Assessing UN Action on Iran and North Korea Posted by Jordan Tama

2006 was a bad year for American foreign policy, marked by our inability to stop the escalating civil war in Iraq, worsening violence in Darfur, and the continued decline of our international reputation. But we also had a couple of important diplomatic achievements that haven't got as much attention as they deserve: the passage by the UN Security Council of targeted sanctions against North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs.

After North Korea's nuclear test in October, the Security Council voted unanimously for sanctions that ban the transfer of nuclear materials to North Korea, bar international travel by officials associated with North Korea's weapons programs, and freeze the overseas assets of those officials. The resolution also authorizes countries to inspect cargo going in and out of North Korea to detect illegal weapons. Eight days ago, the Security Council unanimously approved a less stringent sanctions package on Iran, including a ban on the import and export of nuclear materials and a freeze on the assets of some Iranian individuals and companies.

In both cases, the U.S. had pushed for tougher sanctions, while Russia and China had sought weaker ones. The results were painstakingly negotiated compromises that satisfied no one but represented significant diplomatic achievements considering the wide divergence of views among Security Council members. The sanctions won't stop North Korea and Iran from moving forward with their nuclear programs, but they will slow them down by making it harder for them to acquire needed materials and complicating the work of officials involved in nuclear efforts.

The bigger benefits might be political. In Iran, the sanctions already have contributed to growing discontent with President Ahmadinejad, as some Iranians blame him for unnecessarily isolating their country (though most Iranians support Iran's nuclear program). In East Asia, the sanctions have shown North Korea that its most important patron, China, is willing to cooperate with North Korea's enemies to punish it for recalcitrant behavior.

The sanctions also give more legitimacy to other nonproliferation efforts, such as the U.S. program to pressure banks to stop dealing with North Korea and the Proliferation Security Initiative, in which the U.S. and like-minded countries inspect suspicious cargo on the high seas. They show the world as well that we're willing to address difficult security challenges multilaterally.

Still, the sanctions won't prevent North Korea from producing more nuclear bombs or stop Iran from enriching uranium. North Korea already has the know-how and materials necessary for making nuclear weapons, and Iran probably has enough technology and expertise to join the nuclear club within the next decade. So we must continue to pressure both countries to comply with their nonproliferation obligations and UN resolutions. If Iran continues to enrich uranium and North Korea takes another provocative nuclear step, we should seek more stringent UN sanctions on them.

If Russia or China refuses to support tougher sanctions in those circumstances, we should pursue new multilateral sanctions outside the UN. The Security Council is the most legitimate forum for addressing security issues, but we'd be foolish to allow one or two countries to block action on grave threats. That's why we should lead efforts to create a Concert of Democracies, as called for by the Princeton Project on National Security and by Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay. The Concert, composed of dozens of democracies from around the world, could provide useful competition for the Security Council. Russia and China would be more likely to back Security Council action if they knew democracies might act without them outside the UN.

We should also offer Iran and North Korea greater incentives to halt their nuclear programs. Neither country will give up its program without major political and economic rewards that form part of a grand bargain. With North Korea, we should seek a deal in which Pyongyang verifiably ends its nuclear program and turns over all nuclear weapons and materials, in exchange for the lifting of U.S. and multilateral sanctions, the normalization of diplomatic relations, and an American pledge not to attack North Korea. We should pursue a similar agreement with Iran, with the important difference that the Iranian deal should also include a commitment by Teheran to stop providing funds or arms to Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi militias, and other groups that engage in terrorism or seek the destruction of Israel.

It will be extremely difficult to reach either of these grand bargains, but I know of no other way to end two of the world's most dangerous nuclear programs. In 2007, we should offer Iran and North Korea major incentives and open serious negotiations with them. If they reject our offers, the world will see that they're to blame and we'll have more leverage to seek tougher multilateral sanctions against them. Of course, the chances that the Bush administration will pursue this approach are next to nil. Still, leaders in Congress and 2008 presidential contenders should advocate it.

