The Powell Doctrine's Enduring Relevance
Posted by Michael Cohen
Over at World Politics Review I have a new piece up about the enduring relevance of the Powell Doctrine:
Once upon a time, there was a grand and influential foreign policy
doctrine. It was based on some traditional notions about U.S.
statecraft that placed severe constraints on when America went to war.
It asserted that when the United States used military force, it must do
so in overwhelming fashion and only in the service of vital national
interests. For any military action, it counseled the dispassionate
weighing of costs and benefits, recommended that policymakers have
clear, realistic and achievable political objectives, and called for
the strong support of the American people and a clearly defined exit
strategy.
This doctrine was called the Powell Doctrine, and it was based, in large measure, on a long-simmering debate in the military about how, when and where the United States should use force.
. . . More than a quarter-century after it first entered the strategic consciousness of the U.S. national security bureaucracy, we don't hear much about the Powell Doctrine anymore. It has seemingly become a precious artifact of a bygone era in U.S. statecraft.
Yet, the lack of attention today to the key attributes of the Powell Doctrine is difficult to understand. After the twin conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan, the more than 5,000 American troops killed, the hundreds of billions -- even trillions -- of dollars spent, it's hard to imagine a strategic doctrine that is more appropriate.
Unfortunately, the lesson seemingly being drawn from these two wars is not that the U.S. must avoid the sort of draining, manpower-intensive and time-consuming counterinsurgency operations that have defined the U.S. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, the moral of Iraq and Afghanistan seems to be that the United States must learn to fight these types of conflicts more effectively, because they are the future of war.
Meanwhile, the lessons of the Powell Doctrine and a restrained notion of when military force should be exercised are gathering cobwebs in the U.S. strategic toolbox. The time has come, however, to dust off this old war horse, because it is perhaps more relevant and timely than ever.
This doctrine was called the Powell Doctrine, and it was based, in large measure, on a long-simmering debate in the military about how, when and where the United States should use force.
. . . More than a quarter-century after it first entered the strategic consciousness of the U.S. national security bureaucracy, we don't hear much about the Powell Doctrine anymore. It has seemingly become a precious artifact of a bygone era in U.S. statecraft.
Yet, the lack of attention today to the key attributes of the Powell Doctrine is difficult to understand. After the twin conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan, the more than 5,000 American troops killed, the hundreds of billions -- even trillions -- of dollars spent, it's hard to imagine a strategic doctrine that is more appropriate.
Unfortunately, the lesson seemingly being drawn from these two wars is not that the U.S. must avoid the sort of draining, manpower-intensive and time-consuming counterinsurgency operations that have defined the U.S. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, the moral of Iraq and Afghanistan seems to be that the United States must learn to fight these types of conflicts more effectively, because they are the future of war.
Meanwhile, the lessons of the Powell Doctrine and a restrained notion of when military force should be exercised are gathering cobwebs in the U.S. strategic toolbox. The time has come, however, to dust off this old war horse, because it is perhaps more relevant and timely than ever.
Congress should create an independent blue-ribbon panel or similar body to investigate a host of previously unreviewable activities of the Bush administration, including its detention, interrogation and surveillance programs. Only by chronicling and confronting the past in a comprehensive, bipartisan fashion can we reclaim our moral authority and establish a credible path forward to meet the complex challenges of a post-Sept. 11 world. replica rolex
Rolex Watches
Tag Heuer Watches
Posted by: rolex replica | December 27, 2009 at 08:03 AM
Thank you for your sharing! I like i very much!
Posted by: cheap coach handbags | January 26, 2010 at 12:40 AM
Yes, that's cool. The device is amazing! Waiting for your next one!
Posted by: cheap coach purses | January 27, 2010 at 08:40 PM
Hi,
The rules of military engagement that became known as the Powell Doctrine call for use of the armed forces only if there is a compelling national interest at stake, an overwhelming commitment of resources, clear objectives and the support of the American people and Congress.
Posted by: r4 ds gold | February 23, 2010 at 11:50 PM
Congress should create seslisohbet an independent Video Klip panel or similar body to investigate a host of previously Sesli Chat unreviewable activities of the Bush sesli sohbet administration, including its detention, interrogation and surveillance programs.
Posted by: SesliChat | March 26, 2010 at 08:54 PM