Blogging the McChrystal Review - Who are the People? Pt.2 Posted by Michael Cohen

On the heels of yesterday's post about the nature of popular support for the Afghan government and Taliban a reader forwarded to me this slide from a Tony Cordesman presentation on the situation in Af/Pak. The data is pretty clear that in Kandahar province and the Southwest, the Taliban is relatively popular, while elsewhere they are about as popular as my Governor. 

While I'm generally a little suspicious of Afghan polling data this does track with what appears to be happening on the ground and the areas of the country that support the Taliban. Something to keep in mind when we talk about the Afghan "people." (Oddly, Cordesman was on McChrystal's review team so I'm surprised this sort of data wasn't factored into deliberations.)

Blogging the Israeli-Palestinian Photo-Op: Pressure Works Posted by Joel Rubin

The Obama administration has reminded us, once again, that arm-twisting is essential to Middle East peacemaking.  It has been too long – nearly two years since the failed Annapolis conference – since we’ve even seen a photo of Israeli and Palestinian leaders together, smiling, shaking hands, and generally saying positive things about the need for peace.  Too bad we can’t see the American-made rash on their forearms.

It is clear that both the Israelis and Palestinians need their arms twisted.  Since the last time these two made nice for the cameras, we’ve had a major Israeli-Palestinian war over Gaza, a change of government in both Israel and the U.S., and increasing regional anxiety about Iran.  Not enough arm-twisting has taken place in between, certainly not by the predecessor Bush administration, which let this conflict simmer and stew on its own. 

Symbols matter in Middle East peacemaking, and this symbol is significant.  U.S. arm twisting doesn’t always make things immediately better, but U.S. disengagement always makes things worse.  Getting these two leaders together is a major accomplishment and both George Mitchell and the President deserve significant kudos for pulling it off. 

Netanyahu’s government is stable and Abbas isn’t going anywhere, so we should expect to see these two doing just about everything that one would expect from longtime foes, such as talking past each other, trading complaints, and occasionally preening together for the cameras.  We should also expect a strong American hand to keep them moving in the right direction towards a peace deal, which is in both their peoples’ interests and is supported strong majorities in each population.  If today’s photo-op proves anything, it is that when there’s American pressure, these two are able to move in the right direction.

Blogging the McChrystal Review - Pretty Please Mr. Karzai Posted by Michael Cohen

This graf in the report really jumped out at me:

The absence of personal and economic security, along with the erosion of public confidence in the government, and a perceived lack of respect for Afghan culture pose as great a challenge to ISAF's success as the insurgent threat. Protecting the population is more than preventing insurgent violence and intimidation. It also means that ISAF can no longer or tacitly accept abuse of power, corruption, or marginalization. (p. 2-10)

And how precisely is ISAF going to do this? Hamid Karzai just brazenly stole the Afghan presidential election, right under the nose of the US and NATO - one in three ballots are in question. Color me crazy, but he doesn't seem overly concerned about NATO's upbraiding when it comes to abuse of power or corruption.

Precisely what leverage do we have over Karzai and the Kabul government to act responsibly when as far as McChrystal seems concerned, we have to stay in Afghanistan for the long haul?

Blogging the McChrystal Review - Who are the People? Posted by Michael Cohen

The McChrystal report makes a big point about the "people" being the "center of gravity" and the key "objective" in the counter-insurgency fight, but is rather breezy in how it describes them (p. 2-4).

For example, the report says that "communities make deliberate choices to resist, support or allow insurgent influence" which is almost certainly true. But then the report makes no effort to describe which people, which communities, which ethnic groups choose to support or resist insurgent influence. I'm still going through the report, but I don't see anywhere where it makes a distinction between these groups or identifies the regions where the challenge is the greatest. For a report that makes a big point about "people" being the objective that seems a pretty big oversight. Clearly the motivations of the "people" in  Kandahar is different from those in Kabul or Kunduz - and also quite clearly, they can't be solved by good governance alone. The report seems to presuppose that governance is the key to bringing the people to the side of the government as if ethnicity or tribal affiliation plays little role.

These sort of wide generalizations about the people are endemic. Take for example this section:

First, some GIRoA officials have given preferential treatment to certain individuals, tribes, and groups or worse abused their power at the expense of the people.

