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May 26, 2006

Terrorism

Bin Laden on Moussaoui
Posted by Michael Signer

It's hard to know what to make of the very weird story earlier this week about bin Laden's statement about Zacharias Moussaoui.  Bin Laden's statement has three parts:  first, he says that Moussaoui wasn't involved in 9/11; second, he engages in a somewhat elaborate logical and empirical proof of that point, reasoning that Moussaoui had been involved, the other 9/11 conspirators would have called off the attacks, as Moussaoui was imprisoned 2 weeks before 9/11; third, and most interestingly, he whirls off into a strange riff pleading for "fairness" for the prisoners in Gitmo. 

Harvard Law Professor Juliet Kayyem writes on TPMCafe of this part:

Its a good move on his part. Say whatever you will say about 9/11, he seems to suggest, but it is America now that has the dirty hands.

I'm pretty sure Kayyem, smart as she is, is wrong that this is a "good move" for bin Laden.  On the contrary, I think it shows him reasoning from a position of striking weakness; entangled in ridiculous double standards; and rather panicky.  The statement reveals bin Laden as weak rather than strong -- and suggests that this part of our approach against al Qaeda (the element concentrated on drilling known members of Al Qaeda into the ground) may be working better than many think.

Continue reading "Bin Laden on Moussaoui" »

May 25, 2006

Progressive Strategy

Progressive Organizing Bears Fruit
Posted by Lorelei Kelly

Today, Rep. Jane Harman posted a diary entry about the administration’s aggressive blundering on Iran. She demands “more accuracy and less hype” from the administration, In her post, Harman, a smart, centrist Democrat sounds like a lefty on this issue. Could this be because she’s facing a challenge from the left in her California District?

Irregardless, let’s have more of this! Especially now that Iran has signaled its willingness to negotiate. Also taking up the issue of Iran, the Progressive Caucus today convened its first in a series of ad-hoc hearings on the administration’s pre-emptive war strategy.

This ad-hoc hearing is a big deal in an institutional sense. The Progressive Caucus has had one shared staff person for less than a year. With just that small bit of help, the caucus has held numerous events, convened an annual retreat and begun to meet regularly. The conservative knee-capping of idealism during the last decade(s) has created a hardy sort of new progressive. They are intentional idealists (in my work with the Progressive Caucus, I observe that they are more cautious and thoughtful than their most activist political base, this is especially true on Iraq) They understand the nuts and bolts needs of organizing strategically.

The ability to exercise oversight inside Congress but through informal venues is one vital step toward restoring our legislature’s democratic role. Remember, one of the biggest blows to progressive organizing inside Congress came in 1995, when “reforms” written into the Contract with America gave Congress a mid-level lobotomy--wiping out much of the non-official infrastructure that any Members of Congress could use to recognize important issues. Some examples: the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, the Office of Technology Assessment, the Democratic Study Group ( a rapid response staff that delivered strategic foreign policy information—and which had dozens of Republican members) This hurt progressives and independent thinkers in both parties.

While their progressive Republican colleagues were purged, Democrats languished in the “majority mentality” (believing that they’d take the majority back next election cycle.) Meanwhile, Congress turned into a big marble casino, democracy destroying enterprises like the K Street Project flourished, oversight and accountability –not to mention collegiality--became quaint relics, the leveraged buy-out of the public sector accelerated. The Democratic Party lost its way, the Republican party lost its soul. Which is why Democrats should make sure that the label “progressive” is still open to the other side of the aisle.

May 24, 2006

Settling Israel's Permanent Borders
Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Last Spring my father-in-law and I made a bet:  he said that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip was a one-off effort to relieve Western pressure and offload a long-time albatross.  I maintained it was a precursor to broad Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, which would be Sharon's next move.  He acknowledges that I won, though frustratingly neither of us can remember what we wagered.

Today Sharon's successor Ehud Olmert met with President Bush at the White House to discuss, among other things, his intention for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from most of the West Bank in the event that a negotiated settlement does not emerge in the near-term.   I like Olmert's plan, and here's why:

- All unilateral withdrawal would do is make the inevitable terms of a peace settlement a reality.  The parameters for a negotiated Israeli-Palestinian settlement have been well-known since the Camp David talks during the final weeks of the Clinton Administration in 2000.  Six years later, instead of progress there's been only stagnation and regression.  After Arafat's death prospects seemed to improve, only to deteriorate once Fatah disappointed the expectations of the Palestinian people and Hamas took control.  Under these circumstances, to exclude the possibility of any resolution to the conflict short of negotiated settlement is to be resigned to continued strife with no end in sight.

