But We Need Band-Aids Posted by Michael Wahid Hanna

To keep this back and forth going just a bit more, I wanted to respond quickly to Michael Cohen’s post below where he characterizes tribal outreach efforts as band-aids. To which I would reply that we desperately need band-aids. This type of arrangement is not a long-term strategy and nor must it be. Certainly we should not confuse tactical success from engaging tribal militias as some sort of strategic breakthrough.

But I also believe that we overestimate our ability to craft long-term, sustainable solutions to the many ills that plague Afghanistan. In short, I don’t believe that these types of short-term efforts are irreparably damaging the coherent nation-building strategy that would simply take its place. When coupled with the difficult security situation then I think that band-aids are not such a bad idea − we need all the help we can get.

Further, my main point was simply to rebut the presumption that this type of initiative outside the scope of the central government’s control was inherently problematic and doomed to contribute to the unraveling of the country. In some ways, creating even ad hoc structures for the devolution of power might nudge the country toward a more sustainable and decentralized system of governance.  While Shinwari tribal leaders expressed a lack of trust in Kabul they have not indicated a desire to topple that government and that is a real and important distinction. 

Whether or not circumventing the central government represents some form of doctrinal heresy, we should judge this approach on its effectiveness. Again, this is a very small initiative and I cannot speak to the likelihood of its success, but all things considered I don’t think we can eschew such opportunities simply because of long-term concerns about the authority of the central government.

For the record, having a background in human rights law, I can say definitively that I think burning down the houses of Taliban sympathizers is immoral and also counterproductive. But, if we are engaged in some level of sponsorship with tribal militias then we might have the ability to influence their behavior. And let us not forget, if the root of this dispute is commercial in nature, it is conceivable that it will lead to violence in any event. Accordingly, it seems to me that taking advantage of these existing tribal rivalries might be more constructive than if we simply sat it out.

Climate Change as the New Yemen? Posted by Patrick Barry

Judging from Osama Bin Laden's latest ramblings, Al Qaeda is about to get into the climate change debate in a big way. From the New York Times:

“Talk about climate change is not an ideological luxury but a reality,” Mr. bin Laden was quoted as saying in a report on Al Jazeera’s English-language Web site. “All of the industrialized countries, especially the big ones, bear responsibility for the global warming crisis.”

It stands to reason that all future climate change intiatives should be placed under a counterterrorism umbrella. The Kerry-Boxer Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act will now be referred to as the Defeating Al Qaeda Through Energy Jobs and American Power Act.

A New Twist on Population Centric COIN Posted by Michael Cohen

So there has been a lot of back and forth here at DA on word yesterday that the Shimwari, a Pahstun tribe in Afghanistan is making an agreement with the US goverment for $1 million in development funds. Just to summarize, here are the three things that the Shinwari will do:

1) "They've agreed to support the American-backed government."

Clearly that's good news; after all one of the goals of the counter-insurgency effort is to extend the legitimacy of the Kabul government . . . so this sounds good.

2) "Battle insurgents."

Wow, even better. Clearly getting some tribal skin in the game against the Taliban has to be a good thing.

3) "Burn down the home of any Afghan who harbored Taliban guerrillas."

Excuse me?

You know I really wish there was a way to reproduce a spit take on a blog post; because when I read this I nearly shot orange juice out my nose.

While I certainly understand Michael Hanna's point below about the need to occasionally make unsavory deals; it doesn't strike me as a long-term strategy for success or even stability in Afghanistan to be encouraging one tribe to burn down the houses of their neighbors. Second, the $1 million in development assistance is being provided in such a way to purposely circumvent the Afghan government. Again how does this encourage long-term stability in Afghanistan, particularly when you have Shinwari elders saying things like this, "We have absolutely no faith in the Afghan government to do anything for us. We don’t trust them at all." And isn't this a direct contradiction of the earlier assertion that the Shinwari have agreed to support the Karzai government?

Third, if you read the Times story closely, it seems pretty clear that the Shinwaris war on the Taliban has far more to do with commerce (illicit and licit) than it does with any sort of fealty to long-term US goals. So while I guess this might work in the interim; deals like this one feel a bit like a band-aid on a much bigger and more complex set of problems. By supporting the Shinwari in the short-term are we just fostering a host of long-term problems for the Afghan state long after we leave?