Second, the Afghan government has been unable to provide sufficient security, justice, and basic services to the people. (p. 2-8)

Well the first point here would suggest that not all the "people" share the same frustration toward their government, but it also speaks the the complexity of Afghan politics - a point alluded to in the report, but not fleshed out. It also suggests that perhaps the more effective strategy in Afghanistan would not be to focus on areas where the Taliban are both strong, and also have local sympathy, but instead on areas where the opportunity for political and security gains might be more fertile. It was a point that Sean Kay made a few weeks ago in Foreign Policy:

Shift from COIN to containment: Rather than a heavier presence, the United States should limit its military operations in southern Afghanistan and consolidate existing gains. Where possible, U.S. officials can negotiate with Taliban in the south if they will turn against global jihadists. Many Afghans supporting the Taliban can be bought out -- requiring financial incentives to persuade and empower populations to reject extremism. While several years ago major troop increases could have worked in southern Afghanistan, more troops now may be dangerously counterproductive. Increased presence in the south risks pushing Taliban over the mountains and into nuclear armed Pakistan. Meanwhile, previously secure areas of northern Afghanistan are falling under Taliban and al Qaeda influence -- encircling Kabul and threatening NATO supply lines.

A little prioritization from McChrystal would be nice, doncha think?

And Now For A Little Late Afternoon Levity . . . Posted by Michael Cohen

This nugget from Taylor Branch's new book the Clinton Tapes is a gem:

Boris Yeltsin's late-night drinking during a visit to Washington in 1995 nearly created an international incident. The Russian president was staying at Blair House, the government guest quarters. Late at night, Clinton told Branch, Secret Service agents found Yeltsin clad only in his underwear, standing alone on Pennsylvania Avenue and trying to hail a cab. He wanted a pizza, he told them, his words slurring.

The next night, Yeltsin eluded security forces again when he climbed down back stairs to the Blair House basement. A building guard took Yeltsin for a drunken intruder until Russian and U.S. agents arrived on the scene and rescued him.

Reminds me of my probably favorite video from the Clinton years when a tanked Boris Yeltsin berates the press. There are days when I really miss Boris Yeltsin!

Blogging the McChrystal Review - Changing the Culture Pt 2 Posted by Michael Cohen

Judah Grunstein saves me having to re-type everything in this report by highlighting this damning quote:

ISAF Shortcomings. Afghan social, political, economic and cultural affairs are complex and poorly understood. ISAF does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics in local communities, nor how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent officials, power-brokers, and criminality all combine to affect the Afghan population. (p. 2-10)

Yikes! Hard to reconcile that, with this:

To succeed, ISAF requires a new approach - with a significant magnitude of change - in addition to a proper level of resourcing. ISAF must restore confidence in the near-term through renewed commitment, intellectual energy, and visible progress. (p. 2-1)

How is that near-term restoration process going to occur if "ISAF does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics" . . . well you get the idea. This would all sound like an excellent idea if we weren't 8 years into the war in Afghanistan and domestic support for the war didn't stand at less than 40%. McChrystal is laying out a policy prescription that flies directly in the face of public opinion and political realities in every NATO country, including the United States.

One of my biggest complaints with much of COIN doctrine (FM 3-24 is perhaps the best example) is it often seems very much divorced from reality; traveling in an alternate world where domestic political considerations or even easily achievable military goals do not reside. As I've been arguing for a while, trying to do COIN in Afghanistan is the military equivalent of sticking a square peg in a round hole. This report really is at pace with that phenomenon.

Blogging the McChrystal Review - Changing the Culture Posted by Michael Cohen

Pg 2-1:

ISAF must now adopt a fundamentally new approach. The entire culture - how ISAF understand the environment and defines the fight, how it interacts with the Afghan people and government, and how it operates both on the ground and within the coalition - must change profoundly.

This sort of begs an obvious question; McChrystal is arguing for a wholesale change in military culture not just among US troops, but among all the members of the ISAF coalition. Why does he think this is realistic or even achievable? This seems particularly relevant when one considers that domestic support in NATO countries for the current mission is declining precipitously. It's one thing to counsel this for the US Army, but McChrystal is pushing for a multi-national change in culture and military tactics.

Wouldn't it make more sense, not to change the military culture so dramatically, but to work with what you have? I suppose on some level I applaud McChrystal's ambition, but I'm just not sure why he thinks ISAF can achieve the goal he has laid out.

Blogging the McChrystal Review - Mission Creep? Posted by Michael Cohen

Pg 1-1

"Stability in Afghanistan is an imperative; if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban - or has insufficient capacity to counter transnational terrorists - Afghanistan could again become a base for terrorism, with obvious implications for regional security."

I understand the importance of stabilizing Afghanistan so that it won't fall to the Taliban, but according to McChrystal that is not enough - the Afghan government must also maintain the capacity to counter transnational terrorists. That is a much higher bar for achieving stability than simply keeping the Taliban at bay.