- The prospect of unilateral withdrawal may push the Palestinians back to the bargaining table.  If the Palestinians are as adamant as they claim in opposing imposed borders, they cannot credibly refuse to meet the basic criteria that have been laid down for a resumption of negotiations, including Hamas' recognition of Israel's right to exist.  If they continue to stand aloof, that only strengthens Israel's claim that the unilateral option is their only recourse.

- Even a unilateral withdrawal won't truly be unilateral.  Even if the Israelis are not negotiating directly with their Palestinian counterparts, as they lay plans for their withdrawal consultations with the US, the UN, Europe and Russia will amount to a de facto mediation between the needs and wants of the two parties.  The West will push for boundaries that will minimize Palestinian provocation, and - in the interest of sustaining Western support - Israel will listen.

- The bottom line is that Israeli withdrawal will remove a massive source of conflict in the Middle East.   If Israel withdraws, they will yank out 90-95% of the painful splinter that is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  The primary source of the Palestinian people's 58 year lament will have been removed, and I don't see the world having much patience for the remaining 5-10% of lost territory.  In fact, for years the prospect of straight-up Israeli withdrawal from the territories was thought to represent an unqualified Palestinian victory.  The Palestinians will argue that a unilateral withdrawal without the massive international economic and political supports that would come with a negotiated settlement will leave them in the lurch, but six years after Camp David and four months after Hamas' victory, it will be clear that they had and squandered other options.  Moreover, should a reasoned Palestinian leadership emerge, the economic aid and international backing could as easily be put in place after Israeli withdrawal instead of as part of a settlement.

Sure, a negotiated settlement would sound and feel better, and is less likely to elicit unintended consequences.  But as compared to another decade or more of grinding stalemate, unilateral withdrawal is a better option on all sides.

May 23, 2006

Iraq

RhetoricWatch: "Turning Point"
Posted by Heather Hurlburt

So President Bush has duly introduced the frame that will allow his Administration to draw down 30,000 or more troops "by the end of the year."

BUSH: The new Iraqi government does not change America's objectives or our commitment, but it will change how we achieve those objectives and how we honor our commitment.

And as the new Iraqi government grows in confidence and capability, America will play an increasingly supporting role.

To take advantage of this moment of opportunity, the United States and our coalition partners will work with the new Iraqi government to adjust our methods and strengthen our mutual efforts to achieve victory over our common enemies.

...we have now reached a turning point in the struggle between freedom and terror.

It's interesting that the authors of this and similar Administration statements don't seem to feel that any link is needed between troop drawdowns and actual reductions in violence.  The senior US official who briefed on the speech even noted honestly, according to the Washington Post, that in the near-term violence is likely to go up, not down.

I do wonder what polling is telling them that.  Perhaps you also noticed a senior Republican's assessment the other day that one-third of Americans want the troops to come home, one-third want them to stay, and one third are "persuadable."  Or the comment that the Administration wants to stage as many welcome-home ceremonies as possible -- in lieu of "coffin coverage."

Potpourri

Harry S. Bush?
Posted by Derek Chollet

Speaking yesterday in Chicago, President Bush returned to an historical analogy that he has used often during the past few months: Harry S. Truman.  “One thing history teaches,” the President said, “if you look back at some of the written word when Harry Truman had the vision of helping [Japan] recover from the war and become a democracy, a lot of people were saying, it's a waste of his time; hopelessly idealistic, they would say. But he had faith in certain fundamental truths.”

Bush and his team often harken back to the late 1940s and early 1950s to suggest that the new challenges facing America since September 11 are comparable to those that faced Truman -- and more important, that the quality of leadership to meet these challenges is the same.  Each president had to deal with a new threat to the American homeland, and each developed a new American strategic doctrine – containment in 1947, preemption in 2002.  (Jim Goldgeier and I critique this comparison in detail in this summer’s issue of The American Interest)

The appeal of the metaphor is easy to understand.  They want to believe that like Truman, whose popularity ratings were also in the toilet at the end of his term (and whose party got whipped in the 1950 midterm elections), Bush will one day be vindicated by history – that Iraq will turn out to be a stable democracy in the Middle East as Germany and Japan became in Europe and Asia in the 1950s, and that preemption will stand with containment as a brilliant strategy to combat a new enemy.

It is true that Harry Truman is far more beloved today than when he left office, and that he is now considered to be one of America’s greatest presidents, much admired for his folksy style and decisive, gutsy leadership.  Bush likes to call himself the “decider,” and with Truman, everyone knew where the buck stopped.  And Bush very much hopes that, like Truman, he will one day prove the naysayers wrong.

