Misunderstanding Iraq/Recommendations for U.S. Policy Posted by Morton H. Halperin

Yahia Said is Director of the Open Society Institute's Iraq Revenue Watch and a Research Fellow at the London School of Economics' Centre for the Study of Global Governance.  The son of an Iraqi journalist and leading Iraqi feminist - who was imprisoned by Saddam Hussein - Said left Iraq in 1979.  He specializes on issues of post-totalitarian and post-conflict transition, and is starting a research project at LSE analyzing the post-Saddam transition in Iraq.  He travels to Iraq regularly to meet activists, intellectuals, political and spiritual leaders and ordinary citizens.  He has written an interesting analysis of the situation in Iraq that puts forth concrete recommendations for U.S. policy. I have posted the piece below:

Summary:  Many of the seemingly intractable problems the United States faces in Iraq stem from a series of fundamental misunderstandings about the situation and the views of Iraqis. Following is an attempt at a more accurate assessment of what is happening and policy suggestions which could improve the situation and, most importantly, lay the groundwork for a US withdrawal.

The United States faces a series of related problems in Iraq.  They are:

• A majority of Iraqis perceive US troops as a threat, particularly in Sunni Arab areas where counterinsurgency efforts are becoming part of a sectarian conflict.

• Unreserved US endorsement of the actions of the Iraqi government, its security structures and militias implicates the US in the government's failings, corruption and its emerging authoritarian tendencies

• The US approach to Iraqi politics is seen as contributing to the emergence and entrenchment of sectarianism.

• Open-ended presence of US troops prevents many Iraqis from joining the fight against terror.

Recommendations for US Policy

To address these challenges, the United States should:

• Acknowledge the ineffectiveness of large scale counterinsurgency operations and refrain from using heavy weapons in residential areas.

• Openly condemn human rights violations, authoritarian tendencies, sectarianism, corruption (especially in the oil sector), and incompetence by Iraqi officials.

• Return to a robust approach to the building of Iraqi security structures in particular in relation to ethnic composition and the militias.

• Intensify efforts to bridge differences on constitutional issues and develop a charter which better represents the aspirations of all Iraqis.

• Engage with cross-ethnic, non-political initiatives aimed at addressing the constitution’s main weaknesses in regards to federalism, women’s rights and oil.

• Use every opportunity to reaffirm US commitment to Iraq’s territorial integrity.   

• Negotiate a roadmap for redeployment of US troops within a framework that reintegrates nationalist insurgents and unites Iraqis in the fight against Al-Qaeda.

Analysis

The Iraqi constitution was passed on October 15, 2005, despite overwhelming rejection by Sunni Arabs – one of Iraq’s three main constituent groups.  The December 15 parliamentary elections will be contested by candidate slates based primarily on ethnic/sectarian identity.  Al-Qaeda is deliberately fostering sectarian conflict by targeting Shias. Ethnic tensions are seeping through to the level of society.

If these trends continue Iraq may be headed towards disintegration which will bring violence to levels not seen until now, have serious regional consequences and provide a boon for Al-Qaeda terrorists seeking to turn Iraq into another base of operations. US political and military actions in Iraq have at times contributed to this state of affairs. Following is a discussion of key problems and suggested remedial actions:

1) US counterinsurgency efforts: Are they part of the problem or part of the solution?

Innocent civilians are often caught in counterinsurgency operations. In the eyes of many Iraqis, such actions turn US troop from liberators and protectors to yet another threat to life, property and dignity. Civilian victims of US counterinsurgency operations are concentrated in Sunni and mixed areas.  The heavy and intrusive troop presence in these areas, in contrast to Kurdistan and most cities in the Shia South, deepens mistrust and reinforces sectarian divisions. Where US troops operate alongside Iraqi units comprised of Shia and Kurdish militias, they can be seen as a party to emerging civil conflict.

There is a need to review the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations particularly large scale cordon and search operation and the use of heavy weapons in populated areas in the light of their effect on civilian populations and their contribution to fomenting civil strife.   

2) Is the new Iraq a model for democracy in the Middle East?

