The Future of the US Military Posted by Michael Cohen

Dr. Steven Metz, who teaches at the Strategic Studies Institute has a really important post at Small Wars Journal about some of the flawed assumptions driving current US military strategy. According to Metz, he was attending a recent DoD symposium and reports that “everyone nodded when a speaker said that the threats of the future will be dispersed, non-state entities, but few seemed to understand that this obviates the very essence of American strategy and the current focus of the military.”

Precisely. Yet, the ongoing debate between what Andrew Bacevich calls Crusaders and Conservatives regarding the future of US military doctrine seems to miss this critical point. On the hand, we have Crusader John Nagl, the new head of CNAS, who argues that the security challenges of the 21st century will require that the U.S. military be positioned "not just to dominate land operations, but to change entire societies." On the other hand we have West Point professor Gian Gentile who argues that the military, "ought to be weighted more heavily toward the requirements of conventional warfare."

But as Metz points out, perhaps both Gentile and Nagl have it wrong. For starters, the enshrining of counter-insurgency doctrine presupposes that these types of conflicts will be “the face of battle in the 21st century.” I find this very hard to swallow. Not only is there a lack of political will in the US to engage in the sort of long-term counter-insurgency that we fought in Iraq, but I'm not so sure why we would want our military to engage in this type of conflict. If the Iraq War has shown us anything it is that counter-insurgency is not the most effective type of war for the US military to be fighting - and that the benefits that might be gleaned from such a conflict would be more than outweighed by the costs. Now some might argue that we have no choice but to fight such a conflict that it will be forced upon us. My response is poppycock. The only reason the US would fight a counter-insurgency is if we choose to; and that's a choice we simply should not make because in part, it is difficult to contemplate any sort of protracted counter-insurgency that will further US interests.

As Bacevich succinctly puts it, "If counterinsurgency is useful chiefly for digging ourselves out of holes we shouldn’t be in, then why not simply avoid the holes? Why play al-Qaeda’s game? Why persist in waging the Long War when that war makes no sense?"

But because Nagl overemphasizes counter-insurgency it does not mean that Gentile's focus on conventional warfare is correct either. First of all, in an era when the control of territory has taken on far less importance in US strategic thinking the term "conventional warfare" may not mean what he have traditionally thought it means. Again Metz is spot-on in his analysis: "If you buy the notion that future threats will not be linked to a particular piece of geography--enemies can mobilize resources and undertake operations from almost anywhere--then seizing and controlling terrain will no longer be the essence of security."

Gentile identifies three possible future conflicts that might entail fighting a conventional war, "A clash between Iranian forces and an American combat brigade in Iraq could erupt in a minute. A North Korean march on Seoul will not be a fight for hearts and minds. Nor will ground fighting on Taiwan in the event of a Chinese assault."  But realistically, each of these conflicts, and in particular the latter two will likely not involve a major conventional engagement. If North Korea marches over the 38th Parallel or China invades Taiwan (and really why would either country do something foolish) the Army is unlikely to play a leading role; instead it will be the Air Force and Navy respectively. Does anyone believe that the US should be fighting another land war in Asia? And what about Iran? Well one would hope that after 6 years and more than 4,000 dead in Iraq we would have learned our lesson in the Middle East as well.

In the end, perhaps the focus of the US military and American foreign policy, writ large, should be to avoid counter-insurgencies -- AND AVOID CONVENTIONAL CONFLICTS.

Where Nagl and Gentile fall short in their analysis of the future of the military - and where I think Metz is on to something - is the confusion of tactics with strategy. Before deciding whether the US should be focusing on counter-insurgency vs. conventional warfare strategies perhaps the better question should be - what are the greatest threats facing America in the 21st century and what kind of military do we need to confront them.

Metz identifies the challenges confronting the US as "dispersed, non-state entities." I would add to that list a host of transnational issues, starting with climate change and moving down the list to health pandemics, global economic instability, vast criminal networks, failing states, the rise of semi-authoritarian governments etc. Guess what? It's not easy to bomb any of these challenges.

The means of best confronting non-state actors or multinational threats is not the sledgehammer of US military force it is instead of confluence of diplomatic engagement, law enforcement tactics, civilian development agencies, democracy and good governance promotion and in some cases, our armed forces. While one could argue that this has always been true, the reality has been quite different. More often than not, we perceive our security threats in military terms and choose to respond in kind. But its about time we recognized that the military is not the primary tool in our arsenal for confronting security challenges, but simply one of many - and in some cases, perhaps the least effective.

Indeed, Metz says at the end of his post, "20 years hence, the U.S. Army’s role in promoting American security will decline precipitously." What I find most surprising about this assertion . .  is that anyone finds this assertion surprising. If I could give one piece of advice to President Obama's national security team that I would hope they would follow, it is to assume that Dr. Metz prediction is correct.

Comments

[Dan Kervick]

"If you buy the notion that future threats will not be linked to a particular piece of geography--enemies can mobilize resources and undertake operations from almost anywhere--then seizing and controlling terrain will no longer be the essence of security."