Comments

[kb]

"If Iran continues to enrich uranium"

Which they're perfectly entitled to do so under the NPT.

Or do you americans have any evidence at all that they are going for a nuclear device ?

And by evidence we mean better evidence that you had against Iraq? Or any evidence that wasn't gained by torture.

You know REAL evidence , not just 'well we hate iran like we hated iraq'.

[Dan Kervick]

I think the Concert of Democracies proposal is a very bad idea. I have already posted several comments to that effect in the various discussions at TPM Cafe, so I will just summarize my reasons here.

1. The most pressing needs for international cooperation in the early 21st century require more boad-based cooperation than the ideologically limited Concert of Democracies can provide.

2. I am convinced that the creation of a Concert of Democracies would damage the potential to form these broad-based global partnerships, and would provoke resistance and hostile counter-responses from potential partners in the non-concert part of the world.

3. The formation of this concert sends precisely the wrong signal at a time when progressives should be leading the global community and the US public toward a recognition of the need for global cooperation on energy, the environment, security and economic issues of common concern; about the need to tone down the polarizing rhetoric of fear, suspicion and ideology; and about the need to strengthen our relationships with China, Russia and other important countries who may not make it into the concert. Drawing away from the broader world, and toward coalitions formed on ideological lines, points in the opposite direction. This is a step backward toward a Cold War era we should be well rid of. Instead of retrenching, let's instead move forward in a progressive, global internationalist spirit.

4. The political energy that would have to be put into the formation and organization of the concert, and all its attendant debates, would be a distraction from more pressing matters. And the upshot of the debate is in the end likely to include a series of self-serving and hypocritical verbal compromises on the vexed philosophical issue of what makes some society a democracy.

5. While the proposed charter for the concert does include discussion of the important goal of UN reform, the goal is framed in the charter in a threatening and coercive manner. It comes off as an ultimatum: reform in the way we like, or we will turn our backs on the UN, and turn to the Concert of Democracies for authorization and legitimization of military action. Overall, it seems less a plan to reform the UN than a plan to weaken the UN, or even destroy it, but provide political cover while doing so. Indeed, I suspect this is one of the real goals of some of the concert's backers, despite the happy talk about "useful competition" with ther UN.

6. The world in 2007 is already caught up in an escalating great power conflict over strategic control of and access to energy reserves, and over political influence in the regions that contain them. We are drifting – bungling actually – toward global war in the same way our ancestors did a hundred years ago. At the same time, we are losing control of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the world is awash in small arms. It is of the utmost importance that we arrest this drift, and address its underlying causes through frank discussions and negotiations among all the major players. Otherwise we are dooming our children to the nightmares of the last century. The concert will not be useful in addressing this problem, and will actually exacerbate it by adding an unpredictable and provocative additional element of ideological rivalry to the increasingly tense global situation.

7. The notion that Russia and China would be "more likely to back Security Council action if they knew democracies might act without them outside the UN" is wishful thinking at best. It a judgement that is completely at odds with historical experience. Rather than nudge China and Russia to fall more in line with US wishes, I think we can confidently predict that the creation of a Concert of Democracies would be perceived as a threat in those countries, and would force them into each others arms, along with many other excluded countries who would suddenly feel their interests in need of new protection, and strength in numbers. Again, I think provoking such an alignment is actually part of what is driving some of the backers of a Concert of Democracies.

One of my resolutions for 2007 is to write and work against this neo-Cold War movement among the neoliberals, and advocate on behalf of a progressive global internationalist agenda.

[Dan Kervick]

It will be extremely difficult to reach either of these grand bargains, but I know of no other way to end two of the world's most dangerous nuclear programs.

Well perhaps, Jordan. But that's because it has become quite clear that the White House is simply not interested in pursuing a grand bargain with Iran, despite several opporunities to do so. They administration is bent on regime change, and has apparently concluded that it is in its interest to continue to pursue conflict with Iran to the natural culmination.

