The Bush Doctrine: A Five Year Retrospective Posted by Suzanne Nossel

The Bush Doctrine, advanced after 9/11, comes down to the idea that American and global security is best advanced by toppling repressive and hostile regimes through any means possible, including principally force. 

The appeal of the doctrine has always been more emotional than intellectual:  it provided a needed outlet for swelling feelings of anger, pride, and patriotism after 9/11, allowing Americans to feel powerful again after the unprecedented blow of watching the twin towers - America's two front teeth - knocked out by an enemy we barely knew we had.

Intellectually, the doctrine was never as satisfying.  Its principle flaw was taking for granted a host of things that were expected to flow from the toppling of these hostile regimes that, in practice, have proven elusive.  While Bush claimed that his mantra was the extension of liberty, this outcome was presumed rather than effected through deliberate policies.  It was assumed that broad international support, the embrace of formerly repressed peoples and the flowering of stable democracy not only in the affected territory but in surrounding states as well would all naturally emerge from these US-led ousters. 

Had these consequences resulted, Bush might have been right that the initial trigger - the overthrows of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein - started of a chain of events that measurably enhanced US security.  Since the ensuring consequences were anything but what Bush predicted, the toppling of the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq has had the opposite effect. 

The blindness in the Bush Doctrine was failing to recognize that the key to American security lay not with the removal of hostile regimes, but with their successful replacement with stable and broadly supported alternatives.  Going a step further, Bush failed to foresee that without the latter piece, the initial topplings could create a level of anarchy and regional instability, more dangerous for both the affected regions and the US, than before. 

Worse still, even as it became apparent that dissolution and chaos threatened to undo any positive results of the removal of Saddam Hussein, Bush denied the problem.  He failed to enlist international help years ago when that was still possible, and has since then tersely insisted that he is providing his Generals with whatever they ask for, ignoring the unmistakable evidence that what they've asked for, and what they're doing, won't reap anything close to the gains promised.

Elsewhere, elections have brought radicals to power in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.  Sarah Chayes, in her new book, The Punishment of Virtue, talks about resurgent Afghan support for the Taliban:  they miss the stability and cannot stand the corruption and disruptions of life under Hamid Karzai's tremulous government.  The Bush Doctrine ignores this implacable contradiction as well.  His amounts to a trickle-down theory of democracy - that the empowerment of radicals and fundamentalists, because it is through democratic means, will somehow, in time, redound to the benefit of the moderates we ultimately hope to strengthen.

Its not as simple as amending the Bush Doctrine to put more emphasis on what happens after the fall.  While we have the capability to eject hostile regimes, the last five years have demonstrated that our capacity to facilitate stable and friendly alternatives in their wake is dubious at best.   Both Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate that the latter is much harder than the former.  This forces back open the question of whether, given the inability to guarantee better alternatives, ouster is the right first step.

Full recognition of the challenges of rebuilding at the very least counsels a set of criteria for evaluating when uprooting unfriendly regimes is wise, and how to go about it:  the availability of international support and aid; the spoiler potential of regional neighbors; the political, social and military infrastructure in the targeted country; and the depth of anti-American and anti-Western attitudes among the population all need to be considered. 

Does anything of the Bush Doctrine deserve to survive five years on?  A few kernels:  owning up to the limitations of a policy predicated on supporting dictators who proved reliable as allies, regardless of how they are perceived in their own countries; a broad bias in favor of democracy even under conditions that make it tough to establish or to sustain.  But with the very concept of democracy now discredited in regions that should crave it most, and with approaches that deserve to be cast out now looking better and better in comparison to the more misguided policies that replaced them, these valid elements don't come close to redeeming the doctrine.

Tomorrow, President Bush will wrap himself in the mantle of 9/11, trying to once again awaken the elemental, emotional appeal that fueled his doctrine in the first place.  Let us not be fooled.

Comments

[Dan Kervick]

The blindness in the Bush Doctrine was failing to recognize that the key to American security lay not with the removal of hostile regimes, but with their successful replacement with stable and broadly supported alternatives. Going a step further, Bush failed to foresee that without the latter piece, the initial topplings could create a level of anarchy and regional instability, more dangerous for both the affected regions and the US, than before.