Continue reading "Harry S. Bush?" »

Democracy, Middle East

2010: A Taxi-Cab Odyssey
Posted by Shadi Hamid

Cairo, Egypt. May 2010. The following conversation takes place in a beaten up cab from the 1950s that does not (and cannot) have any seatbelts. Unable to stand the enveloping silence, I make some small talk with the driver:

Shadi: It’s kind of hot today.
Taxi Driver: Yep.
Shadi: Well, what about the political “weather” then (this makes sense in Arabic)? To be honest, I’m pretty disappointed. Always bad news. Gamal [Mubarak] is turning out worse than his father. I didn’t think it was possible.
Taxi Driver: Tell me about it.
Shadi: Well, thank God the US is serious about democracy promotion. The White House will give Gamal a panic attack with its grandiose Wilsonian lectures on political reform.
TD: Who is Wilson?
Shadi: He was an American president 90 years ago. He believed in self-determination for third world peoples, and presumably for Arabs as well.
TD: We want this man Wilson.
Shadi: So do I but, alas, he is dead.
TD: May God be praised. To God we must all return. Still we don’t believe Clinton’s wife is serious in her democracy talk. She talks like Bush. Nice words but empty words. In the Arab world, as you know, we don’t believe what politicians say.
Shadi: Well, I guess that’s one thing we have in common. But what about the US postponing a Free Trade agreement for another five years because of the lack of progress on democratic reform?
TD: Details. Deep down, you don’t want democracy. Ya captain (i.e. Mister) - we remember what happened in Algeria.
Shadi: But that was 20 years ago.
TD: …we also remember what happened in Palestine, when you asked for elections and then you changed your mind after.
Shadi: Ummm...
TD: Plus, you Americans pretended like you didn’t want Gamal to succeed his father. But you could have stopped him if you wanted.
Shadi: 

(silence)

Shadi: Things seemed a lot better when Bill Clinton was president, didn’t they?
TD: May God grant Bill Clinton continued success and prosperity.

May 21, 2006

Progressive Strategy, Weekly Top Ten Lists

Whose Afraid of the Big, Bad Left? 10 Reasons Why Progressives Shouldn't Be
Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Peter Beinart and others are worried that the fiasco of the Iraq War will result in the resurgence of a staunchly anti-imperialist, neo-isolationist left of the sort the American public will never trust with its national security.   I have been arguing for four years that progressives will not retake power if they are perceived not to trust America's military hand around the world. 

So while I agree with Peter's premise that only a robustly internationalist liberalism can resurrect American power and redirect American policy, I think its a mistake to get distracted at this point by worrying about how to manage the left.  Here's why:

1.  Talking up a hawk-dove progressive rift plays right into conservative hands - Conservatives would like nothing more than to paint the opposition as riven with divisions and wracked by isolationist, anti-interventionist sentiment.  This feeds their case that progressives cannot be trusted to defend America and that tough but blundering is better than cowardly and retreatist.  The fact is that progressives have come together to drive some major Congressional victories and are largely in agreement what needs to happen to put America on course.  We should not help conservatives paint us otherwise.

2.  9/11 and Globalization Dealt a One-two Punch Against Isolationism - While Americans rue the conduct of the Iraq war, the combination of economic and technological globalization and the 9/11 attacks have convinced most Americans that the U.S. cannot turn away from the world.  While Iraq has engendered grave misgivings about the Bush Administration's approach, history offers many other more successful models for America's global leadership.  Most Americans, even on the far left, will be receptive to internationalism as long as it is not of the Bush variety.

3.  Talk of isolationism today is greatly exaggerated - As I and others have written, Bush likes to talk about isolationism as a way to tar his critics as head-in-the-sand America-lasters.  The reality is that many of his opponents have far deeper internationalist credentials than he does and that few, if any, are arguing that America can retreat from global leadership.  Rather than arguing against supposed isolationists, progressives should expose Bush's attempt to deflect legitimate criticism by crying isolationism.

4.  Being anti-war doesn't mean being anti a strong defense and an aggressive foreign policy - Though the Administration would have us believe otherwise, there's nothing incoherent about supporting assertive, effective American global leadership and believing that a) the Iraq war was anything but and b) the problems in Iraq won't be fixed by a continued American prresence.  The Fighting Dems and the retired Generals who have openly criticized the conduct of the war all advocate a strong national defense and tough line on terror regardless of where they come out on Iraq.

5.  Iraq is not Vietnam - Vietnam did engender a long period of American isolationism and protracted misgivings about U.S. military intervention in virtually any form.  But Iraq won't do the same for various reasons:  the mistakes and misconceptions of the Iraq adventure are so obvious that people are less prone to believe any American intervention would be similarly flawed; also, as painful as Iraq has been, casualties still are small relative to Vietnam;

Continue reading "Whose Afraid of the Big, Bad Left? 10 Reasons Why Progressives Shouldn't Be" »

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