A Bit More on the Flynn Report Posted by Michael Cohen

I noticed today that Secretary of Defense Gates endorses the conclusions of the recent report by Maj General Michael Flynn criticizing the way the military gathers intelligence in Afghanistan. 

For what it's worth, this now means the chief of military intelligence in Afghanistan, the commander of US and ISAF forces and the Secretary of Defense all think that the military does a poor job of understanding the "people" in Afghanistan . . . several weeks and months after pushing for a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan that focuses on those same "people." Hmm.

In other news, I wanted to pass along some rather insightful comments about the Flynn report from a colleague, who will remain anonymous. While I understand it is helpful to judge such comments with the author's identity in mind, the best I can do here is attest to his sterling reputation as a soldier and scholar who served in Afghanistan (in other words, trust me):

There are some good suggestions in the paper, but I was left wondering whether MG Flynn understands what variables have changed in the months since he (and the rest of GEN McChrystal's hand-picked, well-resourced group along with thousands of troops) have arrived in country.

His argument - that "eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy" - is inaccurately based on two rolling markers: first, what the strategy/goals have been; and second, what the "intel community" has been doing and why.

The first is how we went from a punitive expedition to creating and stabilizing a nation-state. 

It's the second that I believe MG Flynn either misses or consciously discounts - not understanding that it isn't that folks have been doing it wrong, but that the resources just have not been there to ensure security for either the troops or the population.  Brigades and battalions have definitely been thinking about all sorts of different ways to do things over the years - but they simply have not had the luxury of considering his tweaks and recommendations.

Consider his "grassroots" vignette - the situation in Nawa, Helmand province.  He notes that in June 2009 "...a small number of Marines and British soldiers were the only foreign forces...the troops could not venture a kilometer from their cramped base without confronting machine gun and rocket fire from insurgents."

But in July, 800 additional Marines arrived and began "sweeping across the district.” He then jumps to five months later, when things are great - and proceeds to detail the different way the intel officers and analysts did things.  But he skips over a big part - the fighting that had to go on before Nawa became such an oasis.  He makes passing reference - "...with few shots fired by Marines after their initial operation..."

That "initial operation" was a few months of the Marines taking it to the enemy - with a cost in friendly killed and wounded.  Yet MG Flynn hones in on what the analysts and intel officers were able to do after the security was established.  Could the S-2 from that "small group" in the "cramped base" have done something similar?  Was it just because he wasn't enlightened, or guided correctly from his battalion or brigade?  Nope.

To me, this is the huge point that MG Flynn misses - as he disparagingly notes how we've been "doing it wrong" for the past eight years.  I disagree - and it's important, I think, because it goes to the central question:  are training and institutions organizationally broken, or have troops been holding on in a dangerous environment with insufficient numbers and an ever-changing "strategy" that veers from "can't commute to work" to "securing the population" to...whatever comes next.

Leadership has constantly been searching for ways to do much of what MG Flynn discusses - different ways to measure stability, working with agriculture development teams, human terrain teams to strengthen the other means of information gathering, restructuring intel support to give commanders and troops the best perspective - but it was all overshadowed by security concerns.  When the overriding issue is that COPs and OPs would be overrun by the enemy, or that polling stations, bridges and district centers would be blown up or burned down - and a too-small amount of force or analytic power is available to do it all - lots of that other stuff drops by the wayside.

The addition of the extra brigade into RC-East in spring 2009 had an immediate effect - as did the addition of the Marines into RC-South in the summer.  But none of this is noted or acknowledged by MG Flynn.  His argument is about why we just need to *think* differently, be creative, be *better*.  I'm sorry, but there's another key part - if we're going to do this whole "build a country to deny a safehaven" thing - lots of troops and lots of fighting to get that security needed (yes, we should be encouraging the Afghans to fight as well - but if we want an immediate effect, more U.S. brigades helps). 

At the same time, USFOR-A has been completely revamped - a strong well-staffed structure, new 3-star command to ease the span of control issues, new joint ops centers, more bandwidth...all of this has come into play since this summer.  But MG Flynn again doesn't acknowledge how this - and all the additional troops - have enabled folks to (perhaps) think about doing different things besides tracking "insurgents" or "IED cells."

His implication that focusing on the enemy is an "understandable" but ultimately emotional response by commanders is, to put it politely, insulting...as if commanders in years past had a choice where to place their ample resources, and they simply misused them.

I'm glad that - given our expansive goals in Afghanistan - more troops are there and USFOR-A is injected with energy and resources to guide the effort.  But MG Flynn gets it wrong when he asserts we've simply "overemphasized detailed information about the enemy at the expense of political, economic, and cultural environment."

His argument - and much of the COIN/population-centric thesis - glosses over the cost of the security that is necessary as a foundation to these efforts.  Simply calling for "COIN analysts" or "stability operations information centers" doesn't cut it.  

Comments

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Hi I was wondering this report information only.I remember that in his Flynn described U.S. intelligence officers and analysts in Afghanistan as "ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced ... and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers."...Thanks for sharing more info here....

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MG Flynn should heed the warning of glass houses and not throw his stones either forcibly or in the wrong direction. Prior to this assignment he served as the J2 for Central Command and before that he was the J2 for JSOC, so he carries some blame in his own rucksack for "getting wrong" for the past eight years. Simply stated he is grasping and unfortunately it is typical military hubris that allows this kind of leader to achieve this level or rank and responsibility. MG Flynn talks a good game about cultural intelligence and the ever oft-spoken COIN strategy of engaging the people, but when 95% of your forces are bedded down inside cozy FOBs and rarely ever "leave the wire" then it is not surprising for the past eight years intelligence analysts have gotten it "wrong". It is saddening that a person who is probably more responsible for this current state of affairs isn't held accountable, yet is allowed to criticize the very state of affairs he contributed to and is then lauded by the SECDEF as some sort of visionary. Again, this is nothing more than Department of Defense double talk and hypocrisy. Simply stated (again) this is pure hubris for which our beloved DoD knows no end!!

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Prior to this assignment he served as the J2 for Central Command and before that he was the J2 for JSOC, so he carries some blame in his own rucksack for "getting wrong" for the past eight years. Simply stated he is grasping and unfortunately it is typical military hubris that allows this kind of leader to achieve this level or rank and responsibility. MG Flynn talks a good game about cultural intelligence and the ever oft-spoken COIN strategy of engaging the people, but when 95% of your forces are bedded down inside cozy FOBs and rarely ever "leave the wire" then it is not surprising for the past eight years intelligence analysts have gotten it "wrong". It is saddening that a person who is probably more responsible for this current state of affairs isn't held accountable, yet is allowed to criticize the very state of affairs he contributed to and is then lauded by the SECDEF as some sort of visionary.