I would like to explore further the question of the extent to which the removal of hostile regimes is a key to US security at all, whether or not the removal is accompanied by a well-executed post conflct stabilization. Of course, if the hostility of the regime extends to actual and credible direct threats to US security, that is one thing. But I take it that the Bush Doctrine goes beyond that, and seems these regimes as the "swamps" in which terrorists "breed", whether or not the regime itself poses a direct threat; and the doctrine endorses removing these regimes for that reason.

Considering, then, the specific problem of terrorism, I think it is important to emphasize how deficient was the Bush adminstration understanding of the problem in 2001 and 2002. Back then, there was a belief that the key issue was the state sponsorship of terrorism. Only those organizations that enjoyed significant state sponsorship, it was held, enjoyed the financial, tactical and logistical support needed to give them global reach.

In the weeks and months following 9/11, it was not uncommon to hear government, academic and media experts assure us that no organization could possibly have conducted a 9/11 scale attack, with the organization and disciplined long-term planning it apparently involved, without substantial state backing and material support.

From the very beginning the theory seems to have taken hold in administration circles that some powerful "terror masters" in Baghdad or Damascus or Tehran must have been behind the attack. Reports indicated that many in the White House and political level of the Pentagon were enamored of Laurie Mylroie-style theories about deep and nefarious Baghdad connections to both World Trade Center attacks, and others. If I had to wager, I would bet that Dick Cheney still believes some version of the theory to this very day - although he's one of the last true believers.

Hence arose the Bush doctrine in its earliest form, which was just the "with us or against us" theory. There were the good states that were on our side, and the evil states on the terrorist side; and since the power of the terrorists derived from the evil states that supported them, we could solve our terrorism problem by "ending" the states that sponsored terrorism. Recall Paul Wolfowitz's comments on September 13, 2001:

"I think one has to say it's not just simply a matter of capturing people and holding them accountable, but removing the sanctuaries, removing the support systems, ending states who sponsor terrorism. And that's why it has to be a broad and sustained campaign."

Now there was truth in this idea, at least in the "sanctuary" component. Certainly the ability of an al Qaeda to train and plan unmolested in Afghanistan was an important component of their success, and chasing them out of Afghanistan and putting them on the run has probably contributed to weakening them, and capturing or killing many of them. However, Afghanistan was a very poor state, and I don't think Taliban moral support and sanctuary for al Qaeda was that important a factor. Even if the Taliban had been somewhat hostile to al Qaeda, they probably coudn't have done much about the al Qaeda presence in the mountains of their country. It was more the weakness and lawlessness of Afghanistan, rather than substantial support from its government, which was at issue.

Subsequently, we have all come to see the "support systems" for al Qaeda and its spinoffs fellow travelers as a much more distributed and decentralized thing, and as not particularly tied to states at all. Al Qaeda is a stateless and radical revolutionary organization that seeks to do a lot of "ending states" of its own. And it turns out that much more important than attacking supposed states of terrorism was a broader approach to attacking the distributed systems for communication, coordination, training, financing and recruiting that al Qaeda enjoyed. Al Qaeda possessed global reach by virtue of this sophisticated network, independently of any state support which it might have received.

But I think many have already forgotten how important the state sponsorship theory (as well as the alleged WMD threat) was to the decision to invade Iraq, both in motivating members of the government, and in garnering popular support. And although I believe the Bush administration willfully lied about intelligence to produce public rationales for the invasion, I also believe that they sincerely believed in the strong connections between Saddam's regime and international terrorism, including al Qaeda, despite skepticism from even our own intelligence services. They lied in the way police often lie to convict criminals they are certain are guilty.

It wasn't until after it became increasingly clear following the invasion that the imagined terrorist connections weren't there, and that neither were the WMDs, that the regional transformation doctrine, previously just one component of the set of motivators, assumed center stage as the main rationale for the invasion.