The Interim Iraqi Government is failing to provide security and services and is perceived as incompetent and corrupt. Investigations by the UN and human rights groups have implicated government forces and associated paramilitary units and militias in flagrant human rights violations including extra judicial killings, torture and unlawful detention. The blurring of the line between regular security forces and party militias presents the most serious challenge to the legitimacy and stability of the emerging Iraqi state. Moreover, human rights abuses by these militias contribute to sectarian tensions.

State institutions are routinely purged of critical civil servants in favor of less qualified members of ruling coalition parties who are often from the same sect or even clan as the respective minister. The Prime Minister’s blatant drive to control the public media has even been criticized by the President.

The US has so far refrained from condemning any of these transgressions in public. Moreover, US forces provide members of the Government with security, uninterrupted electricity and other privileges denied to ordinary people. Many Iraqis resent politicians whose hold on power and very survival depends on US presence and hold the US responsible for their actions. US silence on the Iraqi government’s emerging authoritarianism casts doubt on stated objectives of building a democratic and viable Iraq and contradicts an uncompromising US stance on such issues elsewhere, including among Iraq’s neighbors.

As the US is responsible for emerging Iraqi security and governance structures, serious efforts must be undertaken to discourage human rights violations, political cronyism and corruption, especially in the oil sector.  There is a need to reinvigorate programmes aimed at demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating militias.

3) Did US policy play a role in the emerging sectarian tensions?

The main party responsible for rising sectarian tensions in Iraq is Al-Qaeda and associated Baathists. However, the US approach to the political process in Iraq, since the days of the Interim Governing Council has tended to reinforce sectarian-based models. The early adoption of ethnic quotas and an analytical framework based on a Shia-Kurdish-Sunni mapping of Iraq created incentives for politicians to identify themselves in ethnic rather than issue defined terms. Many exile politicians were comfortable with this as they had little else in common with their fellow citizens. This dynamic manifested itself in previous elections when voters had only identity to distinguish between competing candidates. Attempts to redress imbalances created by the Sunni boycott of the last elections by matching Shia and Kurdish politicians with Sunni ones exacerbated rather than resolved the problem. Such an approach has entrenched identity as the best way to access power.

The most contentious issues in Iraqi society today are woven into the constitution, including federalism, revenue management, the role of Islam in general and women’s rights in particular. Several important initiatives are underway to propose amendments and laws to address these issues in the next parliament.  These demonstrate that sectarian Sunni politicians are not the only ones unhappy with the current document.

Twelve of Iraq’s most distinguished oil experts criticize the constitution’s formula for the management for oil – a critical plank of the federal system -- in a recent open letter addressed to the current and future Speakers of the Iraqi Parliament. The formula, they argue: fragments a sector which requires economies of scale; fosters confusion over authority and ownership; opens the way for corruption; provides disincentives for foreign investment; and, threatens the integrity of the budgetary process.  All these tendencies undermine the viability of the federal government and create widespread opportunities for abuse.

Women’s rights activists from across the political and ethnic spectrum have recently signed the ‘Iraqi Covenant’ which criticizes the constitution and calls for the revision of a number of paragraphs related to women’s rights, personal status laws and the composition of the supreme court.

Such objections to the new constitution and its almost unanimous rejection by one of Iraq’s main communities seriously impair its legitimacy. They demonstrate the shortcomings of previous efforts to engage Iraqis in the negotiation process. The relentless pursuit of a political timetable at the expense of content and the unqualified endorsement of a flawed document are perceived by many Iraqis as implicit endorsement by the US and its allies of sectarianism and a deliberate design to fragment the country.

The last minute compromise brokered with US help empowers the next parliament to amend the constitution. Efforts to bridge gaps on the most important issues including federalism, Islam and women’s rights should be resumed and intensified. Discussions on these issues will force politicians to address pressing issues rather than compete on the basis of identity.  In this context it is important that US policymakers in Iraq engage with cross sectarian, non-political initiatives aimed at amending the constitution and promoting a consensual legislative agenda for the next parliament.

