More Iraq Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

OK, I’m going to weigh in late here on what has been a high quality debate.

Ultimately, my views are much more in line with Max’s, but I think that Shawn makes some pretty good points that can be incorporated into a withdrawal plan.  The ultimate flaw in Shawn’s approach is that the probability of success under any scenario is extraordinarily low (Like 1-2% in my view), and I don’t think you will see a major difference in outcomes inside Iraq, whether a drawdown occurs over 3-10 years or over 12-18 months.  What you will see under Shawn’s plan is a much greater cost to the United States and further regional destabilization as the U.S. is unable to recalibrate and focus on other major strategic objectives both in the Middle East and across the world.  It’s one thing if there were no costs.  But the opportunity costs are huge and the potential benefits are unlikely to occur.

The reality is that we are sitting on an unstable balance of power inside Iraq, supported by localized cease fires that are unlikely to last.  No one has any idea how to convert these cease fires into actual institutional stability.  All it will take is one major event:  a second Samarra, a well placed assassination, contested elections, something that ignites the powder keg and causes everything to once again explode.  Shawn’s prescription to solving this problem seems to be way too optimistic.

Second, we condition the remaining mission on Iraqi political progress.  During 2009 we would expect to see real progress on oil revenue sharing, a provincial power law, elections, and integration or affiliation of the CLCs into the Iraqi Security Forces. I would expect that we would continue a robust training mission as well.

Every one of these actions by the Iraqi Government is the equivalent of passing Universal Healthcare Reform in this country.  It is a massive legislative and political undertaking and the likelihood of it happening is extraordinarily low.

That being said, I agree with Shawn’s point that the only leverage we have is the American presence.

So, what should a new President do?  Early on I’d appoint either one or a number of high level special envoys.  I would send them out to all of the key players both inside and outside the country:  ISCI, the Sadrists, KRG, CLCs, Awakening Councils, Sunni Greenzone politicians, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, etc…  The United States would make clear to all of these players that we are leaving.  The plan should be to pull most of our forces out in roughly 18 months or whatever the military feels is doable, given the difficult logistics.  But then I would also make clear that if the Iraqis, with help from us and their neighbors, make major political progress and come back and ask for more American support, we would reconsider and leave troops in longer.  In other words, a genuine leave-on-failure stay-on-success strategy that exercises the same type of leverage Shawn is talking about, but with a smaller American commitment and more pressure.

As part of this approach, I think it’d be wise to go to all of the players with at least a suggested outline of what a solution might look like.  Not because we want to dictate a solution but because there needs to be a starting point for discussions that they could react to.  I’d also scrap the whole piecemeal benchmark concept.  Trying to do this operation one benchmark at a time is silly.    If you are dealing with the oil law today, then you are going to take the maximalist position, because you are just negotiating on this one piece.  You have to negotiate a package that includes the oil law, provincial elections law, constitution, etc…  This will force the parties to prioritize and decide which of these issues really matter and on which they can be more flexible.  Everything needs to be on the table at once.

If phase one of these diplomatic discussions goes well, and it looks like an agreement might be possible, then you move on to phase two. Through careful negotiations you pave the way for a prolonged peace conference that brings all of the parties together to negotiate an agreement that settles how the various parties in Iraq will share power and what the state will look like.  This just can’t be done piecemeal in the greenzone.  If it’s going to work it needs to be done all at once.

At the same time.  I agree with everyone that we have a moral commitment to the Iraqi people.  That moral commitment should not involve keeping thousands of troops in Iraq indefinitely in an intractable situation that we cannot control.  That doesn’t help them and it doesn’t help us.  But the moral commitment should involve a massive humanitarian aid program, helping refugees and IDPs resettle and get their lives back together.  We should be much more welcoming to these people in our own country and work with our allies to find more places for refugees to resettle.  I don’t know if we can save Iraq.  But I do know that we can do a lot more to help millions of Iraqis deal with the consequences of what has happened.  This is an element that has been shamefully neglected.

Anyway, is this plan likely to work?  No.  But it’s as likely to work as anything anyone else has suggested, and the benefits of this plan are that if it doesn’t work, at least we are out.

Comments

Let’s start with a more frank appraisal of what is really going on in the region.

First, th