While terrorism detecting eyes are averted to the stunning Hamas performance in Israel, in the campaign against terrorism the state of Al Qaeda is of far greater importance—particularly with regard to the ramifications of this month’s successful U.S. strike inside Pakistan. Not only thereafter did we hear from Osama bin Laden (OBL) for the first time in over a year, but in the course of threatening attacks in the U.S. heartland he also offered something of an olive branch.
Al Qaeda did offer a sort of truce with European governments a couple of years ago, but OBL’s offer constitutes an intriguing departure. Why such a message and why now? With a trove of American analysts suggesting the U.S. is losing the campaign against terrorism—and Al Qaeda’s success in broadening their recruiting, influencing moderate Muslim opinion, and OBL’s remaining at large—why would the leader of Al Qaeda do something that smacks of weakness?
It appears that OBL is feeling newly vulnerable, and he has reason to be. Certainly he could be motivated to snatch back some of the limelight that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (AMZ) has been hogging in Iraq, and OBL has consistently shown himself to be an able media manipulator—e.g. by making an overture he knew the U.S. would reject he comes off somewhat statesmanlike.
And no doubt by rattling the saber a bit he set off a fresh round of concerns about the post 9-11 Al Qaeda chimera’s ability to strike at will deep inside the West. But OBL has been comfortable in having his chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri (AZ), act as the public face of Al Qaeda for a couple of years now; moreover, he has an interest in remaining out of view to stoke those mythical fears even though he is becoming more frail. Granted, the OBL tape could well have been made prior to the strike, but the Al Qaeda death knell is sounding.
Al Qaeda has not only a significantly reduced direct capacity to carry out attacks but also a new reason to feel that OBL and AZ are not as safe in their Pakistani tribal refuge as they are accustomed to feeling. I am in no way writing the epitaph of Al Qaeda, nor foolishly dabbling in any “they’re in the last throes” rhetoric. Rather, evidence points to success against the top drawer terrorist organization even while its affiliates are achieving increased success of their own.
While the Madrid and London bombings indicate a continued threat of local motivated Islamic extremists in the West—the principal threat these days—Al Qaeda itself has been degraded. By the end of December, in addition to OBL, AZ, and AMZ if he counts, only 5 other major operatives were still at large (in May top commander Abu Faraj al-Libbi was captured).
As of the strike this month, aimed at AZ, two of the other five were killed—Abu Khabab al-Masri and Abu Ubayada al-Masri, other top commanders—along with AZ’s son-in-law and another. It was a sizable blow to Al Qaeda and highly ominous for the remaining leaders. For the strike inside Pakistan itself was a departure.
That Pakistan allowed the U.S. strike to take place upon request is significant (President Musharraf’s delayed complaints are purely due to the protests spawned around the country) and presages future success as the U.S. et al. move toward eradicating 90% of notable Al Qaeda leaders. Moreover, the numbers of fighters who went through pre 9-11 Afghan training camps have been exaggerated, as is the report of vast new camps there.
I will say more in a future post about the specter of continued attacks from affiliated groups—including a proposal to open up a Pacific front in the global campaign against terrorism—but the steady eradication of Al Qaeda itself is significant and the day of OBL’s demise may be closer than we think (and especially if he is captured instead of killed, the effect on his followers will be less malign than most imagine).