history of engagement in activities that are corrosive to a well-functioning state.
Hi,
If a Shinwari should kill an Afridi, it is incumbent on every member of the Afridi tribe to repay the debt in like coin, killing a member of the Shinwaris in turn. A vendetta does not always go on for ever. There are mechanisms for resolving long-term vendettas.
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