Accord on Iran, At Least for Now Posted by Suzanne Nossel

A few quick observations on the agreement reached today among the permanent 5 UN Security Council members plus Germany on Iraq:

First of all, its good news that we're able to announce any common ground at all with the Russians and Chinese over Iran.  Many thought that impossible. 

From what I can glean, there was an at least implicit quid pro quo whereby the Administration agreed to drop its unconditional refusal to talk directly to the Iranians in return for an announcement that the P5 were all on the same page.  Of course, Washington's expression of willingness to deal face-to-face with Tehran was subject to the major caveat that Ahmadinejad would need to renounce his nuclear program first, a demand that was promptly refused. 

While I am frankly skeptical that any good could come from negotiations with Ahmadinejad, if the price of the cessation of Iranian enrichment was as cheap as a sit-down session, it would have been well worth it.  In the event, our "concession" cost precisely nothing.

More importantly, the Administration's decision to play ball with its Security Council partners and make what everyone knew would be a symbolic overture was a wise one.  This is the nature of the diplomatic dance the US must do at the UN:  others often tell us precisely what it would take to get what we want.  Too often, we snub their requests and demand our druthers any way, only to be chagrined when we don't get it.

No one should be surprised that today's agreement included no mention of sanctions.  The Security Council is just beginning what's likely to be a long and excruciating give and take with Tehran.  That process will play out slowly, and the key for the US is to put the maintenance of unity ahead of the desire to hasten things to a conclusion that we are at best ill-prepared for. 

Iran is a decade away from having operational nukes.  Short of a halt to their activities, our best bet is to constrain their room to maneuver and delay them through inspections, reports, negotiations, evidence-gathering, etc. in the hope that internal political developments will eventually offer up a more credible negotiating partner.  If it extends the period during which Iran's nuclear activities are at least partially stymied, a slow pace at the UN may thus not be a bad thing.

In the meantime, the other UNSC members will not agree to prejudge subsequent phases of the process, for example by specifying sanctions for non-compliance with a resolution that has yet to be passed.  This is the very same debate that arose in the context of the famous, vanishing "second resolution" on Iraq.  The US maintained that the first resolution provided all the authority it needed to wage war.  The majority of UNSC members who differed with us are not now going to hand us the ability to make the same argument that the use of force is somehow pre-approved for Iran.  Getting agreement on sanctions for Iran will never be easy, but it will get easier if Tehran flouts successive rounds of UN resolutions.

Comments

[Lane Brody]

The only real issue here is whether it is actually true that Iran is a "decade" from a nuke. Given the many recent intell failures, including not only Iraq but Libya where we were wrong the other way, it's extremely problematic to make these kinds of statements. How many secret sites does Iran have and what is in them?

In the final analysis it's debateable that the UN would ever authorize military action against Iran. If this is indeed the case then waiting 2 years for this to become clear could be extremely dangerous if the intell assumptions vis a vis Iran turn out to be wrong.

Lane Brody

[Robert M]

why is it that nobody believes Iran doesn't have nuclear weapons? Is it the believe that they aren't the quality of ours?

[section9]

One of the things that amuses me about foreign policy analysts from the Democratic Party is how quick they are to trust timeline projections from the gang that couldn't shoot straight over at the CIA. Those gits haven't gotten a thing right since the Bay of Pigs, but now you trust them since they don't like Chimpy? Come on.

All the Iranians really have to do is enrich enough uranium to make a Little Boy-type rifle slug device. The rest is just ballistics. We're talking 60 year old technology, here. These people aren't engaged in slash and burn agriculture, you know. And when they get enough plutonium by-product, they can really go to town.

But first, baby steps.

[hass]

Iran has a legitimate economic case for nuclear power - which is why the US encouraged and supported Irans' nuclear program. A few articles on US/European participation in Iran's nuclear program are found at "Blast From the Past" entry at IranAffairs.com -- see http://iranaffairs.typepad.com

[David Billington]

When the Iranians get a nuclear weapon really isn't important to the United States if we have decided not to use force to prevent it. If force is a U.S. option, then we need to debate the consequences of using it.

I don't think the current diplomacy is an effort to go through the motions of negotiation until a nuclear Iran is a fait accompli. But it looks like U.S. leaders do not see any options besides (1) diplomacy to persuade Iran to stand down, (2) economic sanctions by those willing to apply them, (3) acquiescence, and (4) war. If the first two fail and the last is unacceptable, then acquiescence will be the outcome.

Instead of focusing narrowly on Iran as an ad hoc problem, we should be debating a new and stronger framework of global security for the long-term. In a few decades, the world will be a more multipolar and more dangerous place. Although we may have another decade or two before we really feel the consequences, we don't have the luxury of continuing to treat foreign policy and defense as matters in which events can be managed as they arise.