Along these lines, Bernard Finel made a smart point the other day:

In our local politics, we fight over every little thing — school locations, bus routes, sidewalks — but somehow we think we can show in Afghanistan, spend billions of dollars, pick winners and losers, and come out smelling like a rose.

Oh and one more thing; isn't burning down houses a war crime? It's sort of strange to me that the immorality of the US joining up with an Afghan tribe that has openly declared it will burn down its rival's house didn't get more attention in this article.

Jindal Jumps Aboard the Keep America Afraid Wagon Posted by Adam Blickstein

The pattern's becoming a bit clear, isn't it? After wading through 8 years failed policies, the GOP is protecting it's ineffective counterterror legacy and penchant to put politics above national security by outsourcing its politics of terror agenda to Scott Brown and his refrain " Americans don't want their taxpayer hiring attorneys for terrorists. We want to use our taxpayer dollars to kill these terrorists." From Hannity last night, Bobby Jindal joins this earsplitting chorus:

Well, absolutely. Two things are concerning me greatly. You know when you talk -- last night you heard him -- I heard him say he wanted to end the war. I didn't hear him say that he wanted to win the war. And those are two very different phrases.You know, when you look at what happened with the underwear -- the so- called underwear bomber. Senator-elect Brown got it right. Americans don't want their taxpayer hiring attorneys for terrorists. We want to use our taxpayer dollars to kill these terrorists.

It just -- it was very, very disturbing, not only rhetoric but the actions. This whole idea that you've got -- how much more evidence do they need? They've got a man, they catch him in the act, trying to blow up the plane, and they want to read him his Miranda rights.They want to arrest him, give an attorney. And by the way, as soon as he found out he could be silent, he did become silent. Who knows what additional information we could have learned if they hadn't done that?

First, it's pretty clear, that like Gov. McDonnell, Jindal has his facts soiled in regard to the interrogation of and intelligence gleaned from the underwear bomber:

Collins said in a statement that the fact that the FBI read Abdulmutallab his Miranda rights “likely foreclosed the collection of additional intelligence information.” But over the weekend, The Associated Press published the most comprehensive account to date of Abdulmutallab’s interrogation and found no evidence that Mirandization inhibited interrogators’ access to valuable information. FBI interrogators, to the contrary, read him his Miranda rights after they were satisfied that he had no further information about any further attacks.

Second, this whole notion that money should go solely to weapons to kill terrorists completely dismisses that a great deal of money, in fact a critical amount of it from a national security perspective, also goes to intelligence gathering and analysis and other areas of our national security apparatus. Jindal subscribes to the "deny, ignore and bomb" it mentality that imperiled American security and lives during the Bush years. In stark contrast, the Obama administration has implemented a counterterrorism strategy that embraces the full spectrum of American power, one which actually keeps America safe.

Jindal also doesn't understand that naming someone an enemy combatant and sending him to a military commission doesn't mean he is denied representative counsel and legal protections. In fact, the opposite is true. As Ken Gude explains:

These conservatives clearly believe that the criminal system impedes intelligence collection because defendants get lawyers in the criminal system who always tell their clients to stop talking to the government. The only problem with this argument is that their recommended solution to this apparent problem—charging detainees in military commissions or holding them without charge in military detention—doesn’t change a defendant’s access to an attorney...Military commissions also have procedures prohibiting self-incrimination and ensuring that statements from the defendant are made voluntarily. There is virtually no difference between military commissions and criminal courts in the provision and availability of defense counsel.

Gude also undercuts Jindal's argument by describing the litany of valuable and actionable intelligence America has obtained from terrorists with lawyers present. This intelligence gathered in the presence of legal counsel has, in fact, kept America safe:

Brent Vinas, an American convert to Islam captured in Pakistan in 2008 and turned over to the FBI, has proven to be one of the U.S. government’s most valuable sources of information about Al Qaeda. From the moment Vinas was in American custody he had all the access to attorneys and other rights afforded criminal suspects, and he still produced what one intelligence official called a “treasure trove” of information about Al Qaeda. In more than 100 interviews with counterterrorism officials, Vinas provided information that led to a Predator drone strike that killed a suspected militant, and his information has allowed counterterrorism officials “to peer deep inside the inner workings of Al Qaeda.”