What other interpretation can you offer of the reports in May about the White House's scuttling and cover-up of of the 2003 Iranian proposal for dialogue, which you can read about here and here. And what is your view of the White House's efforts to silence Flynt Leverett?

In light of these reports, following along on the phony diplomatic side path being charted by the US at the UN strikes me as a case of willfull naiveté. This administration will never strike any sort of bargain with the Iranians unless very significant US domestic pressure is aggressively brought to bear on the White House. The question you have to ask yourself is what side you are on. Do you plan to assist in the effort to bring about a peaceful resolution of quarter-century US conflict with Iran, or do you plan to continue to be an enabler of a White House policy that is designed to lead to war and death?

What are your views on the opinions expressed two days ago in the LA Times by the Iranian ambassador to the UN?

[Jordan Tama]

kb, You're correct that Iran is allowed to develop peaceful nuclear technology under the NPT, but Iran repeatedly violated its obligations under the NPT to report its nuclear activities to the IAEA. Over the past several years, the IAEA has found nuclear materials and documents suggestive of a program aimed at developing nuclear weapons, which Iran never reported and has struggled to explain. None of this constitutes hard evidence of an effort to develop nuclear bombs, but it naturally raises suspicions. Moreover, Iran is now obligated under international law to suspend its uranium enrichment program because the Security Council has called on it to do so.

Dan, You raise a number of important and legitimate concerns about the Concert of Democracies proposal. I recognize some of the risks you describe, but I don't think the Concert will harm international cooperation in the ways you suggest. China and Russia will still have more to gain from cooperation with democracies, which constitute the vast majority of global power and GDP, than from forming a countervailing bloc.

The Concert would not be based on ideology. Membership would only be based on the practice of democracy. So long as a country has a freely elected government, it could be a member of the Concert regardless of that government's political ideology.

You're wrong to argue that the advocates of creating the Concert seek to undermine the UN. In fact, its chief advocates are liberal internationalists who strongly support the UN, but recognize the UN's shortcomings and want to establish other institutions that can tackle security issues effectively in cases where the UN can't. I share that view.

Lastly, you're right that it's highly unlikely that the Bush administration will pursue the grand bargains that I describe. I said as much in my original post.

[Dan Kervick]

The Concert would not be based on ideology. Membership would only be based on the practice of democracy. So long as a country has a freely elected government, it could be a member of the Concert regardless of that government's political ideology.

Isn't commitment to a democratic form of government an ideology, Jordan? Perhaps I'm confused, but I would think that differentiating countries according to their form of government is to differentiate them ideologically.

By the way, how much of the government has to be freely elected to count as a democratic government? Would you regard Russia's current government as freely elected? How about Venezuela's?

You're wrong to argue that the advocates of creating the Concert seek to undermine the UN. In fact, its chief advocates are liberal internationalists who strongly support the UN, but recognize the UN's shortcomings and want to establish other institutions that can tackle security issues effectively in cases where the UN can't. I share that view.

I agree that its supporters are liberal internationalists. But I disagree that they are strong supporters of the UN. I think they represent a movement of deeply disenchanted liberal internationalists who have soured on the UN profoundly, and are now looking for a new structure to replace it.

As you say, the world's democracies represent most of the world's power and GDP. There is simply no way the UN Security Council can survive as an effective policy-making body if it must compete with an alternative structure in which most of the real power is vested. So, as far as I can tell, there will be only two kinds of international actions in the Concert-world: those taken by the Concert unilaterally, and those taken by the Concert which also receive an additional rubber stamp from the UNSC. It should be clear who really wears the pants under such a setup.

To me it just sounds like a kinder, gentler Boltonism - a UN-undermining Trojan horse with a friendly face.

China and Russia will still have more to gain from cooperation with democracies, which constitute the vast majority of global power and GDP, than from forming a countervailing bloc.