4) Why is it taking so long to defeat Al-Qaeda in Iraq?

Iraqis including those in Sunni Arab areas have a common enemy in Al-Qaeda in Iraq and associated Baathist insurgents. However, many residents in areas where Al-Qaeda operates see the US military as just another threat to their basic security. This, in addition to deeply held feelings against the presence of foreign troops in their homeland, pushes many into the insurgency and prevents the population from taking a more active role in confronting Al-Qaeda terrorists.  The terrorists will never be defeated without the cooperation of the local populace. However, nationalist insurgents will not lay down their weapons let alone join the critical fight against Al-Qaeda without a clear prospect of an end to the occupation.

There is a need to break vicious circle of insurgency and counterinsurgency by enlisting nationalist insurgents into the fight against Al-Qaeda terrorists on the basis of a political compromise which involves a fair and open political process and a roadmap for the withdrawal of US troops. Such roadmap can include a combination of a timetable and conditions including: safeguards against the establishment of Al-Qaeda safe havens; good will gestures such as localized ceasefires and release of detainees; demobilization and re-integration of insurgents into the political process and state institutions including armed forces.

Comments

[Robert M]

Would someone from the Democratic party please hire this guy? He is making a case for the imcompetence of the Bush adminstration and most importantly making a case for how to turn the situation around without pulling out in a manner that is so abrupt as to guarantee anarachy.
This guy is the new winner of the Stop Making Sense award. this award is given to those whom make and argument for policy that is concise and brings clarity to intractaable situtations. Previous winners include Andrew Sullivan and Grim's Hall(issues and political views are not criteria for winning).

[Jeff younger]

These recommendations are preposterous.

1. US counterinsurgency efforts Without the withering effects of continuous counterinsurgency efforts, Iraq would be at the mercy of our enemies. Sunnis will be less tractable if the US ceases counterinsurgency operations. Morevoer, because of the tactics of the insurgents it is not clear that those killed in Sunni areas are in fact civilians. The enemy impersonates civilians as a consistent warfighting doctrine. In short, this recommendation implies the ceding of large parts if Iraq to our Islamist enemies.
2. Is the new Iraq a model for democracy in the Middle East? While rule of law is often established by war, it is a serious mistake to think that it is accomplished during war. Extreme policing measures are not unusual in a war zone, and corruption was an established feature of Iraqi culture long before the arrival of US forces.
3. Did US policy play a role in the emerging sectarian tensions? I substantially agree with the analysis but not the recommendations. Consider that the US went through a failed round of government called the Articles of Confederation. Surely, the Iraqi government will undergo substantial changes in the next decade. So what?
4. Why is it taking so long to defeat Al-Qaeda in Iraq? The US has enlisted, trained, equipped and supported “nationalist insurgents” in the past. It worked then. It would be an excellent force multiplier now. But liberals and a hostile press consistently portray US-supported “nationalists insurgents” as “death squads.” Of course, the enemy insurgents, using exactly the same methods, are portrayed as “freedom fighters.” This duplicity reaches into international diplomacy, rendering the undoubtedly effective “nationalist insurgent” option defunct. In fact, the mere fact of its recommendation by a progressive shows the deep contradictions inherent in progressive political analysis.

[Dan Kervick]

Jeff,

Whether we call the fighters "death squads", "nationalist insurgents" or "aggresive counterinsurgent forces", the fact is that we are now in the middle of a nasty civil war in Iraq, and our own objectives there seem poorly defined, irrational and even delusional.

The current "government" of Iraq will never be able to assert control of all of Iraq; nor is it even clear that asserting such control for any substantial period of time is in the long terms plans of those who make up said government. This so-called government is a coalition of Shiites and Kurds who seem determined to move toward regional autonomy, and are setting loose their thugs to even scores and exact some payback against the Sunni Arabs in the interim.

