Military Solutions To What Problems?
Posted by David Shorr
The current issue of The Atlantic has a lot grist for the debate over the purpose and efficacy of American military might. What caught my eye in Andrew Bacevich's piece on counterinsurgency doctrine and Jeffrey Goldberg's article on McCain were a false choice, a falacious choice, and a genuine dilemma.
The piece on McCain is about his views on war, particularly through the lens of Vietnam and the parallels with Iraq. Goldberg asked McCain's friend Sen. Lindsey Graham to shed new light on how McCain approaches the Iraq debate. Graham cited a belief that
"Some political problems have military solutions." A related McCain belief that's even more out of sync with America's current mood: wars are quagmires only until someone figures out a way to win them.
I'm glad the reporter got at these issues, though the choices of the words related and mood strike me as odd. The first quote doesn't really say much, because it's not the real question. Of course there are sometimes military solutions to political problems, but are there political problems for which there are no military solutions? According to the second statement above, apparently McCain believes there's always a military solution (at least once a war is engaged). I'd say the public's skepticism toward this proposition is more than a mood -- it's a conclusion for the current case and if not an enduring belief, at least a persistent wariness.
Another nugget Goldberg came up with was a quote from McCain's favorite book on terrorism, Philip Bobbitt's Terror and Consent:
The war against a global terror network, al Qaeda, is in an early phase. Yet already owing to the Coalition invasion of Iraq, terrorists from this network or any other cannot someday call on Saddam Hussein to supply them covertly with weapons with which to attack the West when he would not have dared to have done so directly, and when he, but not they, had the resources to buy into a clandestine market in WMD.
This is a fallacy we hear all the time from hardliners. If you decisively remove a threat, you have improved security. For me, even if you set aside the absurdity of extrapolating Saddam's WMD capability, you're still left with a ridiculous way of looking at things. It's an accounting system in which your actions are always a net positive because you don't let negative consequences appear on your balance sheet.
A few words about Bacevich's article on Gen. Petraeus, John Nagl, and the question of how oriented toward counterinsurgency the US military should be. I really see both sides of this one. I do believe that stability operations are important (don't forget, for many of us, Bosnia and Rwanda were formative policy experiences). But as with the wider issue of force (see above), you do have to be careful not to delude yourself about unrealistic social/political engineering projects.