Afghanistan: Where You Can Get Something for Nothing
Posted by Patrick Barry
While I enjoyed Michael ‘Chekhov’ Cohen’s wry send-up of the Gromov\Rogozin op-ed in today’s New York Times, I do think it glosses over something pretty important. What Michael misses is that Russia really does have a legitimate interest in not seeing Afghanistan totally fall apart. Say, hypothetically, that Central Asia does become a turgid sea of Islamic extremism following the collapse of the Afghan government. There’s good reason to presume that such instability would likely touch Russia’s sphere of influence (another Chechnya?) before reaching European capitals. And what about “the coffins of Americans and Europeans who were killed by Taliban heroin in their own countries?” Last time I checked, which was 5 minutes ago, Russia still has a pretty bad heroin problem itself.
So given that some of Russia’s interests in a stable Afghanistan are equal, if not greater than those of NATO and the U.S., why haven’t they been more helpful instead of hoodwinking General Petraeus on basing agreements? Is it as Michael (or was it Dmitry?) says, that Russia would rather European and American leaders be “bogged down in South Asia than poking their heads into the Caucuses or Ukraine?” Probably. But I think what we’re really talking about here is not misdirection, but free-riding. Russia simply doesn’t have much incentive to take better care of matters in its own backyard so long as the U.S. and NATO will do it for them. The way things stand now, Russia can limit the flow of heroin into its borders, tie up militants who might otherwise turn against kleptocratic rulers under Moscow’s control, and keep potential rivals embroiled in endless conflict. Sounds like a pretty good deal.
As I’ve said before, this is the basic predicament facing the U.S. in Afghanistan, and it illustrates the silliness of thinking that we’ll get out of it it by signaling resolve or toughness. Afghanistan’s long-term stability hinges on the productive involvement of its neighbors. This is indisputable. But there isn’t really much hope of that happening, so long as NATO and the U.S. give them what they want for free!
So given that some of Russia’s interests in a stable Afghanistan are equal, if not greater than those of NATO and the U.S., why haven’t they been more helpful instead of hoodwinking General Petraeus on basing agreements? Is it as Michael (or was it Dmitry?) says, that Russia would rather European and American leaders be “bogged down in South Asia than poking their heads into the Caucuses or Ukraine?” Probably. But I think what we’re really talking about here is not misdirection, but free-riding. Russia simply doesn’t have much incentive to take better care of matters in its own backyard so long as the U.S. and NATO will do it for them. The way things stand now, Russia can limit the flow of heroin into its borders, tie up militants who might otherwise turn against kleptocratic rulers under Moscow’s control, and keep potential rivals embroiled in endless conflict. Sounds like a pretty good deal.
As I’ve said before, this is the basic predicament facing the U.S. in Afghanistan, and it illustrates the silliness of thinking that we’ll get out of it it by signaling resolve or toughness. Afghanistan’s long-term stability hinges on the productive involvement of its neighbors. This is indisputable. But there isn’t really much hope of that happening, so long as NATO and the U.S. give them what they want for free!
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