Matt Yglesias has some thoughtful comments about my PPI paper on “re-orienting” US policy toward the Middle East. He says:
And I think most of his policy recommendations are good. I’m a bit wary, however, of the idea that we should “elevate democracy promotion through aid conditionality.” This is a popular suggestion, but I think it has a lot of problems. One way you could implement it would be to say to the King of Jordan “either write and adopt a democratic constitution and hold free and fair elections to fill the office by 2010 after which you step aside or we’re cutting you off.” That would presumably result in the King telling us to get lost, and us cutting off aid. But that’s typically not what democracy promoters have in mind. Instead, they want us to make more moderate demands (”a set of benchmarks, including respect of opposition rights, freedom of expression, and progress toward holding free elections, even if only on the municipal level at first”) that, presumably, the incumbent authorities are more likely to accept.
In an ideal world, it would be nice to say to the King of Jordan “hold free and fair elections by 2010 or we’ll cut your aid.” But, in the real world, more moderate demands will have to do, which is what I suggest in the paper.
But this sets up an odd dynamic. In effect, clever State Department bureaucrats are trying to trick the Mubaraks and Husseins of the world into accepting deals that lead to them losing their grip on power. But common sense indicates that this is closer to the core area of competence of the dictators than of the State Department. Most likely, they’ll trick us, proposing cosmetic reforms that fundamentally change nothing. Meanwhile, we’re now officially certifying shame reform processes.
The State Department doesn’t actually get tricked about this. With the exception of Bush appointees, most people in the State Deparment are relatively smart and informed. They can generally distinguish between real and cosmetic reforms. The more relevant problem, in my view, is that the State Department prefers cosmetic reforms, or at least reforms that don’t rock the boat. DoS, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, has tended to be rather cautious when it comes to substantive democratization, out of fear of Islamist groups coming to power. In any case, State’s main task is to protect what it perceives to be “American interests,” which tend to be narrowly-defined.
Also, Matt is right to say that the suggestion of establishing “a set of benchmarks, including respect of opposition rights, freedom of expression, and progress toward holding free elections, even if only on the municipal level at first” is “moderate.” Despite being moderate, however, this approach has not yet been seriously tried in the Middle Eastern context, which is why I suggest trying it.
Lastly, I believe aid conditionality or the threat of aid conditionality works (it has worked in other regions. In the Middle East, it worked the only time it was really tried, 2004-5). However, even if aid conditionality didn’t work, it would still be an advisable policy recommendation, because it would help us rebuild our credibility with Arab publics, and demonstrate that we’re on their side rather than the side of their oppressors. This would be a good outcome for various national security reasons, as well as for reasons of "narrative," and I talk about that at some length in the paper. More tangibly, rebuilding credibility would also make it more politically feasible for Middle Eastern NGOs to accept our direct or indirect support, and protect them against charges of pro-American duplicity.