The ANSF: Where State-Building & Nation-Building Meet Posted by Patrick Barry

A little while ago, Sen. Sessions asked a very good question about whether "we are overly committed to a centralized authority," seeing local militias a security alternative to the Afghan National Security Forces.General McChrystal cautioned against thinking of local militias as a better security off-ramp than the Afghan army. 

This indirectly gets at the conversation Michael and Spencer were having over whether the U.S. is nation-building in Afghanistan.  Part of McChrystal's concern is that Afghanistan's history of conflict is related to support - either internally based or externally based - for armed security forces un-tethered to any kind of central authority. McChrystal is understandably apprehensive about feeding  such conflict drivers.  In his view, training the ANSF represents a way to address the country's security deficit, while reinforcing, not undermining, a sense of national unity. 

Putting it this way makes it tough to figure out where training Afghanistan's security forces slides into the state-building\nation-building continuum.  A case could be made for either classification. Increasing an Army's size and professionalism could easily be described as a capacity-building, or state-building activity.  But as McChrystal said, it's not enough for security forces to be skilled.  They also have to share a bond or an allegiance that keeps 'them from moving around the battlefield,' becoming 'something predatory.'  If the U.S. is reinforcing Afghan national identity as a check against faction, that seems like the place where state-building could pretty quickly turn into nation-building.

You Talking about Re-integration? Posted by Patrick Barry

In response to a question from Senator Udall, Ambassador Eikenberry clarifies what role the U.S. will play in facilitating the re-integration\reconciliation of elements of the insurgency into Afghan society.  According to Eikenberry, once the Afghan government fully establishes a mission devoted to that process, then the U.S. and ISAF will begin more active involvement

Loya Jirga as Dayton? Posted by Patrick Barry

Senator Wicker (D - Miss.) asks Ambassador Eikenberry a loaded question about President Karzai's calls for a Loya Jirga, and whether the Taliban would be invited to participate in such a convention.

Eikenberry dodges a bit, deferring to the Afghan government, and stating that the purpose of the Loya Jirga would be for the Karzai government to regain the confidence of the Afghan people, after an election that many regarded as flawed.  Whether elements of the insurgency would participate is a question for the Afghan government, not the U.S.

On the issue of elements of the Taliban rejoining Afghan society, Eikenberry is a little more forthcoming. So long as the conditions for Taliban re-integration remain the severing of ties to terrorists, the renouncement of violence, and respect for the Afghan constitution, then such an approach would find support from the U.S., at least according to Eikenberry. 

What I think remains unresolved is how the U.S. will ensure that these conditions are fulfilled, without more actively involving itself in a process that right now it seems content to hand over to the Afghan government. 

Double Standard Posted by Patrick Barry

Why is everyone asking Ambassador Eikenberry about his cable being leaked, but not McChrystal about his strategy review getting leaked? Seriously, the leak of an entire military strategy review and its impact on the civilian strategy should be just as important to congress, if not more important, than the negative repercussions of the leak of fragments of a state department cable.

Uggh John McCain Posted by Patrick Barry

John McCain just doesn't understand strategy.  If by 2011 the United States hasn't accomplished any of their objectives for Afghanistan, than I'd say its time to take a good hard look at whether there's anything more we can do (if we haven't already reached that point.)  That's why you set objectives, so as time goes on, you can assess whether you've achieved them, and whether the continued pursuit of them is worth risks in other areas.  In John McCain's view, achieving victory is worth whatever cost.

Contiguous Security Posted by Patrick Barry

General McChrystal defines success in part by achieving what he calls "contiguous security," something that will allow Afghans to move freely, engage in commerce, etc.  Look for this concept to become a buzzword in the Washington debate.

Eikenberry's thoughts on risks Posted by Patrick Barry

The Senate Armed Services Committee hearing has kicked off.  Ambassador Eikenberry states without greater progress in Pakistan, success in Afghanistan cannot be guaranteed.  Where's Anne Patterson when you need her?

Memo to Congress: Taliban Does Not Want to Lie in Wait Posted by Patrick Barry

For anymore congressman like Rep. Frank Lo Biondo or Rep. John Kline thinking of asking whether the administration's conditions based timetable emboldens the Taliban, or will somehow allow them to lie in wait and plan, please read Matt Duss's post on Wonk Room, and then ask a different, more serious question that doesn't waste everyone's time.

Do you guys understand what defeat even means? Posted by Patrick Barry

Here I was, distracted for a few minutes, and McChrystal goes ahead and takes all the sexiness out of the concept of "defeating the enemy."  Defeat, in McChrystal's view, is not an absolute term, but instead means "rendering the enemy incapable of completing its mission." So much for squashing the Taliban out of existence. 

The elephant in the hearing room Posted by Patrick Barry

McChrystal's response to Chairman Skelton's question about U.S. goals are highly revealing about the disproportionate space taken up by Afghanistan in the Washington debate.  McChrystal defines U.S. strategic objectives in terms of thwarting Al-Qaeda, and enabling the Afghan government to better take charge of its own affairs, something pursuant to the main goal.  But that says absolutely nothing about Pakistan, where U.S. interests are arguably much greater.  Now that's not exactly McChrystal's (or Eikenberry's) fault, since their commands don't extend into Pakistan.  But you have to wonder whether the fuss over their testimony is giving Congress and the American people a proper appreciation for how U.S. interests should be balanced on either side of the Durand line.  Why, for instance, isn't there complimentary testimony from Pakistan Ambassador Anne Patterson and CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus?