Iraq: Bush Begging for Benchmarks
Posted by Suzanne Nossel
I am returning to an idea of a few weeks ago, because President Bush has asked for it. Instead of benchmarks for withdrawal from Iraq, we should adopt benchmarks for staying in. We need regular measurements to assess if the Bush Administration's strategy, announced this week, is working. In its bullet-pointed “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq” the Administration invited benchmarking, telling the public that:
Consider a private corporation. Right now, most Americans would consider the Iraq war a failed business venture, losing more than its gaining. In a corporation, management of a failing venture might get a chance to turn it around, but would be watched closely on whether their turnaround plan is paying off.
Now, Robert McNamara got into trouble thinking that the management principles he learned at Ford Motor Company would win the Vietnam War. But here are a few quantitative measures we ought to track to see whether Bush’s strategy is working. I’ve included only measures that seem to get reported monthly – if you cannot track the benchmark, its no use. Here at Democracy Arsenal we’ll return to these 9 benchmarks periodically.
But the reports the document links to (see the links here) are a lot to wade through and, in some cases, offer more public affairs-style puffery than hard metrics. Having been urged to audit the Administration, we should take up the offer but choose our own measures of progress.We track numerous indicators to map the progress of our strategy . . . Detailed reports . . . are issued weekly, monthly, and quarterly . . . Americans can read and assess these reports to get a better sense of what is being done in Iraq and the progress being made on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis.
Consider a private corporation. Right now, most Americans would consider the Iraq war a failed business venture, losing more than its gaining. In a corporation, management of a failing venture might get a chance to turn it around, but would be watched closely on whether their turnaround plan is paying off.
Now, Robert McNamara got into trouble thinking that the management principles he learned at Ford Motor Company would win the Vietnam War. But here are a few quantitative measures we ought to track to see whether Bush’s strategy is working. I’ve included only measures that seem to get reported monthly – if you cannot track the benchmark, its no use. Here at Democracy Arsenal we’ll return to these 9 benchmarks periodically.
Numbers of Insurgents: A key element of Bush’s strategy is winning over the insurgents it can, and eliminating the rest. According to Brookings’ Iraq Index the # of insurgents in Iraq, there are 20,000 right now. The Administration's success should be measured on whether this number declines.
Iraqi Civilian Deaths – While you could argue that military casualties may signify intensification of a successful fight against insurgents, its hard to see how sustained levels of civilian casualties don’t belie the contention that Iraq ’s becoming more secure. Brookings tracks that here.
Multiple Fatality Bombings – These seem to be the main objective of the insurgents, in that they garner media attention. If Iraq is getting more secure, the number should decline. Brookings tracks on p. 11 here.
Number of daily attacks by insurgents – Another measure of the vitality of the insurgency, tracked on p. 21.
Number of Iraqi battalions in Stage I or Stage II readiness – According to Brookings on p. 24 the number in October was 32,000. This needs to move up and quickly if the Administration is to be judged as meeting its objective of building up the Iraqi Security Forces.
Fuel Supplies – Brookings reports (p. 26) that fuel supplies in Iraq have hovered between 85-90% of goal this fall, with the numbers higher (97% last summer). Getting this number up is one measure of Iraq’s progress on the road to economic self-sufficiency.
Electrical Supply – According to Brookings (p. 28), Iraq ’s electrical supply has been hovering at around 75% of the US ’s stated goal. Since the Administration identified meeting infrastructure needs to support economic growth as a key pillar of its strategy, progress here should be one measure of success.
Aid disbursed – In recent months, the Administration has only been able to disburse roughly 60-70% of obligated economic aid funds for Iraq (p. 30). Given the level of short-term priority the Administration places on improving Iraqi welfare and building infrastructure, this % should rise.
Iraqi Opinion – The International Republican Institute has a tracking poll on whether Iraqis think their country is moving in the right direction. In October 49% said yes, 36% no, with the trend improving. Given the Administration’s goal of building “a broadly supported national compact” it will need this trend to continue to go in its direction.
While numerical benchmarks alone should never determine US strategy, let’s focus on these for at least a couple of months running and see if it doesn’t help settle whether we stay or go.
Iraqi Civilian Deaths – While you could argue that military casualties may signify intensification of a successful fight against insurgents, its hard to see how sustained levels of civilian casualties don’t belie the contention that Iraq ’s becoming more secure. Brookings tracks that here.
Multiple Fatality Bombings – These seem to be the main objective of the insurgents, in that they garner media attention. If Iraq is getting more secure, the number should decline. Brookings tracks on p. 11 here.
Number of daily attacks by insurgents – Another measure of the vitality of the insurgency, tracked on p. 21.
Number of Iraqi battalions in Stage I or Stage II readiness – According to Brookings on p. 24 the number in October was 32,000. This needs to move up and quickly if the Administration is to be judged as meeting its objective of building up the Iraqi Security Forces.
