Iraq v. Vietnam: It's the People, Stupid Posted by Michael Signer

As all of us who want to make things better in Iraq fumble for a better paradigm (much less a strategy) for how to resolve the potential civil war, there's a tough-minded and interesting article about Iraq in the new Foreign Affairs by Stephen Biddle, a Senior Fellow at CFR. 

Biddle argues that our policy approach in Iraq contains a fundamental mistake:  mired in a Vietnam-based mindset, we have viewed Iraq as something like a Maoist "people's revolution," rather than what it actually is:  a "communal civil war." 

What's the difference? 

A people's revolution functions unilaterally.  It's not a hydra, but a serpent -- and so its head can be cut off.  A communal civil war, on the other hand, derives its energy from internal tension.  It's an introvert rather than an extrovert. Biddle explains the difference:

Using a mix of coercion and inducements, the insurgents and the regime compete for the allegiance of a common pool of citizens, who could, in principle, take either side. A key requirement for the insurgents' success, arguably, is an ideological program -- people's wars are wars of ideas as much as they are killing competitions -- and nationalism is often at the heart of this program. Insurgents frame their resistance as an expression of the people's sovereign will to overthrow an illegitimate regime that represents only narrow class interests or is backed by a foreign government.

Communal civil wars, in contrast, feature opposing subnational groups divided along ethnic or sectarian lines; they are not about universal class interests or nationalist passions. In such situations, even the government is typically an instrument of one communal group, and its opponents champion the rights of their subgroup over those of others. These conflicts do not revolve around ideas, because no pool of uncommitted citizens is waiting to be swayed by ideology. (Albanian Kosovars, Bosnian Muslims, and Rwandan Tutsis knew whose side they were on.) The fight is about group survival, not about the superiority of one party's ideology or one side's ability to deliver better governance.

Biddle's most powerful data are:

Whereas the Vietnam War was a Maoist people's war, Iraq is a communal civil war. This can be seen in the pattern of violence in Iraq, which is strongly correlated with communal affiliation. The four provinces that make up the country's Sunni heartland account for fully 85 percent of all insurgent attacks; Iraq's other 14 provinces, where almost 60 percent of the Iraqi population lives, account for only 15 percent of the violence.

Biddle argues that we need to focus less on democratization, which only allows the dangerous divisions in the communal war to flourish, and more on investing all parties in a process where each will table their differences in exchange for stakes in the system.   he explains, "the only way out of this problem is for Washington to postpone Iraqization and make it contingent on the parties' willingness to bargain. 

"Iraqization" is Biddle's translation of the President's oft-mentioned goal of having the Iraqis "stand up" -- which is when we'll stand down.  Biddle says this simply won't work because it aims to use internal, vertical force to resolve what is more fundamentally a horizontal problem -- groups fighting each other, not an entire society fighting an external enemy.

This is extremely smart way of re-thinking the problem we face in Iraq.  I'm not sure it gets us too far past the basic understanding that Iraq is tipping into civil war (where they're fighting each other), and if we don't resolve that problem, we won't even get to the larger problem (them fighting us).  Check -- civil wars:  bad; building institutions and rule of law:  good. 

But it's very helpful nonetheless to understand Iraq against the backdrop of our failures in Vietnam, which certainly controls the thinking of many of our policymakers (for the worse). 

Comments

[J Thomas]

How is this useful?

Of *course* most of our fighting is in sunni areas, those are the areas we're trying to subjugate. We had a deal with the kurds, and we made one with the shias after we finally figured out that efen in the best case dragging al Sadr in chains from the holiest mosque in Najaf would make us a lot of enemies who didn't even like Sadr.

There's no role for the US military in iraq except to support one faction over another. (Not counting keeping the iranian and syrian and russian and chinese armies out. Can you see them lined up waiting for us to leave so they can go in? "Ha! The americans are defeated! Now we'll attack and win where the USA lost. Our turn! Everybody, we're King of the Quagmire!")