And to the extent there is a genuine effort to subdue the Sunni Arab portions of Iraq, and bring them under the heel of the government, that effort is futile. There is no way that the Sunni regions are ever going to be ruled by the current Iraqi government. The reigning idea is supposed to be that US forces are going to "clear" these areas of insurgents - impossible in itself - and then the cleared areas are going to he "held" by government troops. But these latter forces are overwhelmingly composed of Shiites and Kurds. So, in other words, we're to imagine gangs drawn from Shiite or Kurdish militais, with some fancy new "Iraqi Army" uniforms to wear, tooling around places like Fallujah and Ramadi, somehow controlling large populations of surly and indefatigable Sunni Arabs who overwhelmingly do not want them there? How long can this really last?

Since the Sunni Arab part of Iraq is destined to be ruled by Sunni Arabs, why not just get it over with and turn that part of the country over to them right now? Let's stop banging our heads against the inevitable, and stop trying to prevent people from seizing control of their own towns and cities. The Shiite and Kurdish militias seem more than capable of securing their own parts of the country, most of which are already pacified. US troops can be redeployed to shore up the defenses of those provinces, as a reserve deterrent force, while disengaging from the pointless, bloody and violence-provoking daily struggle against the Sunni resistance.

What is the point of these operations anyway? Reports from US commanders in Iraq this week indicate that are even fewer foreign fighters in Iraq than were thought previously. Those that are there have few real friends among the locals. The chances that central Iraq is going to turn into some Taliban-style Salafist state seem extremely remote. Most of the insurgents are themselves "nationalist" insurgents focussed on getting the United States and its manufactured puppet government out of their central Iraqi homeland. And most importantly, the bulk of the insurgency appears to have the overwhelming support of the local population - so we are fighting against popular will, not just militant force. What we should be doing is facilitating a transition whereby the vast majority of Sunni Arab Iraqis, who are extremely unified in wanting us gone, seize control over their own part of the country and purge the relatively small number of Salafist jihadi nutjobs.

Exactly what sort of strategic outcome are you aiming for in Iraq Jeff? Why are you so eager to see all of central and southers Iraq run by folks like SCIRI and their Badr Corps? Much of the remaining support for the current course, and the fatal attraction to the US-managed political process, seems based on little more than stubborn pride. It is as though some Americans are saying "we created this government, and by God we're going to make it stick, no matter how shitty it is!"

There is no real reason to continue to fight the insurgents in the Sunni triangle, other than a vague emotional commitment to "winning" for its own sake. The Sunnis are just fighting to control a region that is going to be theirs eventually anyway.

[J Thomas]

Dan, you say it isn't possible for the shias and kurds to control the sunni areas. But in a sense the sunnis *did* control the shia and kurdish areas. While Saddam's government was secular and not strictly sunni, there were lots of shias like Allawi helping to keep the other shias in line, still it isn't completely wrong to say it was sunnis in control. If the sunnis could do it -- needing the occasional genocidal sweep with mass graves etc -- why couldn't the shias and kurds do it in reverse?

And who's to say for sure the sunnis couldn't do it again? There's a stupid argument that says that without us it would be inevitable. The argument runs that even though the sunnis are outnumbered 4 to 1 and we've sold the IG forces billions of dollars of equipment, still the sunnis have the old Saddamite officers who know how to use tactics and strategy, and they'll win the whole country back and put Saddam back in power. While this is obviously idiotic there is enough background there to give it the appearance of sense.

That "vague emotional commitment to 'winning'" is very real to some of us. Every time we get involved in a military adventure that we pull back from without "winning", it makes us look weaker the next time we threaten somebody. If we got an unconditional surrender every single time we ever fought, then we wouldn't have to fight so much. More nations would surrender before we actually started smashing them up. How can we do total world domination when a little fraction of a third-world nation can hold out against us? And we hold back and don't use most of our weapons. We take casualties because we try to be nice to sunni civilians. We take casualties because we care about world opinion. But if we ignored world opinion, if we showed the world we're going to do whatever the hell we want no matter what they think, then you know the world would start paying a lot more attention to our opinions.

Back before the USSR first collapsed they said that we were the strongest nation in the world because we had three different legs to stand on. We had one of the strongest economies, and we had a whole lot of diplomatic respect, others would follow where we led. And we had a very strong military.