Shadi Hamid has argued in favor of that doctrine several times here. He does offer evidence that there is a high correlation between terrorist incidents, and lack of political and civil freedoms in the home countries of the terrorists. This he uses to support the hypothesis that the root cause of terrorism is the absence of more constructive liberal and democratic outlets for political activity, or simply the psychologically searing indignity of living under authoritarian regimes. However, a problem is that many of those less free counties in the region are also countries that have been subject to high degrees of US or Western intervention over the years, and in some cases remain clients of the US. So it is difficult to identify the most important causal factor at work. The terrorists say that their aim in attacking the US and the West is to remove Western political and economic domination, and cultural influence, from their region - to liberate Muslim territories in other words. They also claim that they intend to establish governments that are nothing like the sort of liberal democratic governments Shadi thinks are essential to their dignity. I tend to take them at their word, and assume they understand their own motivations fairly well. Accepting Shadi's theory seems to require believing that the terrorists do not really understand the underlying source of their own dissatisfaction. Certainly possible; but not as prima facie plausible as the hypothesis that they are after precisely what they say they are after.

In addition, there have been several other studies of terrorism, both in its contemporary and historical forms, that identify more conventional considerations of political power, and the struggle between outside control vs. local resistance, as the common thread in the use of terrorism. Terrorism is a weapon of war; and it is a weapon of choice among weaker groups that have fewer conventional weapons at their disposal. Robert Pape's work, I believe, falls into this category. A 1997 study by Volgy, Imwalle and Corntassel found that hegemonic control was a predictor of terrorism, and a 1990 study by Martha Crenshaw identified unipolarity and imperial power as factors. Terrorism is often a tactical choice that occurs on the periphery of the sphere of control of an imperial power, especially when that power is viewed as overextended. Rather than seeing terrorism as some sort of syndrome or disorder that expresses itself in the targeting of inappropriate substitutes for the real causes and agents of the terrorists' dissatisfaction, this other interpretation of terrorism sees terrorists as people who know what they are attacking and why, and use political violence for pretty much the same reasons people generally resort to political violence - to achieve victory in some political struggle against other people.

So, I am inclined to the view that unless the proposed Middle East regional transformation is accompanied by a decrease in US intervention in the region, and a diminishment of its attempts to exert economic, political and cultural influence over the peoples of that region, I see little reason for confidence that the transformation will result in an end of terrorism. On the other hand, it may make available to the terrorists more of the tools of conventional warfare.

Now perhaps there are other good reasons to support regional transformation. Indeed, I suspect most of the people who are in favor of an aggressive program of regional transformation in the Middle East are predominantly motivated by some other interest: ideological and moral commitments to univeral political ideals; defending Israel against regional enemies; financial interests in the region's oil wealth, etc. But I think the view that such a regional transformation is a key to US security is a weakly justified hypothesis.

[Bill Barnes]

The Unrealism of the Bush Doctrine

True realism means recognizing that we live in a world of increasing inequality not only of material resources and standards of living, but increasing inequality of existential security and dignity, of opportunity and capacity for learning, aspiration, and agency. More and more people face a lifetime on the defensive, from childhood on. Realism means recognizing that globalization, whatever its merits, increases uncertainty, precariousness, the experience of powerlessness, throughout the majority of the world’s disadvantaged populations. Realism means acknowledging that we now face a coming half-century of increasingly catastrophic environmental and public health disasters, increasing criminal, predatory, and socially destructive behavior, amidst unrelenting poverty in much of the world, which, unless dramatic steps are taken, will likely result in the deaths of hundreds of millions of people. These realities accentuate the need for moral and political authorities, educational institutions and public spheres, social capital and modes of its politicization, that can help people make sense of what is happening to them and arrive at coping mechanisms and survival strategies that are not anti-social or self-stultifying (or proto-fascist) but linked to larger projects and meanings in line with the higher ideals of humanitarian, democratic Liberalism. Weak states, failing states, predatory states neither provide nor nurture nor protect such resources, authorities, projects, or political cultures. If the rich societies and their powerful, quasi-democratic states do not devote themselves to heading off the approaching catastrophes, they will find themselves surrounded by radical populisms and “fascisms” and subjected to unrelenting terrorism — and perhaps succumbing to “fascism” themselves. The immediate problem is that, by these standards, the recent policies of the richest and strongest of these states have been, on balance, highly dysfunctional. [**Note]