But how would it play in the USA if we admitted it? The US claim is that we're supporting Democracy. We support the Legitimate Democratically Elected Government. Whoever opposes them are Insurgents. We will bomb the Insurgents until they give up, and then Democracy Wins.

Suppose we said, "The Sunnis are the Bad Guys. So we will bomb them until they Unconditionally Surrender to the Shias who hate them, and then The Bad Guys Lose. And once the Shias are strong enough to win easily without us, then we'll back out and let them get to it.". It doesn't have quite the same ring.

We have to say the shias are Democracy and the sunnis are anti-democracy Insurgents or we won't have the stomach to keep killing them.

[Angryman]

When are you people going to give up this insane venture? We have LOST. Tell me why a man or woman in uniform should continue to risk his or her life for this war? What's in it for them? Most of our service people have families. Most of them want to come home.

Why are you trying to stop them from coming home?

[Dan Kervick]

Well, welcome to 2006 Mr. Biddle!

I am somewhat astonished by this article. Who is its intended audience? A few slumbering Pentagon dinosaurs who have been in suspended animation since 2003?

Are there really a significant number of people in Washington who think what is happening in Iraq is a "Maoist peoples' insurgency", and just Vietnam all over again? If so, where have they been the past two years? Most of the rest of us - and that includes both supporters and critics of the war - long ago recognized that the conflict in Iraq is a multisided power struggle, and is fed by sectarian, ethnic and national rivalries, with a variety of intertwined agendas. We have been arguing for a long time about what to with that situation.

Critics of the war tend to blame the United States for unleashing these divisive forces by smashing the Iraqi state, take a dim view of the prospects for success, and often suggest the continued US presence is only making things worse. The war's supporters tend to argue that we can still succeed in forging some sort of national community in Iraq with a coherent, unified government. But both sides long ago moved beyond the simple national uprising or broad popular insurgency model of the conflict. Does Biddle think he is peddling some new insight? Of course I don't live in Washington. Maybe Biddle's impressions do accurately reflect the outlook of official Washington. That's a depressing thought.

Although Biddle in some ways recognizes the nature of the conflict, his prescriptions are unconvincing. He seems persuaded that the US can manage this conflict to a settlement in the direction of "lasting peace", by playing the different sides off against one another, by changing tactical alliances fluidly, and by applying a variety of carrots and sticks - particularly military sticks - in a subtle, shifting game of power adjustments. In the end, his plan seems to call for negotiatians that will lead to some sort of compromise settlement for the future structure of the Iraqi state. He thus seems to interpret the conflict as mainly a power struggle for control of that state, and recommends slick Machiavellian machinations aimed at balancing those powers, denying any faction a chance at outright victory, and thus rendering negotiation the only path to limited success.

What I fail to discern in Biddle's analysis is any real appreciation of the fact that there are very many powerful and influential blocs in Iraq who do not seek control of a unified Iraqi state; but seek rather a gradual dissolution of that state on terms most favorable to their own particular group. There use for constitutions, negotiations, compromises, "national unity governments", etc. is only temporary and tactical.

Ultimately, Biddle's recommendations still reek of the usual Washington fantasies about the maginificent capacity of US power to ordain the history of regions we barely understand, and whose many ongoing conflicts both preceded us and will outlast us.

[Alex UA]

I've personally think that Israel's invasion and occupation of Lebanon serves as a much better paradigm to the current Iraq Occupation than U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. I only hope that we understand the futility of our attempts to intervene in inter-clan conflict in a shorter period of time than it took Israel.

[David Billington]

Stephen Biddle's point is that the United States cannot bring peace by strengthening the Iraqi army and police if these forces are not purged of militia members. Whether it was Biddle's intention or not, he has written the epitaph to the last year or so of US strategy in Iraq, and he wrote it before the Samarra bombing vindicated his main point.