David Headly—also known as Daood Gilani—was arrested in Chicago and charged in connection with the 2008 Mumbai attack that left more than 150 people dead. Headly pleaded not guilty, but he is cooperating with prosecutors and helped U.S. officials uncover a plan by Lashkar-e-Taibi to unleash a similar attack in Copenhagen, Denmark, targeting the newspaper that printed cartoons of the prophet Mohammed. Meeting with his attorney has not prevented him from providing intelligence information that disrupted at least one terrorist plot.

And, my god, all that information without torture! The bottom line is Gov. Jindal joins Gov. Pawlenty, Gov. McDonnell and other GOP leaders who talk tough on national security, but really don't actually project any confidence that they can keep America safe. False assertions, fearmongering bluster, and placing politics above national security simply does not protect American lives.

What NYC Terror Trial Uproar Changes: Nothing Posted by Patrick Barry

Speculation that the White House is taking up Mayor Bloomberg's request to re-locate the trial of the 9/11 conspirators somewhere outside NYC will probably find supporters of military commissions sharpening their knives.  But why should that be? Leaving aside that the request for a relocation is largely a controversy of inconvenience (H\T Adam Serwer), civilian courts are still the most effective tool for bringing terrorists to justice. Ken Gude, of the Center for American Progress, writes, “The facts are clear: Criminal courts are a far tougher and more reliable forum for prosecuting terrorists than military commissions.”

The record of federal courts for trying terrorists, particularly since 9/11 is formidable.  Former Republican Congressman from Oklahoma Mickey Edwards writes: “[Critics] scowl and declare that our American courts will not, or can not, convict terrorists.  They seem pretty damned certain of that.  Which is weird since nearly 200 terrorists have been convicted in our federal courts in the last nine years (that's 65 times as many as have been convicted by military commissions).” A 2009 report by Human Rights First written by a team of former federal prosecutors found that terror trials in civilian courts had “a conviction rate of 91.121%.” And for those still think the NYC issue somehow stems from the courts effectiveness at prosecuting extremists, a study by NYU’s center on Law and Security, found that NYC courts have a zero acquittal rate for terrorism cases.

Another refrain from opponents of civilian trials is that they will somehow act as a soapbox for Al Qaeda to spread its virulent ideology.  Writing in the New York Times last November, Council on Foreign Relations counterterrorism expert Steven Simon pushed back on this idea: “Historically, the public exposure of state-sponsored mass murder or terrorism through a transparent judicial process has strengthened the forces of good and undercut the extremists. The Nuremberg trials were a classic case. And nothing more effectively alerted the world to the danger of genocide than Israel’s prosecution in 1961 of Adolf Eichmann, the bureaucrat who engineered the Holocaust.”

Support for military commissions might make sense, if the commissions themselves weren't so ineffective and soft. Gude explains, “military commissions have never handled a single case of murder or attempted murder and have doled out shockingly short sentences to terrorists—even to a close associate of Osama bin Laden.”  Moreover, “since their formation in November 2001, military commissions have only had one trial, negotiated one plea bargain, and convicted one defendant after he boycotted the proceedings,” while sustaining multiple supreme court challenges.  Of the three individuals convicted in military commissions, two received sentences less than a year long. 

So why, despite the overwhelming evidence that civilian courts are the best mechanism for bringing terrorists to justice, do people like Lindsey Graham support military commissions?  Might it be do avoid drudging up the GOP's torture problem in an open criminal proceeding? That's what Adam Serwer suspects: “There's also a potentially even more cynical motivation for the bill, however. Graham, a former JAG lawyer, is the Senate's expert on military law. He helped craft the revised military commissions, so he has to know that the prior commissions were ineffective, and that the new ones still might not be constitutional. Republicans have an interest in not revisiting the torture of terror suspects in open court, so preventing a civilian trial for KSM, depending on whether or not the commissions pass constitutional muster, could mean simply putting off any kind of trial indefinitely.”