Fuel Supplies – Brookings reports (p. 26) that fuel supplies in Iraq have hovered between 85-90% of goal this fall, with the numbers higher (97% last summer). Getting this number up is one measure of Iraq’s progress on the road to economic self-sufficiency.
Electrical Supply – According to Brookings (p. 28), Iraq ’s electrical supply has been hovering at around 75% of the US ’s stated goal. Since the Administration identified meeting infrastructure needs to support economic growth as a key pillar of its strategy, progress here should be one measure of success.
Aid disbursed – In recent months, the Administration has only been able to disburse roughly 60-70% of obligated economic aid funds for Iraq (p. 30). Given the level of short-term priority the Administration places on improving Iraqi welfare and building infrastructure, this % should rise.
Iraqi Opinion – The International Republican Institute has a tracking poll on whether Iraqis think their country is moving in the right direction. In October 49% said yes, 36% no, with the trend improving. Given the Administration’s goal of building “a broadly supported national compact” it will need this trend to continue to go in its direction.
While numerical benchmarks alone should never determine US strategy, let’s focus on these for at least a couple of months running and see if it doesn’t help settle whether we stay or go.
Somehow, the notion of getting on top of the Iraq situation by injecting more bureaucratic thinking rubs me the wrong way.
A war is not a business enterprise. Corporations have a bottom line - profit and loss - which establishes a precisely quantifiable metric against which all other aspects of the operation can be measured. Corporations also run on paper, spreadsheets, targets etc. Every aspect of the operation provides piles of intelligence about the quantifiable.
While the armed forces themselves obviously manage their own bureaucracies, and have their own forms and benchmarks and spreadsheets, the complexities of our national interest, and the interests of a whole region cannot be summed up in a few neat metrics. And there is nothing corresponding to a bottom line. Many of the most pressing issues are not easily quantifiable, and even for those that are, accurate intelligence is not readily available. I would point out that even at this late date, there is trememdous confusion about exactly whom we are fighting in Iraq, and about what those we fighting are trying to accomplish.
What the Iraq war needs is an injection of clear-eyed and comprehensive vison, and worldly practical wisdom and experience - not better bean-counting. The benchmarks you mentioned may form a piece of the puzzle, but they don't take us very far in understanding what needs to be done.
Posted by: Dan Kervick | December 04, 2005 at 11:37 PM
I still am not comfortable with the default action being withdrawal. Personally, I believe that a set of benchmarks structured around our existing presence (accomplish X Y and Z and we will leave) is a much better idea, since it both implies we are committed and yet it also shows why we are there. I think that's the prime thing that Americans don't understand about Iraq: Why are we there, and what are we there to accomplish? If there is no clear goal or no clear hope of accomplishing our goal, then we should not be there.
Posted by: perianwyr | December 05, 2005 at 09:34 AM
I like the idea behind Ms. Nossel's metrics. It is valuable to sift through the various reports and distill a trend. However, there seems to be an excessive focus on what happens inside Iraq.
The rationale to go to war in Iraq dealt with global terrorism and their ability to get WMD. None of Ms. Nossel’s metrics attempt to measure progress at the Grand Strategy level of national policy. I’d like to see them added.
Posted by: Jeff younger | December 05, 2005 at 06:59 PM
Um...
"Number of Iraqi battalions in Stage I or Stage II readiness – According to Brookings on p. 24 the number in October was 32,000. This needs to move up and quickly if the Administration is to be judged as meeting its objective of building up the Iraqi Security Forces."
32 thousand battalions? Or 32 thousand people? There's a massive difference.:-)
Posted by: John Penta | December 06, 2005 at 04:26 PM
Thank you for your sharing! I like i very much!
Posted by: cheap coach handbags | January 26, 2010 at 08:29 PM
thanks for sharing Sohbet many people are pay more attention to one's wearing than before, especially a watch. Chat .
Perhaps when you went to some place far away Chat you must borrow it from friends Sohbet you can get everything you want in this game
Chat money to invest in other industry which will return you good profit. Sohbet when you look at the surface of the watches
Egitim from the city you live in and thought you knew nobody there exsohbet
Posted by: chat | December 17, 2010 at 01:53 PM
wow, this Bostancı Halı Yıkama is the first time that I've heard your actual Acıbadem Halı Yıkama due date - June 2nd is my birthday! Halı Yıkama Türkiye It's a good Kadıköy Halı Yıkama birthday - summer birthday parties, Erenköy Halı Yıkama halfway til Ataşehir Halı Yıkama christmas (so new toys every 6 months), and being a gemini is fun! The only downside is being Çamlıca Halı Yıkama younger Acıbadem Halı Yıkama than most of the other kids in your grade (longer wait to get a Üsküdar Halı Yıkama driver's license, legally get into bars, etc). I hope your baby ends up sharing Bostancı Temizlik a birthday with me!
Posted by: Yuri | January 18, 2011 at 03:06 AM
Some women in order to save time, use the same on different occasions are only the package
Posted by: Burberry canada | March 11, 2011 at 09:30 PM