I agree with the posters above is that we cannot broker a compromise if the main parties do not want to form a common state. The only question then is whether partition can be accomplished relatively quickly. Facilitating partition might be a more realistic US goal. This article could at least stimulate debate over it.

[J Thomas]

My suggestion as of 2+ years ago, was to get local elections for local governments, and then when those are mostly functioning, have elections to ask each local population whether they'd like their local government to link up to some other local government, and if so which one? Get regional governments by acclamation, and then let each regional government accrete new areas as local areas bounding them choose to join -- or not. And then as big regions created regional governments, then let the voters of each decide whether to combine into one or more nations.

The USA wouldn't have to be involved in the decision about how or whether to keep a unified government. Each local area that achieved local stability would develop local police forces and maybe local armed forces to keep order.

But 2 years ago Bremer was shutting down local elections because religious candidates were often winning; he preferred to appoint governors, preferably iraqis from Detroit etc.

[David Billington]

JThomas, you proposed an interesting idea. Once we have gone the country may devolve along these lines.

[Ranselar VanDerpoel]

I see many similarities to Vietnam & its struggle to free itself(south) from occupiers. First the French then the U.S. ,while at the same time the North wanted the whole as one country-theirs. They conned the South until they rid the country of outsiders, then there was a very swift & brutle civil war,purging the leadership of the South, leaving the North with the whole country. In Iraq the Kurds could be playing this card, while the rest are already desiding the civil war while occupied.We certainly opened a very dangerous "pandora"s box!

[seyid]

There are certain things in life related to smoking that simply cannot :)
parça kontör
parça kontör bayiliği
parça kontör bayilik

[angels gold]

I am so happy to earn some angels gold. In fact at first sight I have fallen in love with angels online gold. So no matter how much I have spent to buy angels gold, I never regret. My life changes because of cheap angels online gold.

[cheap rf gold]

I always heard something from my neighbor that he sometimes goes to the internet bar to play the game which will use him some rf gold，

[cheap mabinogi]

I hope i can get mabinogi online gold in low price.
i buy mabinogi gold for you.

[Runes of Magic Gold]

Once I played Rom Gold, I did not know how to get strong, someone told me that you must have Rom Gold. He gave me some Runes of Magic Gold.

[Sho Mun]

You can buy the cheap Sho Online Mun, in here,you can Sho Mun.

[requiem lant]

Do you like playing the game where you need to use requiem gold, when you do not have requiem lant,

[injection molding]

Booklets printed by China printing is very good quality and good prices.
Quality China rubber molding parts at low price.
Shoring scaffolding for construction is a very useful tool.

[movado watch]

Thanks for your sharing,and you will enjoy the sunshine service. Let's abandon all the worry, omega watch and enjoy the happy shopping travel.All the are most in fashion boutique this year. show your chaming temperament. In addtin, the and the other make you mold your unique glamour this winter. The swiss have the high quality but low price. nd have all the style and cheapest price Chanel Watch Enjoying the fun of net purchase! We will supply you the perfect service and after sale support system. Our honest will bring you absolute satisfaction. Aslo and are so good for you.

[Network]

thanks for sharing Sohbet many people are pay more attention to one's swearing than before, especially a watch.Chat.
Perhaps when you went to some place far away Sohbet you must borrow it from friends you can get everything you want in this game Chat money to invest in other industry which will return you good profit. Sohbet when you look at Chat
the surface of the watches viaload great any cool Exsohbet from the city you live in and thought you knew nobody there Egitim Fourth, there were various signs of political conflict among shia. If they split 3 ways or 4 ways, the sunnis and the kurds could often be the Sohbet swing votes in the politics. If they felt they had political clout out of proportion to their numbers, they could settle in Sohbet and do politics and not feel oppressed.

[Chat Sohbet]

neden olmuyo acaba arada ya

[accurate jewelry appraisals]

Biddle's recommendations still reek of the usual Washington fantasies about the maginificent capacity of US power to ordain the history of regions we barely understand, and whose many ongoing conflicts both preceded us and will outlast us.