One More on Tribal Militias Posted by Michael Wahid Hanna

At the risk of engaging in a practice that I have come to abhor, I am going to draw a few parallels between Iraq and Afghanistan, knowing that the situations are not generally comparable. On the issue of tribal engagement, many knowledgeable regional experts have emphasized the fact that Afghan tribal structures are deteriorated in comparison with Iraq's tribal structures and that tribal authority is far from sacrosanct following decades of war.

Be that as it may, I wanted to respond to Patrick Barry’s post below discussing the implications of providing direct support for the Shinwari tribe based on their declared intention to take on the Taliban. Patrick, in response to a post by Josh Foust, is sympathetic to the notion that this type of U.S. sponsorship will undermine the Afghan government since it is premised on a form of factionalism that is inimical to the state structure.

I find this concern puzzling for the simple fact that the U.S. has gotten to this point due to the fact that it has been unable to achieve its security goals in conjunction with the central government and its subsidiary organs. At present, the Afghan security forces lack capacity and they are simply incapable of reversing the deterioration in security. And while Foust is right in pointing out that Shinwari best practices of burning down the houses of enemy sympathizers is probably not something we should be associated with, the mere fact of operating outside of the formal structures of the state is not in and of itself sufficient to doom the current efforts (which are really small-bore in relative terms in any event).

When the Sunni Awakening arose in Anbar province and, particularly, when it was replicated in concerted fashion in other mixed areas of the country, there was a great deal of concern that the United States was undermining the authority of the state by eschewing the concerns of Baghdad and supporting or orchestrating the rise of these Sunni militias. Such efforts largely contradicted some of the central goals of any counterinsurgency, namely, reinforcing the power of the state and garnering civilian support for it. Some criticisms also pointed out that the United States was now engaged with unsavory criminal characters. But these critiques definitely put the cart before the horse, so to speak.

Certainly, American support for the Awakenings was unsustainable over the long-term and their establishment created a whole series of concerns about their relationship to Baghdad and the prospects for future sectarian warfare. But they arose and spread at a time when many people within the military thought that Anbar province had been lost and sectarian civil war had begun to engulf wide swaths of the country. As such, the concerns generated by U.S. sponsorship of the various Awakening groups were, in my mind, a second-order priority to the immediate task of reversing the disastrous momentum that had brought the United States to the brink of defeat in Iraq.

Of course such arrangements are less than ideal––they represent a stark reminder of the limited capabilities of the central state and are fraught with possibilities for blowback. But bearing that in mind, the first order of business has to be the improvement of security. If this can and has to be done through more localized means then so be it. And if the U.S. military pursues such means in the midst of an insurgency then they are very likely to be dealing with and sponsoring those with suspect affiliations and former insurgents with blood on their hands. If the Afghan security forces and local authorities were more capable then a simple solution would have presented itself long ago.

Now the Shinwari might be lousy allies, as Foust indicates in his post, and this whole initiative might come to naught, but it is not as if we have a vast menu of excellent choices to choose from. And we will never even get to the point of contemplating serious negotiations with senior Taliban leaders on a political settlement or issues of improved governance capacity and human security if current trends continue on the same trajectory. As was the case in Iraq, if we have any hope of addressing those political, systemic and institutional concerns, then security will have to come first. 

Foreign and Domestic Posted by Heather Hurlburt

CATO's Justin Logan tweaks me for something I said on Bloggingheads with Dan Drezner two days ago.  He seems to think I said foreign and defense spending are not fungible.  What I meant to say:

1.  The idea that foreign and domestic spending allocation is a one-for-one zero sum game is mistaken.  We need a strong economy at home to form the foundation of our power abroad (as President Obama went on to suggest in his state of the union).  We also need smart spending abroad -- to keep ourselves secure, to block disease and environmental disaster and other threats before they reach our shores, and to encourage economic and social development that, among their other benefits, create consumers and trading partners for our economy.