Blogging the McChrystal Review Posted by Michael Cohen

There's a lot to discuss about the McChrystal review and I'll try to keep a running tally of posts going throughout the day as I slog though it. This graf from the Woodward leak article really jumped out at me though:

He (McChrystal) repeatedly warns that without more forces and the rapid implementation of a genuine counterinsurgency strategy, defeat is likely. McChrystal describes an Afghan government riddled with corruption and an international force undermined by tactics that alienate civilians.

Here are some of the follow-up quotes from the report:

The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government.

Afghan social, political, economic, and cultural affairs are complex and poorly understood. ISAF does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics in local communities, nor how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent officials, power-brokers, and criminality all combine to affect the Afghan population.

Um, if the Afghan government is riddled with corruption and ISAF doesn't understand how to prosecute a counter-insurgency strategy . . . why exactly are we prosecuting a counter-insurgency strategy. I mean how exactly are we supposed to stand up an Afghan government if that same government is seen as corrupt and illegitimate? And why does McChrystal believe that the problems with ISAF and embracing COIN doctrine will be turned around in 12 months?

Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch - The Who's In Charge Version Posted by Michael Cohen

I've been meaning for a few days to write something about Michael Crowley's piece in the New Republic about troop increases in Afghanistan and how it unintentionally demonstrates precisely how screwed up  civil-military relations are in this country. RIght on cue, the massive leak of Gen. McChrystal's strategic review does a nice job of making the case for me.

Crowley's argument is predicated on the notion that the current Administration is subverting the will of the military by placing political constraints on the number of troops they can request - i.e trying to fight the war on the cheap. But in fact the exact opposite is occurring - it's members of the military who are trying to subvert the will of the country's elected leaders.

First, we all have to recognize that every general - from time immemorial - has wanted more troops. And considering that Gen. McChrystal is trying to fight a troop-intensive counter-insurgency operation his desire for additional soldiers is obvious. But the job of the civilian leadership is to determine strategy and to balance military requests with political realities.

That was almost certainly the context behind Jones WTF moment back in July with Marine officers in Afghanistan. And yet ever since then the military was been none too quietly lobbying for the US to send more troops to Afghanistan. As I've argued repeatedly in the AMCW, the President announced a policy of defeating, disrupting and dismantling al Qaeda that evolved into a much more expansive policy of nation-building and counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. And it wasn't the civilian leadership pushing that particular version of mission creep.

Via a policy of selective leaking to prominent media outlets, the military has further constrained the President's options, by making this entire debate one about more troops vs. less troops, rather than the current counter-insurgency strategy vs. a different one.

The notion, expressed in Crowley's piece, that "there is pressure being brought on generals" by the White House has it precisely backwards. Looking at the situation over the past five months, it is the military that is putting pressure on the WH for more troops!

That brings us to today: the selective leak today to Bob Woodward of McChrystal's strategic review, which ominously warns, "Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible."

How is this not a crystal clear example of the military playing politics or at the very least using a pliant media to push its agenda and force the President's hand on troop increases? I'll have more to say about McChrystal's review later, but this should be lesson number one in precisely how screwed up civil-military relations are in this country. 

Look for example at the lead story over the New York Times:

General Calls for More U.S. Troops to Avoid Afghan Failure

Appalling I tell you. Absolutely appalling. So much for the President's own internal review of Afghan policy. Now if he wants to change course in Afghanistan he is going to have to disagree with his own top general, who has very flagrantly and very publicly shown his hand.

Finally, what exactly is wrong with the President taking into account political and public opinion considerations when making military decisions? The success of any military intervention relies at least in some measure on the support of the electorate. Conservatives love to argue that when it comes to matters of national security, Presidents should ignore polls and do what they think is right. But this is a simplistic argument, because public support for a US military intervention is essential to its success. The pro-surge folks will argue that Bush's disregarding of polls in 2007 "saved" Iraq. It's a debatable point, but in the process Bush's refusal to consider public opinion a) destroyed the Republican Party politically and b) limited President Obama's strategic options in Afghanistan.  Generals have the luxury of ignoring public opinion or, at the very least, disregarding it; president don't. And that's part of the reason why we should be glad that we live in a democracy with a well-established principle of civilian control of the military.

It's the job of politicians to balance politics and strategy. It's the job of the military to give advice, but then follow orders and fight wars. But these days it feels like the nation's generals are not only making strategic decisions, but trying to force the hand of our elected leaders.