But now of those the only one that's left is the strong military. Since it's all we've got we need to make the most of it, and that means we can't afford for the rest of the world to see us getting anything but victories.

So I expect we're going to be taking the gloves off. If it takes 3 million or 4 million casualties before the sunnis surrender, then we'll deliver as many casualties as it takes. Nobody else in the world is really on our side anyway, better they fear us than they despise us. The sunnis can serve as a display of our resolve. How can we hope the world will fear us when we're too soft-hearted to kill them? Let the insurgents see that for every IED we'll kill 50 civilians, hell make it 100 civilians, and in a very few years they'll give up. Go into the nearest sunni town and kill 80 military-age men and 10 grandmothers and 10 little girls, let the insurgents see they can't protect their own people at all, and after maybe 2 years they'll surrender. Particularly since they depend on us to bring them their food. The bulk of their food comes in from the southern ports, through shia land. We don't *have* to let them deliver any of that to sunnis. We're just doing it because we're nice guys. Anyway, if it's too much trouble for us to go to the nearest sunni town and pick out who to do reprisals against, we could just drop bombs on them. It's more expensive but it's easier on our soldiers' mental health.

We've been pretending that it's a fight against a small number of insurgents that keep the other civilians (who're all armed, remember) too scared to turn them in. Once we accept that it's the whole sunni population that's against us, we can do as you suggest and treat them as a nation that's getting its independence, or we can try to truly beat them into submission.

Note Jeff's first point above. Why should we be nice to sunni civilians when they might not really be civilians at all? Why should we try to be nice to *enemy* civilians? The alternative to withdrawing and letting them do whatever the hell they want to in the places we withdrew from, is to kill as many of them as it takes until the rest truly give us an unconditional surrender.

Jeff was sort of pussy-footing around the issues. I have stated them much more baldly.

1. The sunnis are our enemies. Why should we let them win?
2. Forget about rules of war or laws or whatever. First do whatever brutality it takes to win. We can set up a legal system after we win.
3. OK, we helped get the sectarian split going. But now it's here, why *not* help the shias suppress the sunnis? The sunnis are our enemies. If a whole lot of them get killed before they give up trying to fight us, that's a *good* thing.
4. It's a goddam civil war. They use death squads to do ethnic cleansing and suppress resistance. We do the same. So what? We can ease up on that after we win. It's stupid to fight a war with one hand behind our back because we don't like that kind of war. If we're going to fight the war we need to use every weapon in the warchest. Or at least every weapon we can find targets for. The tactical nukes probably need to go to iran, there aren't any targets in iraq that they're appropriate for.

I don't exactly sympathise with this reasoning, but I can understand it. And I do get a sneaking sort of sympathy for it, the same sort I get for the nazis trying to survive with the whole world against them. It's sad Jeff has to be all mealy-mouthed and not say it like it is.

[Captain Morgan]

Yahia Said politely attributes the "suckiness" of US policy to simple "misunderstanding", when clearly there are motives less pure than kicking terrorist butt and hoisting purple thumbs of freedom.

It's sad this debate is so far removed from the reality of NewRaq. To succeed, one need not "withdraw", "cut and run", or even admit losing a battle in the GWOT. First, just simply acknowledge the separation of Iraq into three states (Kurd, Sunni, Shia) including some problematic mixed regions, including Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk. Then redeploy US troops out of conflicts' way, keep training the Iraqi army, buy Sunnis and other troublemakers off with proportional distribution of Iraq's oil wealth and international aid, reign in ethnic militias, and let the Sunnis get the jihadis.

Tom Englehardt (another "progressive") basically acknowledges this multi-state reality after a thoroughly linked and scary critique of US polcy at: http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=40663

Even without acknowledging a three state reality, one wonders why is it proving so hard for US policymakers to understand the logic of moving live US troops from Shia and Sunni Arab areas where they are not wanted and/or are not needed to maintain security? The US military can't force Shia and Sunni faithful to accept secular rule, evolution, or to reject alliance with Iran. Nor can it force Kurds to live under the rule of Baghdad. Nor can it promote democracy or human rights. By redeploying away troops and reducing, instead of increasing, heavy weapons use in civilian areas, the US can actually support the splitting of nationalist "insurgents" from the jihadi terrorists.