The current degree of Bush administration, Neocon, and Liberal Hawk focus on and absorption in the “long war” against “Islamic fascism,” entails criminally negligent inattention to the foregoing problems, and thus huge opportunity costs. Of course, these opportunity costs are of ultimate concern only if you are serious about actually realizing the goal of universalizing liberal democratic capitalism, and if being serious means paying attention to reality on the ground, beyond Potemkin formalities. If a lack of such seriousness, a disinclination to pay attention to the “gap problem” (the gap between norms/ideals and practice) is constitutive of your political identity, then all of this matters much less. Thus the actual achievability of the goal that you say justifies your means is much more important for Liberal Hawks than for people like Dick Chaney and Don Rumsfeld.

Sociologist Michael Schwartz writes:

"Media coverage of the Iraq War has generally portrayed the current quagmire as the result of an American failure to achieve a set of otherwise admirable goals: ... U.S. failure, then, resides in its inability to halt and reverse the destructive forces within Iraqi society [that U.S. forces recklessly let loose, and that make positive achievements much more difficult].

"This rather comfortable portrait of the U.S. as a bumbling, even thoroughly incompetent giant overwhelmed by unexpected forces tearing Iraqi society apart is strikingly inaccurate: Most of the death, destruction, and disorganization in the country has, at least in its origins, been a direct consequence of U.S. efforts to forcibly institute an economic and social revolution, while using overwhelming force to suppress resistance to this project. Certainly, the insurgency, the ethno-religious jihadists, and the criminal gangs have all contributed to the descent of Iraqi cities and towns into chaos, but their roles have been secondary and in many cases reactive. The engine of destruction was–and remains–the U.S-led occupation."

“How the Bush Administration Deconstructed Iraq,” tomdispatch.com, May 18, 2006. Schwartz then goes on to emphasize that U.S. policy was informed by a

"larger American project of economic reform that involved demobilizing Iraqi state enterprises...and so bringing the Iraqi economy into the global system on its knees. Modern equipment and infrastructure, introduced everywhere by largely American-owned multinational corporations, would then have to be maintained by those same corporations."

In the absence of any effective oversight or regulation, favored U.S. corporations proceeded to steal the country blind, never completing most of the infrastructure and reconstruction projects for which they had been paid on no-bid contracts.

It seems to me that Schwartz goes too far in effectively discounting the idea that many U.S. policy-makers really believed that the Iraqi exiles working with the Bush administration were the leaders of an Iraqi modern middle class which, once the Baath regime was out of the way, would rally to, and partner with, American and British actors in this larger project of political and economic reform, bringing much of the Iraqi population with them. In other words, whatever else they were, such U.S. policy makers were also vulgar modernization theorists who believed in the chimera of a neo-liberal “big push” toward capitalist economic reconstruction and development, in which foreign actors would substitute for a non-existent national bourgeoisie, in the process coalescing a wider modern middle class, and stimulating American-style petty bourgeois individualism throughout the Iraqi population. And they thought (in so far as they thought at all) that U.S. and British enterprises could be trusted to play this role in good faith without any strict oversight or regulation by a national state, and that from their example, Iraqis would learn modern economics under the rule of law. They really believe in the New Right’s mythological history of the development of Anglo-American capitalism and its universal applicability. The corollary theory of democracy promotion is that all historical and material preconditions and requisites of democratization can be substituted for by the combination of (1) the Cold War victory of the New Right and the consequent universalization of abstract attraction to and approval of “democracy” American-style (as shown by survey research), and (2) the injection of democracy-bearing human and social capital in the form of the U.S. democracy industry, and the subsequent well-fertilized, greenhouse-growth of its in-country proteges. No progressive national bourgeoisie? No broadly-based, democratically-minded political parties or well-rooted progressive popular movements? No professionalized, nom-sectarian governmental institutions effective over at least most of the national territory? No Problem! Once the bad guys and the utopian fools are out of the way, capitalist democracy can be jump-started anywhere, because all rational human beings are, potentially, petty bourgeois individualists, leaning, if given half a chance and a dose of demonstration effect, into something like the American way of life (see Louis Hartz). This is the unrealism of the Right – including gross failure to “know thyself.”