2.  The idea that it's a useful political trope to lead your argument on any national security issue with "we can't afford it" is also mistaken.  In the public mind -- I'm talking about perception here, and I think this is where the confusion came in -- if it's about our security of course we can afford it.  What kind of defeatist would say we can't afford things that are essential for our security?  If you establish first in your messaging that something -- say, the F-22, or outdated nuclear bombers, or an endless war in Iraq -- is not effective in promoting US security, then you can say, and besides, it's not cost-effective.  

3.  Also, if you believe as I do that the US has security, economic and moral interests in an active, engaged (though mostly civilian-led) foreign policy around the world, then the idea that a dollar spent abroad is better spent at home is not your friend.  Again, it ain't as simple (pace John Kerry) as firehouses there or firehouses here.

Finally, Justin raises the question of whether or not we can afford an "interventionist" foreign policy over the long term.  Now it's my turn to say I don't know what he means.  Usually at CATO that term is not a compliment.  What I laid out in point one above doesn't count to me as "interventionist" -- but starting two wars a decade sure does.  I actually think if we launch two wars every decade we will run out of manpower, morale and morals long before we run out of cash. Justin may think that policies that try to shift US energy production away from fossil fuels and negotiate with China to encourage/help/pressure it to do the same -- just as one example -- count as "interventionist."  I would disagree that they belong in the same worldview as the Iraq war.  I believe we both agree that we can afford the former policies; obviously I believe that kind of "engaged" foreign policy is a necessity.  I also believe we both agree that we can't afford the latter.

By the way, this is the crazy thing about the relationship between liberals and libertarians on national security these days.  We often start from the same critique and reach many of the same policy prescriptions -- but the intervening steps of reasoning look very different.  Justin's colleague Chris Preble looves to tweak me about this.  But at least the libertarians usually have internally-consistent reasoning.  Usually.

Who’s Who of Securing Loose Nukes Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

As I noted last night, President Obama’s comments on securing vulnerable nuclear materials received a standing ovation from both sides of the aisle.  (Though according to ABC’s tweet…there were 37 standing ovations in all…)

Now, even as we prosecute two wars, we're also confronting perhaps the greatest danger to the American people -– the threat of nuclear weapons.  I've embraced the vision of John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan through a strategy that reverses the spread of these weapons and seeks a world without them.  To reduce our stockpiles and launchers, while ensuring our deterrent, the United States and Russia are completing negotiations on the farthest-reaching arms control treaty in nearly two decades.  And at April's Nuclear Security Summit, we will bring 44 nations together here in Washington, D.C. behind a clear goal:  securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years, so that they never fall into the hands of terrorists.  (And the crowd goes wild...)

As a follow-up on the President’s plug, the White House announced today whichcountries received invitations to attend. Via Josh Gerstein of Politico:

Israel is among the countries President Barack Obama has invited to Washington to discuss nuclear security issues this spring, the White House confirmed Thursday. However, Iran, the country whose nuclear ambitions are most the focus of international suspicion at the moment, will not be attending.

Arab countries on the 43-nation guest list include Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, whose foreign minister regularly hounds Israel over its nuclear arsenal during international meetings. All the major nuclear powers are also expected to attend the summit, along with countries like India and Pakistan who built and tested small numbers of weapons in recent years.

Another nation whose nuclear program has triggered widespread concern, North Korea, is also absent from the invite list, although neighboring South Korea will be present.

The full list, as released by the White House to POLITICO Thursday morning, is as follows:

Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Czech Republic
Egypt
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
India
Indonesia
Israel
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Philippines
Poland
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
Vietnam

I for one, am pretty relieved to see that Russia made the cut...

The Cold War Called...They Want Their Nukes Back. Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

The security threats of the 21st century necessitate a revised national security strategy that is based on combating the ambiguous and ever-changing enemy we now face. In a post 9/11 world, we cannot continue to pour resources into Cold War systems that are too outdated to combat the security threats of our time. Recent reports present a sober reminder that al Qaeda is continuing its quest to obtain weapons of mass destruction and that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real. With over 20,000 nuclear weapons in existence, the possibility that a terrorist organization could buy or steal a nuclear bomb is far too great.