The logic of reducing violence seems quite evident as only when security is reestablished can basic services be restored, international engagement resumed and civil society reenergized. The USG might then even better shovel $billions into critical non-military support (Khalilzad's piloting a PRT model might be nod to such a notion.)

Said's prescription to prevent civil war and ethnic cleansing by reducing violence doesn't seem "preposterous", and I can't imagine anyone living or working in Iraq would find it so.

Said also importantly underscores the need to use the existing opportunity to amend the Iraqi constitution to allow greater buy-in to the "social contract" now being hammered out. Iraqis of all stripes must be encouraged to freely and openly debate relations between the three states, the role of religion, the future status of US forces, etc.

The debate over ending violence in Iraq should not be a partisan one. No one gains from death and destruction in Iraq (oh yeah, except al Qaeda, Big Oil, defense contractors, fake journalists, lobbyists, and other vermin).

Was that too snarky?

[Christiane]

J Thomas just made a good analysis of the US situation in Iraq:
Back before the USSR first collapsed they said that we were the strongest nation in the world because we had three different legs to stand on. We had one of the strongest economies, and we had a whole lot of diplomatic respect, others would follow where we led. And we had a very strong military. But now of those the only one that's left is the strong military."
He then concluded : "Since it's all we've got we need to make the most of it, and that means we can't afford for the rest of the world to see us getting anything but victories."

But isn't that exactly what the US did while invading Iraq in Aprile 2003 ? Isn't there any lesson to learn from the actual deteriorating situation in Iraq ? the invasion has shown blunt US military power in action and the US got a fast first win, occupying Baghdad after only a few weeks of fight. But where is the US invader after two years and a half ? In a quagmire. Because you can't win by mere military power against guerilla. You can only win with diplomacy and politic. The biggest of empires is nothing without allies, without friends supporting him. That's the harsch lesson the US will now have to learn.

I'm speachless when hearing the call for ignoring all the rules of war internationally admitted and all the humanitarian laws protecting the civilians.. You are right to make a comparison with the nazists of WWII, because that's were these theories of crude fullscale military power lead.

[Jeff younger]

Christiane wrote, "I'm speachless when hearing the call for ignoring all the rules of war internationally admitted and all the humanitarian laws protecting the civilians.. You are right to make a comparison with the nazists of WWII, because that's were these theories of crude fullscale military power lead."

Who is calling for "ignoring all the rules of war?" I’m generally well informed, but I’ve never these calls except from our Islamist enemies and their supporters.

Most NAZI analogies are simply inept, inaccurate…really, just stupid. The one’s posted above, including yours, are surely subject to Godwin’s Law.

[bob mcmanus]

"Who is calling for "ignoring all the rules of war?" I’m generally well informed, but.." ...jeff younger

"Let the insurgents see that for every IED we'll kill 50 civilians, hell make it 100 civilians, and in a very few years they'll give up. Go into the nearest sunni town and kill 80 military-age men and 10 grandmothers and 10 little girls, let the insurgents see they can't protect their own people at all, and after maybe 2 years they'll surrender. Particularly since they depend on us to bring them their food. The bulk of their food comes in from the southern ports, through shia land. We don't *have* to let them deliver any of that to sunnis. We're just doing it because we're nice guys. Anyway, if it's too much trouble for us to go to the nearest sunni town and pick out who to do reprisals against, we could just drop bombs on them. It's more expensive but it's easier on our soldiers' mental health." ...jeff younger

Hague & Geneva Conventions are online, I would suggest you visit them, but I really needn't bother

[Jeff younger]

Uh Bob, I never wrote that second quote, and I am quite well versed in both of the treaties you mention.

As a matter of honesty, do please retract your incorrect attribution.

The quote you cite was actually written by J Thomas whose meaning was clearly ironic.

[bob mcmanus]

My apologies to jeff younger. I did indeed misattribute the quote.

The irony of j thomas is very far from clear in his comment.