What invalidates Francis Fukuyama’s Liberal triumphalist vision of world-historical evolution (with its particular melding of idealism and realism) is not just that Liberalism contains greater internal contradictions and essential contests than he allows for, and not just that we cannot say anything definitive about the universal or lasting viability of any particular ensemble of institutional incarnations of Liberalism (particularly given the likely need to confront a long epoch of increasing natural and man-made disasters). More fundamentally, the essential reality is that separate-but-equal national liberal-democratic capitalisms (in anything like the form we know them) can never be achieved in much of the world – at least there will never come a point where such can co-exist everywhere all at the same time – and there is no sign that those now occupying sofas will ever be willing to play musical chairs with those who have yet to achieve more than precarious perches on three-legged stools. The sofas will have to be down-sized if there is ever to be decent seating for everybody. That some of the ideals and insights of democratic liberalism may be in some sense universal and permanently true says nothing about their universal realizabilty in practice in any of the real worlds that may ever actually be available. In other words, while things might be different had the world taken a different course beginning 100 or 200 or 300 years ago, given the world that has been made by the history that actually happened, with its profound inequalities, traumas (and consequent mounting epidemics of post traumatic stress disorder and clinical depression), resource depletions and accumulated environmental insults (and consequent mounting health hazards and natural disasters), you just can’t get to Fukuyama’s end of history from here (not to mention to Marx’s), or from any future world that is within the horizon of realistic imagination. There is simply no reason to believe this will ever change.

Even if Liberalism were universal and true, even if the polling data that shows “democracy” to be preferred and supported by majorities almost everywhere were reliable and meaningful, even if the right ideas and leadership – strength and perseverance of will -- can make it possible for liberal democracy to grow, mature, and consolidate in virtually any soil, even without anything close to what used to be thought of as the material preconditions – even if all that is true, it says nothing about the feasibility of ever realizing democratic capitalism all over the world at the same time. Even if the political conflicts and problems could be resolved, the resource endowments and environmental elbow-room for such universal “coexistence” simply do not exist.

The more the large population segments of our world that are left endlessly disadvantaged and treading water, and ever vulnerable to catastrophe, recognize their fate under the existing dispensation and its future trajectory, the more they will insist on a different world. Unless “Liberals” world-wide, of all different kinds (left and conservative, but sharing approximately the right mode of blending realism and idealism), can learn and work together to make radical redistributive, public-regarding, Green reforms politically viable, so as to head off the disadvantaged world’s descent into disaster, many in that world (generally from its better off, not its destitute) will be driven to frenzy and some to revengefull martyrdom, whether as part of messianic religious movements or fascistic movements or otherwise. It is the refusal to look this reality in the face, blind hubris and blithe utopianism in the face of mounting mass insecurity, resentment, and defensiveness-gone-wrong, and the tendency to scapegoat the bearer of bad news, that are most politically debilitating. This is exemplified by the Bush administration’s combination of blindly crusading foreign policy, domestic war against environmental science, and corruption of the public sphere and electoral politics by the mobilization of anti-intellectual religious fundamentalism and the promotion of the likes of Fox News and Rush Limbaugh.

____________________________________________

** I am not advocating that the rich societies and strong states engage, wholesale, in forceful humanitarian intervention or democracy promotion (though limited forms of such might be included in some circumstances). I would emphasize rather programs along the following lines: (1) the power of example of domestic budgeting, tax, and regulatory reforms and R&D initiatives prioritizing public health, public education, environmental protection and reclamation, sustainable development; (2) support for international programs and NGOs in public health, nutrition, environmental reclamation and protection, disaster preparedness-warning-relief-reconstruction, universal primary and secondary education; (3) funding and advocating reorientation of higher education everywhere in the world toward encouraging and preparing young people for careers in, and/or solidarity with, the foregoing kinds of efforts; (4) professional and scientific societies and associations all over the world advocating the foregoing and delegitimizing work on behalf of any entity, including one’s own nation-state, involving WMD, torture, terrorism, war crimes, recklessness toward the environment; (5) commitment to deliberation within an open, reality-facing transnational public sphere.

[Bill Barnes]

My email is wrong on the post - it should be @aol.com.

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