Elite military and foreign policy leaders from both sides of the aisle have voiced their concerns with the status quo and warned of the dangers of nuclear weapons. These experts represent a growing, bipartisan consensus that realizes we cannot counter today’s terrorist threat with Cold War weapons. The four horsemen of nuclear disarmament—former Secretary of State George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn have joined together to call for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Former Secretary of State Collin Powell has also rejected the utility of nuclear weapons and advocated that they eventually be abolished:

The one thing that I convinced myself after all these years of exposure to the use of nuclear weapons is that they were useless. They could not be used. If you can have deterrence with an even lower number of weapons, well then why stop there, why not continue on, why not get rid of them altogether.

Eliminating nuclear weapons will be a long and difficult process that takes place over a number of years. The current nuclear security agenda focuses on several key areas, including securing all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years. As the President explained in his address last night, the U.S. will bring forty-four nations together in April to specifically address this issue. Such action represents a step in the right direction; however, further research and debate will be required to map out more concrete, long-term steps.

Aware of this strategic gap, Dr. Barry Blechman and his colleague, Alex Bollfrass of the Stimson Center, recently released a new publication, Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty. The book details the technical aspects of nuclear disarmament and lays out a step-by-step approach for mitigating, and eventually eliminating, the threat of nuclear weapons. Unmatched in its contributions to the debate on eradicating nuclear weapons, Stimson’s latest book maps out the specific verification, governance and enforcement mechanisms that would be required for governments to move forward and effectively reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Former Secretaries of Defense, Frank Carlucci and William Perry lauded the book, saying:

Considerable research, analysis, and experimentation by government organizations would be required to convince national leaders that elimination could be accomplished safely and fairly, without posing a threat to any nation’s security. Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty offers an excellent starting point for those official discussions.

Carlucci and Perry continued…

As former secretaries of defense, we understand well how difficult the policy adjustments called for in this book would be. Nonetheless, we have reached the conclusion that we can no longer afford to approach the nuclear problem from a passive posture of crisis-management. Now is the time to seize the initiative.

And there you have it—the threat is real, but so are the opportunities to dismantle it. How many statements do we need to read, how many speeches do we have to hear before we’re convinced it’s time to take action? We’re not waiting on scientific breakthroughs or technological advances—only the political will. We can’t let our security fall prey to those who are stuck in the past. It’s time we meet the security needs of the 21st century with 21st century solutions.

Spending in Haiti Posted by James Lamond

The AP has a story saying the following:

Less than a penny of each dollar the U.S. is spending on earthquake relief in Haiti is going in the form of cash to the Haitian government, according to an Associated Press review of relief efforts.

Two weeks after President Obama announced an initial $100 million for Haiti earthquake relief, U.S. government spending on the disaster has nearly quadrupled to $379 million, the U.S. Agency for International Development announced Wednesday. That's about $1.25 each from everyone in the United States.

Each American dollar roughly breaks down like this: 42 cents for disaster assistance, 33 cents for U.S. military aid, nine cents for food, nine cents to transport the food, five cents for paying Haitian survivors for recovery efforts, just less than one cent to the Haitian government, and about half a cent to the Dominican Republic.

Is it me or is this a nonstory? I would not expect, that in an emergency, the assistance money would to the government of Haiti during the immediate response.  A government that had limited capabilities before the tragic loss of personel, facilities, and even structures. This seems obvious.  Yes, eventually, money should be invested in the Haitian government for long term institution building.  But this is an emergency response where time is not a luxury.  But don’t take my word for it, former Special Envoy to Haiti Ambassador James Dobbins testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today and said that:

The urgency of the immediate crisis requires that donor countries themselves provide people with food, water, medicine and shelter, bypassing the Haitian state. As we move beyond this emergency relief phase, the next priority will be to repair the country’s most basic infrastructure – hospitals, schools, roads, electricity, telephones and government buildings. But these institutions should not be rebuilt on the old, inefficient, corrupt foundations. Rather the scale of this disaster offers the opportunity to accelerate long planned, oft delayed reforms in each of these sectors.

This seems like a situation where criticism is inevitable.  Given Haiti’s reputation for corruption –although I do recognize that there has been great progress under Preval –wouldn’t there be a whole lot of criticism regarding the spending if it was going through the Haitian government?