Maybe some of the time. But since China and other countries would be excluded from the concert anyway, they have little to lose and much to gain by pooling what power they do have, rather than remaining isolated, and then working as a bloc to decide when to cooperate with the Concert of Democracies, and when to work against it. Even a minority can exert significant power if it works as a team - more power than they would by working alone anyway. What is China supposed to do, sit by itself in a corner and watch the US, India and Japan run circles around its interests?

I imagine China would reach out to energy-producing states in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa, almost all of whom will have been excluded from the concert. Those states will also have a new interest in pooling their power to protect themselves against a concerted new alliance of energy-hungry democracies.

The most important thing is that the creation of the concert is bound to set up a new dynamic of conflict and intitutionalized strategic rivalry at a most unwelcome time.

[Dan Kervick]

Jordan, if you really do agree that the Bush administration is not serious about a grand bargain with Iran, then I don't think you should continue to support the sort of diplomatic path the administration has set out, since that path is diversionary, and designed only to create unproductive noise in the diplomatic channels as the administration pursues its real priorities along the non-diplomatic path.

More specifically, I believe these two recommendations you make are at odds in practical terms:

If Iran continues to enrich uranium and North Korea takes another provocative nuclear step, we should seek more stringent UN sanctions on them.

and

In 2007, we should offer Iran and North Korea major incentives and open serious negotiations with them. If they reject our offers, the world will see that they're to blame and we'll have more leverage to seek tougher multilateral sanctions against them.

So do we offer the incentives and open a negotiating track only if Iran stops enriching uranium first? Given the tendencies of the current US administration, this is unlikely. Enriching uranium is the only thing Iran has right now to push the US toward any kind of bargain with Iran. Whether Iran seeks a nuclear weapon or not, the suspicion that it might do so is the key to the small amount of leverage it holds. If Iran ceases to enrich uranium, then the US no longer has any reason to make concessions or deals of any kind, and will continue along its more aggressive path aimed at regime change. Or at least Iran might with very good reason draw that conclusion.

We really have to choose here. Are we simply going to propose an opening and deal with Tehran, or are we going to take the Bush/Rice line that such negotiations will only follow the satisfaction of preconditions?

I say you're right in the second recommendation. Suppose we make a very public offer to re-establish trade and diplomatic relations with Iran, unfreeze their assets, provide non-aggression guarantees, and explicitly disavow a regime change policy. Suppose in return Iran is asked to submit their domestic nuclear power program to rigorous and round-the clock international oversight, to commit itself publicly to a two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in accordance with UN 242, to work with the US on cooperative strategies for regional stability and security, including in Lebanon, and to declare its acceptance of the right of Israel to exist.

Rather than adhering to pre-conditions for talks, let's simply take the initiative and make a bold offer. As you say, the response will have a very significant impact on the world's perception of how threatening Iran actually is. A negative response would convince many that Iran has implacably hostile intentions and help push a unified response. And a positive response would be a great and hopeful leap forward for all of us.

[Jeffrey Laurenti]

Jordan Tama is right to call attention to the two sanctions regimes adopted by the U.N. Security Council in 2006 against known or suspected nuclear proliferators, but fails to note that this is a HISTORIC, UNPRECEDENTED development. This is the first time in the U.N.'s history that the Security Council has imposed mandatory sanctions on any country because of its nuclear weapons program. (Iraq only found itself in the sanctions noose because it had invaded Kuwait; the sanctions conditionality on WMD was tacked on after the '91 war.)

As the sanctions against Libya demonstrate, even narrowly targeted sanctions (fashioned in that case in response to terrorist bombings of aircraft) over time can force a change in the target's policy, so long as the target government's mere existence is not the goal.

Dan Kervick's observations about the "Concert of Democracies" phantasm are all well taken, and I'd add one more: The intended invitees to such a concert aren't interested -- not the Europeans, not the Latin Americans, not the big Asian democracies. They all see it as a device to give Washington another multilateral fig-leaf for its policy.

If the point is to "pursue new multilateral sanctions outside the UN," those can be cobbled together outside the U.N. right now anyway. We don't need a formal, dues-eating organization to do that.

[kamil]

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