But what evidence do we have that this is true? Despite recent fear-mongering to the contrary, we haven't seen much evidence at all that these geographically scattered, non-state, rogue actors can mobilize the resources and logistical capabilities either to acquire or threaten us with nuclear weapons, biological weapons or chemical weapons, or to build or buy the kinds of missiles that can shoot down a satellite. Yes, they can build car bombs, boat bombs, human bombs and maybe an occasional plane bombs. But is this really the greatest threat facing us?

Metz identifies the challenges confronting the US as "dispersed, non-state entities." I would add to that list a host of transnational issues, starting with climate change and moving down the list to health pandemics, global economic instability, vast criminal networks, failing states, the rise of semi-authoritarian governments etc. Guess what? It's not easy to bomb any of these challenges.

The threat from the non-state entities Metz is talking about is overblown. The other threats that you mention are real, but as you note, they are mostly non-military in character. Yet it is the job of those planning military strategy to identify the long-term military threats that are the most real and the most weighty. What are those threats?

If our children were to die in the foreseeable future as a result of military activity, what form will death most likely come in? It strikes me that the greatest likelihood attaches to nuclear weapons delivered by states. Unfortunately, we seem to have entered a new period of neo-imperial, multipolar great power competition. Also, if the global economy continues to see stressful times, then the perceived need by national strategists to compete over strategic control of resources, shipping lanes, pipelines and client markets will grow more acute.

What disturbs me is that liberals who seem most eager to press great power competition against Russia and China, including by pushing NATO right up to the Russian doorstep, and who have voiced the loudest complaints about cooperation with China, are the least willing to address the military risks that are posed by their strident, ideological posture.

[Jason]

I think Dan's on target here. The threat poised by non-state actors only arises when US economic interests are imperiled. Although AQ had one lucky hit, they are not an existential threat as Russia, China, India, and other major powers are. But as the more our economy depends on overseas resources, trade, and power agreements, the more our military will be pulled into future non-state conflicts.

As for avoiding future conflicts - please. Our military-industrial complex isn't spending $600 billion a year just to look pretty. It has to be used occassionally to make the case for F22s, EFVs, V-22s, FCS, etc etc.

[Zathras]

Is Metz not assuming that the threats of the future will be "dispersed, non-state entitites" because those appear to be the threats of the present? And is not one reason they are the threats of the present is that more conventional threats run up against the vast superiority of American military power?

Most of the American military budget, exclusive of expenses related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, is devoted to the Air Force and Navy, not to our ground forces. These services are capital-intensive and therefore expensive for us; they are prohbitively expensive for any other nation that might wish to challenge us. In the absence of assumed American supremacy at sea and dominance of the air, all sorts of threats of a kind we now regard as relics of history are likely to reemerge -- threats not immediately directed at us, but rather at weak states with powerful neighbors around the world.

[Steve Hynd]

The means of best confronting non-state actors or multinational threats is not the sledgehammer of US military force it is instead of confluence of diplomatic engagement, law enforcement tactics, civilian development agencies, democracy and good governance promotion and in some cases, our armed forces...its about time we recognized that the military is not the primary tool in our arsenal for confronting security challenges, but simply one of many.

However, the military and most of the COINdinistas (including Petraeus, Gates, Nagl and the rest at CNAS) seem only too happy to let the military do those other jobs too...and to build a permanent, costly capability to do those jobs. That suits the army just fine, as it preserves its relevance and then some. But it leaves all the practical tools of nation building in DoD hands ands consigns State to being simply door holders for nation-builders in uniforms. You end up with a military hammer because only they have the standing capability and infrastructure to do these non-military COIN tasks.

Not only is that the wrong thing to do by COIN doctrine (which isn't slowing them down one bit), it creates a massive imbalance in both budget allocations and bureaucratic power which could be described best as a military-industrial complex wet dream.

Regards, Steve Hynd

[spockamok]

Obviously the big national strategic question is what to fight for and if to fight.

But it seems appropriate for Nagl and Gentile as members of the military academic community to think about military operational toolkits. The military are an instrument, military thinkers earn their pay predicting what types of fights future US political leaders are less likely to avoid.

[fnord]

Copy-paste from your other post on this issue (Im a lazy bastard)

First, one issue wich has largely been forgotten is how the difference between Afghan and Iraq in the Phase IV is the participation of the UN. In Iraq, Rumsfeld had no patience for the UN and provided little security resources to their ops. In Afghan, the UN is seriously involved.

Second, and to the argument: I guess the problem with your point is that most COIN-proponents think you only touch on the superficial policy questions in your arguments, and avoid the purely mechanical military ones. The job of a military is to be ready for any form of conflict and to obey its political leaders to the best of its abilities. I started reading and commenting on the old now gone Intel-dump blog Phil Carter ran (now in charge of winding down Gitmo, I believe). Thats one of the central blogs where the howls of the military folks who could see that the US was doing it wrong in Iraq surfaced in the blogsphere, way pre-surge. So the COIN approach is just as much an attempt to institutionalize that knowledge into the rest of the military skillset. Not to go forth and conquer the world.

And I think maybe you will be surprised at the level of statebuilding I think will come in a year. Gates is smart, he chose a set of middleground terms, he is one of those who still remember that we are at fucking war. Ive heard some happy grunts from norwegians. I think the channels the money itself runs through will recieve an overhaul, and the costmultiplying contractors gradually will be phased out. Hopefully. Im more worried about increased CAS.

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